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Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to the understanding of households’ saving behavior.
Savings and savings behavior was subject to large and comprehensive research, see Deaton (1992),
Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Attanasio (1999), and still, the complexity of households’ savings
behavior is not completely understood. This is astonishing since the allocation of available income
on spending and saving is one of the most important economic decisions made by a household. The
intertemporal aspect of saving is fundamental for the understanding of how a household plans for the
long term. Saving behavior encompasses not only the sober economic thinking of perfectly informed
planners but also (often only seemingly) unstructured reactions deeply rooted in human psychology and
socio-cultural norms. Actual behavior may deviate (e.g. Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Laibson (1997),
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)) from the models economists are used to work with (e.g. Kotlikoff
(1989); Hurd (1990); Jappelli and Modigliani (1998)). To understand saving, it therefore helps to be
open for economic as well as psychological and sociological explanations.
Germany, in particular, is an interesting country to study saving, especially among older house-
holds. Even though the pension and health insurance system in Germany is one of the most generous
systems in the world, private savings are high until old age. Bo¨rsch-Supan et al . (2001) refer to that
phenomenon as the “German savings puzzle”.
Until recently, there has been a lack of data that records detailed information on savings in Germany
in conjunction with sociological and psychological characteristics. The German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) only records rough indicators such as “Did you spend all of your income last year or was
there anything left over?” and “Do you have a savings book?”, etc. but does not cover the quantitative
composition and any changes in the amount of wealth. The situation is similar for the ‘Soll und Haben’
(Debit and Credit) survey. While this contains very detailed data on the composition of various forms
of investment it does not quantify these in greater detail.
The income and expenditure survey (EVS ) conducted every five years by the Federal Statistical
Office with its detailed information on the amount and composition of income, expenditure and wealth
is the main source of data on the savings behavior of households in Germany. Unfortunately, several
variables that are important for savings behavior are now missing. More importantly, extensive socio-
logical or psychological factors are completely absent in the income and consumption surveys, because
these very expensive surveys are primarily intended for the work of the Federal Statistical Office.
Weaknesses of existing data material can only be rectified by new surveys. It is important to
record variables which can also describe psychologically determined behavioral phenomena for a better
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understanding of actual savings behavior. This insight in the need for new data material was the
motivation to create an additional data base for the analysis of savings behavior.
In 2001, the first wave of the SAVE survey was conducted. It was initiated and is administered
by members of the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA). Considering
the experiences of researchers and external experts with other surveys, a questionnaire was designed
approaching the subject of savings from different angles, taking into consideration economical and
sociological as well as psychological perspectives. The main financial support for this survey stems
form the German Science Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)). So far, data from
three years and five different subsamples are available. The next wave will be guided in 2005.
This dissertation is based on the SAVE survey. Since SAVE has in many respects an experimental
nature, methodological aspects are an integral part of SAVE. These will be analyzed and discussed in
this work before discussing substantial questions on savings and savings behavior.
Structure of this work
I summarize the seven chapters concisely at this point. Every chapter, though, has a more thorough
separate introduction highlighting the research interest and methodology.
Chapter 2 presents a basic methodological review of the SAVE dataset. It explains the general
construction of the questionnaire and the sampling schemes, and it shows descriptive findings of
similarities and differences between the four different SAVE subsamples available until spring 2004.
Furthermore, the representativeness of the data is discussed. It also investigates whether weights
constructions can help to eliminate potential differences if they were significant between subsamples
and between representative population values.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Joachim Winter. We analyze nonresponse to questions on financial
items such as income and asset holdings in household surveys using data from a controlled field
experiment. As part of SAVE, questions on household income and financial assets were administered
using different modes (personal interview vs. drop-off questionnaire). The data also allow to investigate
the influence of interviewer characteristics on nonresponse. Our results are in line with predictions
derived from models of survey response behavior that have been developed in survey research and
social psychology.
In Chapter 4, I discuss first panel results for saving behavior, the effect of changes between 2001
and 2003 for pension information level and pension expectations, and present results for risk variables
and their effect on financial behavior.
The literature on precautionary saving gives very contrary results for the importance and size of
precautionary saving. The SAVE data offer the possibility to generate some of the frequently used
instruments for the precautionary motive known from the literature. Chapter 5 compares the influence
of these instruments on long-run and short-run saving measures. Additionally, the SAVE questionnaire
contains information on saving motives. I compare the explanatory power of these saving motives to
other subjective instruments.
General purpose surveys typically refrain from using an exhaustive list of consumption items since
the trade-off between gaining more precise data on consumption and losing a lot of both, interview
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time and respondent effort, generally forbids this procedure. An alternative is to ask respondents a
non-exhaustive list of sub-items and use those to impute total expenditures by the use of an external
data source. Beginning with the 2003 wave, the SAVE questionnaire was enriched by a short section
of expenditure questions in a way enabling this imputation method. This is done in Chapter 6.
The results from Chapter 6 are preparatory for the discussion of savings measures in Chapter
7. In SAVE, savings are measured using a one-shot question for total annual savings. This recall
question might cause significant problems concerning the precise measure for actual savings. Unlike
expenditures, savings is a far more complicated concept which most respondents might not be fully
aware of. This chapter shows potential flaws of this kind of questioning as well as potential remedies
to squeeze the most of reliable measures given the information at hand.
The demographic change presents major financing problems for the pay-as-you-go pension system.
For this reason, the 2001 pension reform entailed a reduction in the level of statutory pensions and
created a significantly strengthened framework for the funded second and third pillars of old-age
pension provision. The population at large is only dimly aware of the gap in provision created by the
2001 pension reform and the introduction in 2003 of the sustainability factor. Chapter 8, which is
joint work with Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan, examines the extent to which households are in a position to close
this gap with their personal assets without changing their savings and asset accumulation behavior.
Four critical factors are relevant to this issue. 1. Anticipated life expectancy: In the 2001 and 2003
SAVE samples, only qualitative information was surveyed. To calculate the specific subjective life
expectancy, the SAVE 2004 sample was modified to raise this information. 2. The level of personal
assets on retirement, 3. the age of retirement itself, and 4. anticipated interest rates. The results
show that, unless they were to change their savings behavior, more than half of households would not
be able to bridge the pension gap from their future financial assets. The results for that analysis shed
light on two points. First, households, even though having a good idea of the average unconditional1
life expectancy, systematically underestimate their own, even relative to the time-specific life tables
which do not include probable medical progress for each cohort, and even more, if compared to actual
research results on demographics. Second, one third of the households will not be able, if continuing
their financial behavior, to fill the pension gap. The situation becomes even more unfavorable when
assuming more realistic individual life expectancies.
1 I.e., the life expectancy of newborns.
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Chapter 2
Methodological aspects of the SAVE data set
2.1 Introduction
Savings and savings behavior is still not fully understood. In fact, it is partially even hard to tell what
economic agents have in mind when thinking about savings. The introduction of this dissertation
listed some of the many contributions to this topic. The recent research development suggests to
enlarge the economist’s view to other research fields, especially to psychology and sociology.
Additionally, the data situation for the savings analysis is limited in Germany. Weaknesses of
existing data material can only be rectified by new surveys. It is important to record variables which
can also describe psychologically determined behavioral phenomena for a better understanding of
actual savings behavior. Taking as a basis the examples of the Dutch CentER Panels, the US Health
and Retirement Surveys, and the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), the
Mannheim Research Institute on the Economics of Aging (MEA) has cooperated with the Mannheim
Center for Surveys, Methods and Analyses (ZUMA), NFO Infratest (Munich), and Psychonomics
(Cologne) to produce a questionnaire consisting of six sections. The questionnaire has been designed
in such a way that the interview should not exceed 45 minutes. It is downloadable in English and
German as PDF-file.2
Surveys are an important source of data for the empirical analysis of household behavior. Unfortu-
nately, data problems such as unit nonresponse (sample selection), item nonresponse, and measurement
error are the rule rather than the exception in survey data. Well-designed studies using household
survey data carefully proceed to detect outliers, to impute missing values, and to correct for selection
caused by missing observations.
The SAVE panel attempts to collect a large set of variables shedding light on many household
characteristics. The SAVE data were collected in 2001 and 2003. In the year 2001, one of the
tense aspects of the survey was to check whether a major survey can be established in Germany which
directly asks so called ‘hard’ financial, and, therefore, most private questions. The 2001 wave consisted
of two parts. The first one was a computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI) quota sample which
was itself divided into four different interview modes. For an analysis of potential interview mode
effects, see Chapter 3. The second part was a paper & pencil (P&P) interview which drew households
from a standing German access panel. In 2003, the survey again consisted of two parts. The first one
2 Visit www.mea.uni-mannheim.de, select the language, go to ‘research/Forschung’, ‘household savings behavior /
Sparverhalten der Haushalte’, then ‘SAVE-Project’, where you can find the questionnaire.
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assembled the recontacted households from the 2001 CAPI samples, while the second one was a new
‘refreshment’ sample constructed as a random (‘Random Route’) sample.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 I briefly review the general design of the SAVE
survey and the sampling differences between the four embedded subsamples. In Section 2.3, I discuss
problems and opportunities of the sampling design considering the income question as an example.
Section 2.4 discusses the representativeness of the data; probit regressions with nonresponse dummies
for income and two key assets as dependent variables show potential subsample differences. Section
2.4 also shows the weights constructions to rectify potential deviations of representative population
values. Section 2.5 summarizes the results and discusses implications for the use of the SAVE data
material in estimation procedures.
2.2 SAVE
This section describes the general design of the SAVE survey: the design of the questionnaire, inter-
viewer and interviewee motivation, and sampling differences between the two subsamples conducted
in 2001 (Section 2.2.2) and 2003 (Section 2.2.3). Contributions in Gabler et al . (1997) discuss different
sampling procedures and their experiences for German data.
2.2.1 General design of the SAVE survey
The SAVE survey seeks to achieve several goals. The most important one is to shed more light
on households’ saving behavior. This substantive goal can certainly only be accomplished if severe
threats to the data validity are excluded or reduced as far as possible.3 Research perspectives from
six different groups are worth to be taken into account when designing surveys and evaluating survey
data: statisticians, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and economists.
Groves (1989) classifies three major languages of error which are applied to survey data, associated
with three different disciplines: (i) statistics (mostly, sampling theory) (ii) psychology (psychometric
test and measurement theory) and (iii) economics (mostly, econometrics). The other three disciplines
mentioned above employ in Grove’s view similar languages to these three. Andersen et al . (1979)
depict a conceptual structure of error sources in surveys, accumulating in the total mean square er-
ror. Variance and bias, the two components of the mean square error criterion, are split up into
errors of nonobservation and observational errors. Errors of nonobservations are due to three sources,
coverage, nonresponse (if not located or refusals), and sampling error (depending on the subset of
the population). Observational errors can be due to interviewer errors (wrong [manipulative or ig-
norable] guidance through the interview process), instrument errors (stemming from the wording of
the question, a large field in social psychology; see, e.g., Schwarz (1999)), respondent errors (arising
from different cognitive abilities or motivation to answer questions), and the mode of data collection
(different effects of CAPI vs. P&P or CATI interview modes).
3 Statistical and econometric models, e.g., try to minimize sampling errors, but are generally not tailored for nonsam-
pling errors
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In addition to the potential errors leading to errors in survey data, it is possible that errors would be
made after receiving answers from the respondent: interviewers could enter wrong values, variables can
be wrongfully matched to respondents, skip patterns might be erroneous; in general, other procedures
proceeding and following the data collection phase.
Apart from these more or less ‘trivial’ technical errors, the questionnaire might be designed in a
way not suited or incomplete for the topic of interest. For example, if one is interested in studying
saving behavior, wealth variables are a necessary list of variables which are even theoretically hard to
assess and disentangle.
The Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA) has cooperated with the
Mannheim Center for Surveys, Methods and Analyses (ZUMA), TNS Infratest (Munich), Psycho-
nomics (Cologne) and members of the Sonderforschungsbereich 504 at the University of Mannheim
to design a questionnaire which reduces the extend of instrument and respondent errors. In addition,
experiences with other surveys, especially with the HRS and the Bank of Italy Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW ) data sets inspired certain wordings of questions and their associated
answering scale.
The task to reduce interviewer errors was undergone by the survey agency, TNS Infratest, by
intensive interviewer training and motivation for the subject.4
To check the influence of interview modes on nonobservations (unit and item nonresponse) and
on respondent errors, the first SAVE wave additionally included an experimental component. The
CAPI part was divided into four subsamples, differing in interview mode and questionnaire design in
the central part, see below. Dillman (2000) discusses extensively issues on questionnaire construction,
survey implementation and mixed-mode surveys. Many issues implemented in the SAVE design are
discussed in that survey.
So far, the arguments for data quality and error minimization neglected a non-trivial component:
survey costs.5 Surveys are very expensive; and some interview modes are much more expensive than
others, e.g., CAPI interviews are more expensive than CATI6 or P&P interviews. Obviously, there
are trade-offs between the modes’ results; if not, the cheapest interview mode would be the only one
available at the market. The question is whether survey results justify the cost differences. Given
budget constraints, the first SAVE wave included P&P interviews from a standing access panel. This
opens the opportunity to check for which variables these much cheaper data work and where they
don’t.
The questionnaire has been designed in such a way that the interview should not exceed 45 minutes.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the SAVE questionnaire.
The survey’s sensitive topic requires careful convincing by the interviewer. A letter which was
handed to the interviewees explaining the scientific and political concern about the topic was thought
to raise the willingness for participation, see also Dillman (2000).
4 For the Survey on Health, Retirement and Ageing in Europe (SHARE), the principals of the survey personally
encountered the interviewers in addition to the survey agency’s effort to motivate the topic’s importance.
5 Ignoring legal problems (e.g., holding a gun to uncooperative respondents’ heads).
6 Computer-assisted telephone interview.
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The brief first section of the questionnaire explains the purpose of the questionnaire and describes
the precautions that have been taken with respect to data protection. This introduction was considered
appropriate because the survey particularly deals with the personal affairs of those surveyed. The
interviewer then asks to speak to a member of the household who knows about household income and
assets. If this person is not at home, the interviewer must make a return visit.
Part 2 lasts about 15 minutes and is the standard initial interview in which questions are asked
about the composition and socio-economic structure of the household, including age, education and
participation in the labor force of the person surveyed and his or her partner.
The interviewer deals with the key issues in Part 3 of the questionnaire. This part contains qual-
itative and simple quantitative questions on saving behavior and how households deal with income
and assets, such as the type of investment selected for one-off injections of cash, the importance of a
series of savings motives, whether there is actually anything left over to save, how regularly savings
are made, etc. Questions are also asked about decision processes and possible rules of thumb7, past
patterns of behavior as well as their parents and attitude to money.
Part 4 is the critical part of the questionnaire because this is where a complete “financial review” is
made of the household. A detailed survey is made of income according to the types of income, changes
in income, the level of assets according to the various kinds of wealth and changes in the types of
wealth over the last year. Apart from financial assets, the questions also cover private and company
pensions, ownership of property and business assets. Questions are also asked about debt. Part 4 is
kept separate from the other parts, see Section 2.2.2.
Part 5 contains questions about psychological and social factors. It includes the social environment,
expectations about income, the economic situation, health, life expectancy and general attitudes to
life.
Part 6, the final part, ends the interview with the standard questions about the interview situation
and leaves both the person surveyed and the interviewer considerable scope for their own comments.
Typically, comments about confidentiality, the length and accuracy of the questionnaire are expected.
Questions are also asked about Internet access and the possibility of conducting a further survey.
The survey’s topic demands careful convincing by the interviewer and, in order to motivate inter-
viewers, by the principal. We did not reward participants by financial incentives,8 even though there
is a huge amount of literature describing possible advantages of monetary incentives, thereby possibly
reducing reducing unit nonresponse. See Brennan et al . (1991), Singer (2002), Porst (1996), and Klein
and Porst (2000) for surveys of incentives.
7 See Baumol and Quandt (1964) for a theoretical foundation on the use rules of thumb under uncertainty and Rodepeter
and Winter (1999) for the use of rules of thumb in life-cycle savings models
8 There were mainly two reasons for not paying incentives. The first is that for CAPI interviews, the amount needed
to raise interview participation is unclear. The cited literature mainly addresses P&P mail surveys. Second, there




The surveys took place in early summer 2001 and 2003. In 2001, the fieldwork for the personal
interviews took place between May 29 and June 26, 2001, whereas the fieldwork for the Access Panel
took place between June 29 and July 24, 2001.
Experimental design of the SAVE 2001 survey
The first four versions were computer aided personal interviews (CAPI); they were carried out by
NFO Infratest, Munich. In contrast, the fifth version was a conventional paper questionnaire (“paper
and pencil”, P&P). The CAPI interviews were carried out using quota samples whereas conventional
P&P questionnaires were given to a so-called Access Panel operated by the company TPI (Test Panel
Institute, Wetzlar).9
The only difference in the four versions of the CAPI interview is in the critical part 4 of the
questionnaire. In versions 1 and 2, all questions were administered by CAPI in the presence of
the interviewer. The difference between these versions is that the questions on asset holdings were
presented using an open-ended format with follow-up brackets (range cards) in version 1 and with
‘forced’ brackets in version 2.10
Because many of these questions relate to intensely personal matters of income and wealth, there
is another modification in versions 3 and 4. In these two versions, part 4 was not part of the personal
CAPI interview, but left as a paper-and-pencil questionnaire by the interviewer (this mode is termed
“P&P drop off” in the sequel). In version 3, the interviewer came back personally to collect the drop-
off questionnaire; in version 4, the questionnaire had to be returned by mail using a pre-paid envelope.
If this was not done within a specified number of days, the respondent was reminded by telephone
several times. This helped increase response rates for the drop-off questionnaire, but nevertheless,
they were significantly lower in version 4 than in version 3 (90.5% vs. 98.0%).
Both the CAPI (quota sample) and the P&P (TPI Access Panel) segments were targeted at house-
holds with head of the household aged between 18 and 69 years. For the CAPI versions, the quota
performance targets were related to the dimension gender (male respondent ratio of 75 percent) and
age (a distribution in age classes under 25, 25-34, 35-50 and 50-70 years) according to the current
official population statistics (and, in particular, the 2000 micro census).
For the TPI interviewees, the quota targets were also based on the 2000 micro census and either
related to the dimensions gender (male respondent ratio of 75 percent) and age (a distribution in age
classes 18-29: 13%; 30-39: 24%; 40-49: 22%; 50-59: 21%; 60-69: 20%), and, additionally, whether the
respondent is a wage earner or a salaried employee, and the size of the household.
Table 2.2 shows the sample sizes for the five survey versions. In total, 1,829 households were
surveyed.
9 In other words, a standing panel of households surveyed at regular intervals.
10 This experimental manipulation of question format is not investigated in the present chapter; this is part of Chapter
3.
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Quota sampled surveys are heavily debated concerning their representativeness and arising statis-
tical problems. King (1983) lists four principal sources of bias possibly induced by quota sampling:
Differences in respondent availability, insufficient control strata, interviewer selection bias and in-
correct information on stratum sizes. Even though these arguments are well known and taken into
account, there are still arguments in favor of quota sampling. A survey of this is kind is new to Ger-
many, and caution with regard to the survey design therefore was a driving force. In a quota sample,
interviewers try to contact easily reachable persons which typically are acquainted households. The
presumption was that unit and item nonresponse would be significantly lower than in random samples.
Or, talking economics, we were seeking output maximization under given budget constraints.11
2.2.3 SAVE 2003
The SAVE 2003 wave consisted of two major samples. The first one consisted of the households
which already participated in the SAVE 2001 CAPI sample. The second one was a newly added
“refreshment”12 random sample. Interview modes for the two subsamples were identical. They were
CAPI interviews except for part 4 (drop-off with mail-back / collection by the interviewer).
Panel CAPI sample
One of the major interests of the SAVE study is to analyze behavioral and financial changes over
time. Therefore, we tried to re-contact the interviewees from the 2001 personal interviews (N=1169)
again in 2003.
The German data protection act prohibits to keep interviewees’ addresses when they denied a
future follow-up corporation. This has to be checked at the end of an interview. While there is
no precise law article, there exists an agreement between the ADM (Arbeitskreis Deutscher Markt-
und Sozialforschungsinstitute e.V., where Infratest is also a member) and the official data protection
agency.13 As a result of the denials in 2001, only 72% (= 840 households) were available as gross
sample in 2003. After different stages of losses (moved away/died, refused, no time, not available) and
rejecting some incomplete interviews, only 483 completed interviews were available.14
The fieldwork for the 2001 CAPI sample in 2003 took place between June 2 and July 18, 2003.
Random Route sample
The most favorable argument for the quota sample in 2001 was the expectedly lower unit and item
nonresponse rates. Since item nonresponse rates were in line with comparable surveys in other coun-
11 As will be shown, item and unit nonresponse rates in the quota samples are below those from the Random Route
sample.
12 The quotation marks indicate that this sample size is actually much larger than the original panel. See section 2.2.3.
13 The agreement itself is sometimes called “Schweinoch”-agreement since Mr. Schweinoch conducted negotiations on
behalf of the official site.
14 Chapter 3 analyzes both the probability of refusals and the probability of interviewing households another time given
that they agreed to in the first place. While in the former case the interview mode in part 4 of the questionnaire
played a significant role (see Section 2.2.2), the latter was also influenced by income (pos. influence) and age.
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tries, and also descriptive statistics compared to other German data sources, the decision was made
that the design of the SAVE 2003 refreshment sample was to be a Random Route sample.
Sample design The data universe for the SAVE 2003 random sample were all German speaking
households in Germany with the households’ head being eighteen years and older. Interviewees were
selected from a multiply stratified multistage random sample. All communities were segmented into
stratifications by regional criteria. Stratification criteria were states (Bundesla¨nder), districts and
community types. For further sampling details, see Heien and Kortmann (2003).
Unit response rates Random Route sampling requires more careful planning than quota sampling.
In contrast to quota sampling schemes where the interviewer is actually in control of sampling the
interviewees as long as they fulfill the quota targets and where no information is available on unit
nonresponse, this information is available for the Random Route sampling.15 The contract with the
field agency Infratest Sozialforschung aimed at a net sample of 2,200 households. It turned out that
a gross sample of 4,772 addresses was needed to get a net sample of 2,184 interviews. The most
important reason for losses was, as expected, refusal (directly indicated or indirectly as “no time”)
which accounted for 36.7% of the losses.
The fieldwork for the Random Route sample began on May 26 and ended on July 14.
2.3 Reported income in the SAVE survey
This section explains problems and opportunities which arise in P&P interviews / interview parts
(part 4 of the SAVE questionniare). In the first part of this section, I will explain how income was
asked in the questionnaire, what problems arose, and how they can be dealt with.
2.3.1 Income questions in SAVE
Income was asked in a three-step process. Interviewees were first given a list of 20 types of income
from which composes monthly household income. Afterwards, an open-ended question for the amount
of monthly net household income followed. In case of nonresponse, a brackets list was presented
including 14 income classes.16 The brackets list was asked as a range card. See, e.g., Juster and Smith
(1997) or Hurd et al . (2003) for more advanced unfolding brackets methods.
2.3.2 Imputation of income values
Table 2.4 shows differences between the different SAVE subsamples. An unintended effect of the
questionnaire design and interview mode will be used to correct for income outliers. As the fifth line
15 There is an ongoing discussion about the required minimum unit response rate in surveys. Numbers between 50%
and 80% were proposed, see Porst (1996) for a review. The assumption that missing values due to unit nonresponse
are missing at random might be misleading. See Little and Rubin (1987).
16 Income brackets range from <500, 500-1000, 1000-1500, 1500-2000, 2000-2500, 2500-3000, 3000-3500, 3500-4000,
4000-4500, 4500-5000, 5000-7500, 7500-10000, 10000-15000 and ≥15000 e.
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in Table 2.4 shows, we observe income values for both the open-ended question as well as for the
range-card follow-up brackets question in 1,263 cases. This results from the fact that respondents
overlooked the filter instructions to skip the follow-up question in case they answered the open-ended
question.17 Further inquiries at the survey agency support the fact that respondents typically have
problems following filtering instructions in a P&P questionnaire, even though these instructions were
very clearly pronounced. If respondents fully understand the questions and the values being addressed,
responses in the open values and in the brackets question should lie in the same brackets class. For
a comparison, Table 2.6 shows the class distances when subtracting actual given classes from class
analog values imputed from the open value question. Household income from those data was imputed
assuming class means.
Table 2.6 shows that about 90% of both given income values lie in the same or in an adjacent
income class (marked as bold). This shows that for an overwhelming majority of responses, income
can be believed as a reliable measure.
Answers for brackets questions18 were used when no answer was given in the previous question. This
was done in 881 cases of SAVE 2001 and 2003. One is tempted to claim that large class differences in
Table 2.6 may be due to a misperception of yearly and monthly income. A different possibility might
be that errors are simple input errors when the P&P data were electronically transferred. We had
this double-checked by the survey agency.
In a second step, we propose the hypothesis that respondents are less likely to mix up monthly with
yearly income because brackets induce a readaptation due to a cognitive process: relatively more lower
income brackets are linking obviously not to yearly but to monthly data.19 The correction procedure
uses the following ideas:
1. If both values available: compare brackets values to open values. If open values between 7 and
17 times the brackets means values: divide open values by 12. This leads to 42 changes.
2. Use panel information: when data differ more than by factor five between two years→ supposedly
yearly income → divide by 12. 13 cases reimputed for the 2003 CAPI sample, 11 for 2001.
These two at least partially hypotheses-driven correction procedures still leave us with 79 observations
where the monthly net household income is still at least 10,000 e. Even though one might be tempted
to divide these remaining large income values by 12, I refrain from this procedure for two reasons.
First, this would completely exclude any ‘true’ measure of high income, which, even though unlikely,
are still possible, even in small samples. Second, this is no hypothesis driven procedure. One might, of
course, look at different indicators implicitly excluding such high values. But which to pick is rather
vague and a matter of ongoing discussions.
17 Table 2.4 also shows that this did happen significantly less frequently for the 2001 TPI subsample. This most probably
stems from the fact that the TPI respondents have some questionnaire experience.
18 Class mean values.
19 See, e.g., Winter (2002a) for an experimental study on bracketing effects in survey questions.
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2.4 Representativeness
This section discusses the quality and representativeness of the SAVE data. Figure 2.1 shows the
number of observations for each subsample, the refusal rate for future interview participation and the
actual loss of observations from the CAPI 2001 subsample to 2003. Panel attrition rates will also
decrease over time, which can be seen from the drop of the CAPI 2001 refusal rate of 28.1% to 12.0%,
since reluctant respondents already disappeared in the second wave.
Household surveys underly two major stages. The first one is the design of the study (random
route, quota sample etc.), while the second one is the field work itself (systematic and idiosyncratic
observation losses). The inclusion probability of a “target person / household” might or might not be
equal to its relative population frequency counterpart. The two mentioned stages might influence and
bias this inclusion probability; resulting data might therefore be “weighted” relative to its population
frequency. So called “weighting procedures”, or, correctly spoken, “unweighting20 procedures”, try to
reduce or, in best case eliminate these effects.21 See also Von der Heyde (1994).
Table 2.13 shows item nonresponse to income, and conditional item nonresponse to savings accounts
and stocks for the four different samples. Like the regression results presented in tables 2.14 - 2.16,
item nonresponse is depending on the sampling method. See the following sections for a discussion.
2.4.1 Subsample differences: Regression results
This section presents estimation results from probit regressions on income and assets (saving accounts
and stocks) with dummies for item nonresponse of each of the three variables as dependent variable
and a set of household (and interviewer) characteristics as well as subsample dummies as independent
variables as dummies to check whether sampling procedures (access panel, quota, random route)
influence response behavior.
Regression results: income
Table 2.14 shows conditional probit estimates for nonresponse for open-ended question of monthly net
household income of the SAVE subsamples (four / three). For better comparability and, in order to
eliminate mode effects, observations for the non-P&P modes for the SAVE 2001 CAPI subsample were
discarted. The second two columns show estimates with interviewer variables, ignoring the SAVE 2001
TPI subsample22. The relative influence of the sample dummies remained nearly completely constant.
Table 2.14 shows that a change from quota samples to a random sample significantly reduces the
willingness to reveal sensitive data (raises nonresponse). Thus, the response rates achieved in 2001
with the quota samples could be attained; this supports the hypothesis from Section 2.2.3 that quota
samples promise higher response rates. But another effect is also astonishing. One might wonder
whether respondents in a quota sample would react to an interviewer change. This is not supported
20 Assuming the total population as being unweighted, a sample not being representative due to different sorts of sample
selection is then weighted in that sense.
21 Indeed, the procedure rather tries to correct presumed survey’s biases.
22 Remember, this was a pure P&P sample
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by the data. Even in a probit regression keeping only households when observed in 2001 and 2003,
a dummy variable for interviewer change is not significant. The problem here is that I ignore23 the
effect that an interviewer change could already have affected unit nonresponse which eliminates the
item nonresponse effect. Interviewees of the quota sample typically are more likely to collaborate with
an interviewer they know and trust. If there was an interviewer change between 2001 and 2003, they
might refuse to participate in the 2003 survey if the known interviewer would be replaced by someone
unknown to them. Thus, the interviewer change might well lead to unit nonresponse, and does not
translate into different item response behavior.
Regression results: assets
Tables 2.15 and 2.16 show regression results from probit estimates of conditional24 item nonresponse
to financial variables on a set of respondent characteristics, interviewer characteristics and dummies25
for each subsample.26 The results show a strong influence of the sampling design on item nonresponse.
Interview ‘professionals’ like the sampled respondents in the TPI sample prove to have the highest
response probability. This result is as expected since they actually have agreed to collaborate with
the survey agency on a regular basis.27 Quota sampled respondents in the 2001 CAPI sample have
the second highest response probability. On the other hand, one result is puzzling: respondents in the
panel sample 2003 seem to be more reluctant to answer to financial questions. Two hypotheses were
tested. First, regressions were run to test for the influence that the willingness to further participation
influences the answering probability in the 2001 CAPI sample. Second, it was tested if there is a
time effect when only including respondents into the regression when observed in both subsamples.28
Interestingly, neither dummy variable controlling for each of the two effects is significant. The dummy
variable for the 2003 random route sample is soundly significant in any specification and has the
expected sign: as hypothesized earlier, respondents in a random route sample typically have lower
response rates.
This brings back the trade-off between costs and errors. Even if item nonresponse is unsystematic,
so that values are missing at random and thus ignorable, a larger net sample is needed to produce the
same amount of responses than the quota sample.
23 Since I cannot control for it.
24 Conditional on the fact that people claimed to own assets of this type (in tables 2.15 and 2.16) but gave no actual
value to the follow-up questions.
25 The basic sample is the 2001 TPI, 1 stands for the CAPI 2001, 2 for the panel 2003, and 3 for the new random route
‘refreshment’ sample.
26 Observations were excluded from the regressions when the interview mode differed in the corresponding part 4, see
Table 2.2. Moreover, the last two columns in tables 2.14 - 2.16 only refer to samples 1-4 since the 2001 TPI sample
was a full P&P interview with no interviewers involved.
27 Still, they have the right to refuse the participation in unpleasant interview topics.
28 While the results are not shown here, they are available by the author on request.
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2.4.2 Weights constructions
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show how representative the SAVE sample is in comparison with the German
micro-census of 2000 and 2002, respectively. The figures in this table compare the proportion of
households in an age and income class with the comparable proportion of the same type of households
in the micro-census. A figure of 1.2 means that the micro-census covers 20% more households of this
type than are present in our random sample. If we take the micro-census as the benchmark, a figure
of less than 1 indicates underrepresented household types, and figures over 1 indicate overrepresented
household types. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 were stratified for each subsample and for two variables: income
/ age and income / household size. The reason for using these two different methods lies in the fact
that on the one hand, it is common to use income and age as classical spanning variables, but on
the other hand, age itself was used as a quota target variable for the SAVE 2001 CAPI subsample.
See Gabler et al . (1994) for a discussion of weighting criteria. Differentiation by more variables
imposes the problem of too small cell sizes. In comparison to the micro-census, the random sample
contains considerably more middle-aged households but fewer older households. This applies to both
sample groups (CAPI variants and Access Panel). Young households are represented approximately
correctly. With regard to income, we can see really pronounced shifts towards richer households. This
is particularly pronounced in the Access Panel: here the micro-census indicates four times as many
households with a monthly net income of less than DM 2,500 / 1,300 Euros than in our sample group
but only half as many households with an income of over DM 5,000 / 2,600 Euros.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the importance of using the variable ‘subsample type’. This weighting
criterion variable was used implicitly by constructing the weight factors separately for each subsample
in each year. While especially the 2003 random sample proves to fit the 2002 German micro-census
data extremely well (especially regarding the age / household size part of Table 2.8 where values
orbit around 1), we see large deviations in the distribution when comparing the 2001 Access Panel
sample to the 2000 micro-census (Table 2.7); the SAVE sample contains considerably more middle-
aged households but fewer older households. This applies to both sample groups (CAPI variants and
Access Panel). Young households are represented approximately correctly. With regard to income, we
can see a really pronounced shift towards richer households. This is particularly salient in the Access
Panel: here the micro-census indicates four times as many households with a monthly net income of
less than DM 2,500 / 1,300 Euros than in our sample group but only half as many households with
an income of over DM 5,000 / 2,600 Euros.
While the following paragraph will show the influence of the weights use on the distribution of
certain key variables, the weights used in the following chapters of this thesis refer to the dimensions
subsample type, age, and income. The reason for not using the the dimension household size instead
of age is a continuity reason, since Bo¨rsch-Supan and Essig (2002) used these weights in the first
examination of the SAVE data.
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2.4.3 Weighting effects
The results of tabes 2.7 and 2.8 demand a further investigation of the influence of weighting procedures
on key variables in the SAVE data set. Therefore, income, savings and wealth will be displayed by
each subsample with and without the usage of weights. Results are presented in tables 2.9 and 2.10.
The use of weights shifts the distributions of all presented measures to the left; theses effects are
translations from the results of tables 2.7 and 2.8: weighing variables have the strongest effect when
distributions of income and age (or income and household size) deviate the most from the German
microcensus.29 The higher means of income in the SAVE 2003 RR sample are due to remaining high
outliers: 52 households (or 2.6%)30 in this subsample claim to earn more than 10,000 e net each
month. Not considering values higher than 15,000 e in this subsample reduces the mean net monthly
household income to about 2,100 e.
Similar effects are observed for the GSOEP 2000 to 2003 (Table 2.11) and the EVS 1998 and
1998 (Table 2.12) income measures: in both surveys, richer households seem to be oversampled in
comparison to the microcensus (Table 2.11).
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter briefly surveys the objective and structure of the questionnaire and the sampling methods
of the 2001 and 2003 SAVE study. Unit and item nonresponse, a measure of acceptance of a survey of
this kind, are absolutely in line with surveys in other countries.31 I also show how representative the
data are in comparison to the German microcensus and other comparable data sources. It proves to
be the case that the SAVE data actually show similar effects as, for example, the GSOEP data. The
sampled persons are slightly richer (or, biased towards middle classed households; the strength of this
bias depends on the sampling criteria for each subsamle). Using sample weights tailored individually
for each subsample, values are obtained that fit the microcensus population means almost perfectly,
exemplified using the income measure. Contributions in Gabler et al . (1994) discuss the use of weights
for different data sources. While weighting might be a probate method for descriptive analysis, it is
unclear whether weights should be used for estimation procedures. There is still ongoing research on
this topic; see Wooldridge (2001b) and Wooldridge (2001a) for a discussion of the use of weights.
Clearly, data quality could be enhanced by more sophisticated survey methodology in future
waves.32 This, on the other hand, comes at the cost of inconsistencies across time. In such cases, one
is tempted to renounce to improved survey methodology to avoid those inconsistencies and simply
freeze survey methodology over time, thereby eliminating any quality enhancement. However, as a
long run strategy, this is clearly a bad idea - robust empirical findings cannot be obtained from poor
29 And this is the reason why the use of weights for the RR 2003 subsample does merely affect the means and medians
of the presented variables.
30 Only about 1.5% in the 2000, 2001 and 2002 GSOEP, and about 0.5% in the 1998 EVS.
31 Compare the figures for unit and item nonresponse for eight European surveys in Alkemade et al . (2003).
32 See, for example, Van Soest and Hurd (2004) for a review.
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data. Juster et al . (2002) develop methods of recovering time series consistency in the face of data
enhancements. These ideas are beyond the scope of this chapter.
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2.A Figures
Figure 2.1: Sample scheme of the SAVE data set
Quota Sample 2001
N=1169
Access Panel (TPI) 2001
N=660
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2.B Tables
Table 2.1: Structure of the SAVE questionnaire
Part 1: Introduction, determining which person will be surveyed in the respective household
Part 2: Basic socio-economical data of the household
Part 3: Qualitative questions concerning saving behavior, income and wealth
Part 4: Budget balance: Quantitative questions concerning income and wealth
Part 5: Psychological and social determinants of saving behavior
Part 6: Conclusion: Interview-situation
Table 2.2: Experimental design of the SAVE 2001 data set
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 Version 5
Sampling scheme Quota Quota Quota Quota Access panel
Mode: Parts 1, 2, 3, 5 CAPI CAPI CAPI CAPI P&P
Mode: Part 4 (sensitive items) CAPI CAPI P&P P&P P&P
(pick-up) (mail-back) (mail-back)
Response rate P&P 98.0% 90.5%
Question format: income open-end open-end open-end open-end open-end
Question format: assets open-end brackets open-end open-end open-end
Number of households 295 304 294 276 660
Source: Essig and Winter (2003), Chapter 3
Table 2.3: Design of the SAVE 2003 data set
Panel sample Refreshment Sample
Sampling scheme Quota Random Route
Mode: Parts 1, 2, 3, 5 CAPI CAPI
Mode: Part 4 (sensitive items) P&P P&P
(pick-up) (mail-back)
Response rate P&P 98.1% 97.0%
Question format: income open-end open-end
Number of households 483 2184
Source: SAVE 2003
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Table 2.4: Income values: single and double measures
2001 TPI 2001 CAPIa 2001 CAPIb 2003 old 2003 new
N 660 599 570 483 2,184
No part D 0 0 32 9 65
Open values 88.2% (582) 88.15% (528) 79.82% (455) 72.88% (352) 65.29% (1426)
Bracket values 23.9% (158) 3.0% (18) 53.86% (307) 63.56% (307) 62% (1354)
Both (open+brackets) 12.9% (85) 0 40.53% (231) 40.79% (197) 34.34% (750)
at least 5’ in open field 3.5% (23) 4.67% (28) 2.11% (12) 7.45% (36) 5.95% (130)
at least 10’ in open field 0 3.33% (20) 0.18% (1) 4.97% (24) 3.53% (77)
Mean (open values) 2520.11 2922.90 2191.53 4264.2 3385.79
Median (open values) 2351.94 2045.17 2045.17 2200 1800
a Only Mode 1 and 2 (full CAPI interview, see section 2.2.2
b Mode 3 and 4 (CAPI with dropoff)
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
Table 2.5: Age distribution in SAVE 2001 and 2003
2001 2003
TPI CAPI CAPI Random Route
Age class N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent
18 - 29 54 8.2 141 12.1 45 9.3 310 14.2
30 - 39 184 27.9 274 23.4 107 22.2 387 17.7
40 - 49 152 23.0 263 22.5 117 24.2 419 19.2
50 - 59 152 23.0 223 19.1 88 18.2 316 14.5
60 - 69 117 17.7 237 20.3 105 21.7 393 18.0
> 69 1 0.2 31 2.7 21 4.4 359 16.4
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
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Table 2.6: Income values class differences
Number of double answers
Class differences 2001 TPI 2001 (only CAPI dropoff) 2003 old 2003 new
-11 2









-1 1 3 12
0 173 137 540
1 68 39 39 148
2 5 1 2 5
3 4 1 2










Total 85 231 197 750
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
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Table 2.7: Representativeness and weights of the SAVE 2001 samples
Low income Medium income High income All income classes
<2500 2500-5000 >=5000
Age CAPI TPI CAPI TPI CAPI TPI CAPI TPI
up to 35 years 1.18 3.43 0.81 0.74 0.58 0.57 0.88 1.06
81 17 116 77 52 32 249 126
from 35 up to 55 years 1.18 3.33 0.77 0.71 0.68 0.44 0.79 0.67
65 14 225 148 201 190 491 352
55 years and older 3.34 6.45 1.12 1.37 0.81 0.69 1.40 1.62
57 18 177 88 100 71 334 177
All age classes 1.79 4.51 0.90 0.90 0.70 0.52
203 49 518 313 353 293
Household size
Single 1.86 8.82 0.69 2.88 0.59 2.47 1.18 5.22
142 18 160 23 28 4 330 45
Two 2.40 2.89 0.60 1.10 0.28 0.52 0.53 0.96
30 15 329 108 314 103 673 226
3 and more 0.87 1.20 5.26 0.53 11.89 0.46 4.44 0.52
32 14 30 179 12 185 74 378
All HH size classes 1.78 4.66 0.90 0.90 0.70 0.51
204 47 519 310 354 292
Source: SAVE 2001 and German micro-census 2000
Table 2.8: Representativeness and weights of the SAVE 2003 samples
Low income Medium income High income All income classes
<1300 1300-2600 >=2600
Age Panel RR new Panel RR new Panel RR new Panel RR new
up to 35 years 1.42 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.86 0.75 1.10 0.89
27 177 38 179 16 81 81 437
from 35 up to 55 years 1.01 0.93 0.74 1.02 0.73 0.91 0.78 0.96
33 158 99 317 91 319 223 794
55 years and older 2.36 1.17 1.16 1.04 0.74 1.10 1.27 1.10
32 283 75 366 51 150 158 799
All age classes 1.60 1.05 0.93 1.01 0.74 0.94
92 618 212 862 158 550
Household size
Single 2.62 1.56 1.12 1.47 1.00 0.99 1.74 1.49
41 302 48 161 9 40 98 503
Two 0.90 0.69 0.86 0.98 0.56 0.83 0.75 0.87
32 184 96 371 79 231 207 786
3 and more 0.57 0.36 0.89 0.81 0.92 1.02 0.87 0.81
19 131 68 330 70 279 157 740
All HH size classes 1.60 1.05 0.93 1.01 0.74 0.94
92 617 212 862 158 550
Source: SAVE 2003 and German micro-census 2002
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Table 2.9: Effect of weights usage: 2001
TPI 2001 CAPI 2001
Weights None Inc./Age Inc./HHSize None Inc./Age Inc./HHSize
Net Income
Mean 2577.34 1962.76 1933.83 2300.81 2060.59 1941.71
Median 2300.81 1789.52 1789.52 2045.17 1738.39 1636.13
Gross savings
Mean 5928.24 5903.74 5086.12 4246.96 3586.98 4163.52
Median 2556.46 2812.11 2556.46 2556.46 2045.17 2045.17
Financial Wealth
Mean 35248.00 25765.22 24293.87 28043.36 22610.99 25842.35
Median 15364.32 8691.96 8078.41 8947.61 5777.60 5112.92
Total Wealth
Mean 159472.10 152342.60 119679.90 125759.70 104399.10 110759.20
Median 92901.73 51020.79 27090.80 26127.02 15717.11 19684.74
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
Notes: When no information on weights construction variables (income/age/household size) was available, weights were
set to 1.
Table 2.10: Effect of weights usage: 2003
Panel 2003 RR 2003
Weights None Inc./Age Inc./HHSize None Inc./Age Inc./HHSize
Net Income
Mean 2397.00 2091.79 2108.63 2732.43 2635.16 2641.33
Median 2100 1800 1800 1800 1750 1750
Gross savings
Mean 5160.68 4745.93 4759.52 4333.62 4267.64 4193.16
Median 3000 2500 2500 2400 2400 2400
Financial Wealth
Mean 29239.61 23393.43 22650.22 21312.56 21062.73 20629.94
Median 7530 4500 3500 2190 2300 2330
Total Wealth
Mean 140537.40 116894.90 109512.60 139554.90 140014.50 133325.50
Median 38198 21990 18928 8600 9000 8000
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
Notes: When no information on weights construction variables (income/age/household size) was available, weights were
set to 1.
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Table 2.11: Income measures: German microcensus and the German Socio-Economic Panel GSOEP
German micro-censusa GSOEP
Not weighted Weighted values
Year Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
2000 1973.04 ./. 2075.99 1891.78 1967.57 1738.39
2001 2015.40 ./. 2127.49 1942.91 2000.77 1789.52
2002 2103.78 ./. 2525.07 2096 2077.30 1800
a Income classes changed from 2001 to 2003. For the lowest class, 400 ewere assumed, for the highest, 7800 e.
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
Table 2.12: Income measures: Income and expenditure survey EVS
Not weighted Weighted values
Year Mean Median Mean Median
1998 2844.30 2510.94 2301.91 1947.56
2003a 2612.29 2450 2120.59 1850.00
a EVS 2003 income values are self-classified measures for January income. Class means were assumed for the imputation.
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
Table 2.13: Item nonresponse: descriptive results
TPI 2001 CAPI 2001a Panel 2003 RR 2003
N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent
Income
Nonresponse 78 11.82 83 15.43 122 25.74 693 32.7
Savings accounts
Ownership 513 78.08 407 76.36 303 65.58 1,153 58.44
Value nonresponse 99 19.3 100 24.57 77 25.41 331 28.71
Stocks
Ownership 304 46.27 147 27.58 105 22.73 304 15.41
Value nonresponse 57 18.75 33 22.45 38 36.19 134 44.08
a Only modes 3 and 4, see table 2.2
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
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Table 2.14: Nonresponse regressions: household net income
Income All samples CAPI only
Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
Age -0.002 0.817 -0.007 0.464
Age squared 0.000 0.555 0.000 0.473
Secondary school (D) 0.179 0.002 0.162 0.019
Graduation diploma (D) 0.068 0.419 0.008 0.942
University degree (D) -0.016 0.831 0.012 0.905
Partner (D) 0.177 0.001 0.200 0.000
East Germany (D) 0.009 0.889 0.073 0.265
Female (D) 0.047 0.389 0.034 0.555
Worker (D) -0.019 0.827 -0.019 0.849
Civil Servant (D) 0.169 0.155 0.136 0.307
Freelancer (D) 0.570 0.002 0.615 0.002
Self-employed (D) 0.233 0.047 0.268 0.037
Part-time working (D) 0.022 0.832 0.013 0.910
Little working (D) 0.118 0.278 0.138 0.239
Not working (D) 0.022 0.813 0.025 0.803
Retired (D) 0.070 0.520 0.071 0.542
Unemployed (D) -0.004 0.971 -0.004 0.971
Small Community (D) 0.004 0.962 0.040 0.650
Version
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D) 0.212 0.028
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D) 0.588 0.000 0.358 0.000
Sample: RR 2003 (D) 0.792 0.000 0.590 0.000
Interviewer
Interviewer changed in 2003 0.100 0.569
Experienced > 4 years (D) -0.023 0.655
Female (D) 0.123 0.017
Older than resp. (D) -0.156 0.027
Higher schooling (D) 0.009 0.913
Lower schooling (D) -0.057 0.460
Constant -1.563 0.000 -1.110 0.000
Number of obs 3684 3066
LR 210.74 126.12
Prob larger chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.05030 0.03440
Log likelihood -1987.9579 -1768.4779
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
Note: Interview versions dropped when part 4 was not P&P
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Table 2.15: Nonresponse regressions: savings accounts
Saving accounts All samples CAPI only
Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
HH income 0.000 0.737 0.000 0.811
HH income squared 0.000 0.992 0.000 0.928
Age 0.012 0.313 0.016 0.203 0.016 0.229
Age squared 0.000 0.542 0.000 0.350 0.000 0.373
Secondary school (D) 0.032 0.669 0.015 0.838 0.048 0.609
Graduation diploma (D) 0.005 0.963 0.009 0.929 0.068 0.630
University degree (D) 0.006 0.949 -0.018 0.855 0.047 0.731
Partner (D) 0.191 0.007 0.206 0.005 0.217 0.006
East Germany (D) -0.162 0.047 -0.149 0.075 -0.137 0.142
Female (D) 0.099 0.156 0.096 0.176 0.125 0.104
Worker (D) -0.057 0.580 -0.060 0.568 -0.100 0.420
Civil Servant (D) -0.074 0.584 -0.074 0.584 0.002 0.988
Freelancer (D) 0.168 0.438 0.209 0.339 -0.030 0.909
Self-employed (D) -0.084 0.578 -0.087 0.577 -0.130 0.464
Part-time working (D) 0.114 0.382 0.124 0.347 -0.007 0.964
Little working (D) -0.106 0.450 -0.123 0.388 -0.170 0.293
Not working (D) -0.058 0.639 -0.033 0.797 -0.023 0.869
Retired (D) -0.108 0.444 -0.143 0.320 -0.150 0.343
Unemployed (D) 0.111 0.510 0.079 0.646 0.072 0.696
Small Community (D) 0.013 0.903 -0.036 0.739 -0.009 0.938
Version
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D) 0.189 0.097 0.176 0.072
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D) 0.210 0.104 0.191 0.080 -0.002 0.986
Sample: RR 2003 (D) 0.310 0.082 0.288 0.001 0.103 0.251
Interviewer
Interviewer changed in 2003 0.051 0.817
Experienced > 4 years (D) -0.062 0.358
Female (D) 0.187 0.006
Older than resp. (D) 0.036 0.681
Higher schooling (D) 0.079 0.342
Lower schooling (D) 0.142 0.166
Constant -1.398 0.000 -1.452 0.000 -1.451 0.000
Number of obs 2320 2284 1802
LR 40.55 40.11 40.39
Prob larger chi2 0.0064 0.0149 0.0611
Pseudo R2 0.0154 0.0157 0.0195
Log likelihood -1298.4317 -1259.9054 -1017.1128
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
Note: Interview versions dropped when part 4 was not P&P
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Table 2.16: Nonresponse regressions: stocks
Stocks All samples CAPI only
Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
HH income 0.000 0.346 -6.81E-05 0.263
HH income squared 0.000 0.121 3.88E-09 0.156
Age -0.001 0.971 0.002 0.942 0.005 0.860
Age squared 0.000 0.876 0.000 0.972 0.000 0.983
Secondary school (D) -0.019 0.885 -0.027 0.843 0.253 0.172
Graduation diploma (D) -0.008 0.961 -0.014 0.934 0.160 0.515
University degree (D) -0.136 0.360 -0.158 0.317 0.254 0.301
Partner (D) 0.070 0.579 0.103 0.448 0.107 0.491
East Germany (D) 0.147 0.271 0.158 0.254 0.139 0.415
Female (D) 0.153 0.193 0.179 0.133 0.122 0.389
Worker (D) -0.100 0.590 -0.088 0.636 -0.083 0.735
Civil Servant (D) -0.043 0.818 -0.004 0.984 0.129 0.570
Freelancer (D) 0.163 0.543 0.020 0.945 -0.032 0.929
Self-employed (D) -0.145 0.452 -0.130 0.510 -0.343 0.170
Part-time working (D) 0.161 0.412 0.152 0.444 0.254 0.280
Little working (D) 0.262 0.264 0.282 0.232 0.157 0.612
Not working (D) 0.282 0.154 0.260 0.196 0.279 0.253
Retired (D) -0.548 0.019 -0.560 0.018 -0.687 0.016
Unemployed (D) -0.349 0.221 -0.344 0.229 -0.378 0.252
Small Community (D) -0.072 0.682 -0.046 0.793 -0.033 0.873
Version
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D) 0.151 0.317 0.143 0.347
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D) 0.586 0.000 0.541 0.002 0.425 0.040
Sample: RR 2003 (D) 0.722 0.000 0.662 0.000 0.509 0.004
Interviewer
Interviewer changed in 2003 -0.161 0.681
Experienced > 4 years (D) 0.120 0.332
Female (D) 0.177 0.148
Older than resp. (D) 0.105 0.502
Higher schooling (D) 0.210 0.190
Lower schooling (D) -0.090 0.573
Constant -1.013 0.089 -0.987 0.104 -1.326 0.079
Number of obs 840 828 538
LR 71.97 78.2 52.15
Prob larger chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0037
Pseudo R2 0.0700 0.0778 0.0743
Log likelihood -477.98488 -463.78174 -325.07301
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
Note: Interview versions dropped when part 4 was not P&P
Chapter 3
Item nonresponse to financial questions in household surveys:
An experimental study of interviewer and mode effects∗
3.1 Introduction
Surveys are an important source of data for the empirical analysis of household behavior. Unfortu-
nately, data problems such as unit nonresponse (sample selection), item nonresponse, and measurement
error are the rule rather than the exception in survey data. Well-designed studies using household
survey data are careful to detect outliers, to impute missing values, and to correct for selection caused
by missing observations.
Economists and econometricians have traditionally addressed such data problems using ex post
approaches such as various imputation schemes or sample selection models. These methods have
reached a high level of sophistication, as summarized for instance in the monograph by Wansbeek and
Meijer (2000) and in the chapter on “Measurement error in survey data” by Bound et al . (2001) in the
most recent volume of the Handbook of Econometrics. An important drawback of such approaches is
that they either require imposing untestable assumptions about the data generating process to ensure
point identification of parameters of interest or allow only for much weaker conclusions if weaker
assumptions are imposed; see Horowitz and Manski (1995, 1998) for an extensive discussion.
Complementary to correcting data problems ex post , researchers have recently increased their efforts
to improve survey administration and the design of survey questionnaires so that problems such as
item nonresponse can be avoided or at least mitigated ex ante. In particular, economists who design
survey questions are beginning to use knowledge about the sources of data problems that has been
accumulated in other disciplines. For instance, Bound et al . (2001) devote a section of their handbook
chapter to results from survey research and social psychology that apply to the measurement of
quantities that are of economic interest. However, this approach has not been widely used yet. In this
Chapter, we show how economists can use knowledge about survey response behavior accumulated in
psychology and survey research not only in their analysis of existing data, but also in the design of
future household surveys.
We concentrate on a specific aspect of response behavior that is of interest in the empirical analysis
households’ saving and asset allocation decisions: item nonresponse to questions on financial items
in household surveys.33 Nonresponse in household surveys has been analyzed by various authors,
∗ This chapter is joint work with Joachim Winter.
33 In the remainder of this chapter, the term “nonresponse” refers to item nonresponse. We do not address issue of unit
nonresponse.
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beginning with the work by Ferber (1966); see Schnell (1997) and Beatty and Herrmann (2002)
for reviews.34 However, empirical evidence on response behavior in surveys that focus on financial
variables such as income, saving, and asset choice, is still sparse. Recent examples for Germany are
Biewen (2001), Riphahn and Serfling (2002), and Schra¨pler (2003) who work with data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); Nicoletti and Peracchi (2001) investigate nonresponse in
the European Household Panel (EHCP). In contrast to these papers, we use data from a controlled
experiment that was conducted as part of a representative household survey specifically to analyze
the effects of interview mode and question format.
As part of the SAVE study, questions on household net income and on six key financial assets were
administered using different modes (computer-assisted personal interview vs. self-administered drop-
off questionnaire) that were assigned randomly to sample households. We show that nonresponse rates
to these sensitive questions are lower in the drop-off questionnaires than in the personal interviews.
These results are in line with predictions from models of survey response behavior developed in social
psychology that stress, inter alia, the role of privacy in answering sensitive questions. Our analysis
also confirms earlier findings on the influence of characteristics of the interviewer on response rates in
personal interviews.
The plan of the Chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2 we briefly review models of survey response
behavior from social psychology that motivate our analysis. The design of the 2001 SAVE survey and
the embedded experiments on mode effects are described in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we present
our results, primarily a series of probit regressions with nonresponse dummies for income and six key
assets as dependent variables. Section 3.5 summarizes our results and discusses implications for the
design of survey questions on financial variables.
3.2 Item nonresponse in household surveys
Why should survey mode and question format influence responses? If respondents are perfectly certain
about the quantity in question, they should be able to give the correct answer. However, respondents
are rarely certain about quantities they are asked to report in household surveys. Therefore, the
formation of answers to survey questions is a complicated process. As a starting point for thinking
about item nonresponse and other data problems ex ante, or to correct for resulting bias in survey
data ex post , it is useful to review existing research by psychologists and survey methodologists in
some detail.
Since the early 1980’s, psychologists and survey methodologists have worked together, trying to
understand the cognitive and communicative processes that govern survey response behavior. One
of the first systematic attempts to analyze survey response behavior as an interaction between the
interviewer and the respondent, and to uncover the cognitive processes involved in answering survey
questions, is Tourangeau (1984). There is now an extensive literature in survey research on cognitive
processes that generate survey responses and on pitfalls that should be avoided in survey design; Sud-
man et al . (1996) and Tourangeau et al . (2000) provide overviews of the literature on survey response
34 The edited volumes by Groves and Couper (1998) and Groves et al . (2002) are devoted entirely to survey nonresponse.
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behavior and question design in cognitive and social psychology. Cognitive issues in households’ re-
ports of financial variables, in particular with respect to reports of household income, are discussed
by Moore et al . (1999).
An important insight from survey research is that the process of forming the response to a survey
question consists of several steps, each of which might contribute to the fact that answers often do
not provide reliable measures of the quantity in question. Survey respondents first have to understand
the question and determine which quantity they are to report on. To do so, they draw on a wide
range of contextual information in ways that researchers are often unaware of. Second, respondents
have to recall information on the quantity from memory. In many instances, respondents will have
imperfect recall and need to apply various inference and estimation strategies to arrive at an answer;
this is the third step of the response process. Fourth, once respondents have arrived at an answer, they
need to map it onto the response alternatives provided by the researcher (unless the question format
is open-ended). Finally, respondents may edit their answer because of social desirability and self-
representation concerns (i. e., even though they might be aware of the “true” value of some quantity,
they on purpose or unconsciously report a higher or lower value).
In order to derive hypotheses about factors that influence item nonresponse on financial questions
in household surveys, we use a conceptual model by Tourangeau and Smith (1996). For our purpose,
the advantage of such a model is that it makes cognitive processes and social interaction between the
interviewer and the respondents explicit. This conceptual model links interview modes, psychological
variables, and data quality. Specifically, dimensions of data quality, such as accuracy, reliability, and
item nonresponse are influenced by three psychological variables: privacy, legitimacy, and cognitive
burden. The signs of the relationships form the basis for hypotheses about survey response behavior.
For instance, privacy reduces the problem of item nonresponse on sensitive questions while increased
cognitive burden reduces response accuracy. The key variables privacy, legitimacy, and cognitive bur-
den are influenced, in turn, by the mode of data collection (face-to-face interviews, self-administrated
surveys, computerized surveys such as internet surveys, or telephone interviews with auditory presen-
tation).
In our analysis, we specifically concentrate on the trade-off between using a computer-assisted
personal interview (CAPI) and a self-administered paper-and-pencil questionnaire (P&P) for collecting
data on sensitive financial variables. The prediction from models of survey response behavior such as
the one outlined above is that relative to CAPI, the self-administered P&P interview should result in
higher perceived levels of privacy, which in turn increases responses accuracy and decreases the rate
of item nonresponse.
A second hypothesis we test is related to the social interaction between interviewer and respondent.
It seems plausible that in personal interviews, characteristics of the interviewer may influence response
behavior; interviewer effects on survey response have been analyzed as far back as Rice (1929). For
instance, there is evidence that interviewer attributes such as age and gender affect response rates in
surveys. Interestingly, the effects of interviewer experience on response behavior seem to be stronger
than those of personal characteristics; see Groves and Couper (1998), Chapter 7, and Hox and de Leeuw
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(2002) for reviews. Riphahn and Serfling (2002) provide empirical evidence on interviewer effects in
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).
Finally, response behavior may depend on the respondent’s motivation and on incentives for provid-
ing accurate answers. These aspects are analyzed in the rational-choice approach to survey response
behavior; see Philipson (1997), Philipson (2001), Philipson and Malani (1999), Singer (2002), and
Stocke´ (2003). In the analysis presented in this Chapter, we do not address these issues – our field
experiment does not contain reliable indicators of respondents’ motivation, and no incentives were
used to increase response accuracy.
3.3 The field experiment embedded in SAVE 2001
In this section, we discuss the embedded survey experiments. For a short overview of the SAVE 2001
study, please see Chapter 2.2.1.
The embedded experimental design of the SAVE 2001 study is summarized in Chapter 2, Table
2.2. The first four versions were computer aided personal interviews (CAPI); they were carried out by
NFO Infratest, Munich. In contrast, the fifth version was a conventional paper questionnaire (“paper
and pencil”, P&P). The CAPI interviews were carried out using quota samples whereas conventional
P&P questionnaires were given to a so-called Access Panel operated by the company TPI (Test Panel
Institute, Wetzlar), in other words a standing panel of households surveyed at regular intervals.
The only difference in the four versions of the CAPI interview is in the critical part 4 of the
questionnaire. In versions 1 and 2, all questions were administered by CAPI in the presence of
the interviewer. The difference between these versions is that the questions on asset holdings were
presented using an open-ended format with follow-up brackets (range cards) in version 1 and with
“forced” brackets in version 2. The experimental manipulation of the question format with respect to
follow-up vs. forced range-card questions is not investigated in the present Chapter. For a discussion
of how follow-up questions alleviate the problem of item nonresponse, see Juster and Smith (1997).
Hurd et al . (1998) and Winter (2002a) investigate response biases such as anchoring that arise in
follow-up questions that use unfolding brackets or range cards, respectively.
Because many of these questions relate to intensely personal matters of income and wealth, we went
one step further in versions 3 and 4. In these versions, part 4 of the questionnaire was not part of the
personal CAPI interview, but left as a paper-and-pencil questionnaire by the interviewer (this mode
is termed “P&P drop off” in the sequel). In version 3, the interviewer came back personally to collect
the drop-off questionnaire; in version 4, the questionnaire had to be returned by mail using a pre-paid
envelope. If this was not done within a specified number of days, the respondent was reminded by
telephone several times. Nevertheless, response rates for the drop-off questionnaire were significantly
lower in version 4 than in version 3 (90.5% vs. 98.0%).
Summarizing, in order to test our hypothesis that there is an anonymity/privacy effect on non-
response to sensitive financial questions, we could compare response behavior in versions 1 and 2 to
that in versions 3, 4, and 5. In this Chapter, we use data from versions 1, 3, and 4 only, for reasons
detailed below.
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The survey took place in early summer 2001. The fieldwork for the personal interviews took place
between May 29 and June 26, 2001, whereas the fieldwork for the Access Panel took place between
June 29 and July 24, 2001. Both the CAPI (quota sample) and the P&P (TPI Access Panel) segments
were targeted at households with head of the household aged between 18 and 69 years. For the CAPI
versions, the quota performance targets were related to the dimension gender (male respondent ratio
of 74 percent) and age (a distribution in age classes under 25, 25-34, 35-50 and 50-70 years) according
to the current official population statistics (and, in particular, the 2000 micro census). For the TPI
interviewees, the quota targets were also based on the 2000 micro census and related to whether the
respondent is a wage earner or a salaried employee, and the size of the household. Table 2.2 shows
the sample sizes for the five survey versions. In total, 1,829 households were surveyed.
3.4 Results
In this section, we present our findings on response behavior in the 2001 SAVE survey and relate these
findings to the hypotheses presented in Section 3.2. We present summary statistics for the dependent
and independent variables in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.2, respectively. We then turn to the main part
of the analysis, a series of probit regressions that allow us to test for factors that influence item
nonresponse in Section 3.4.3. Other aspects of response behavior that might be related to interview
mode and interviewer characteristics are briefly discussed in section 3.4.4.
In the following, we restrict the analysis to a comparison of version 1 (CAPI) with versions 3 (P&P
drop-off, pick-up) and 4 (P&P drop-off, mail-back). As noted above, version 2 differs in the format
of asset questions (“forced” brackets rather than open-ended questions with follow-up brackets). An
analysis of the effects of question format on nonresponse is a separate issue from the mode effects we are
interested in here, so we leave that to future work. Version 5 of the SAVE 2001 study used a different
sample (drawn from a standing Access Panel) that exhibits a significant middle-class bias.35 We
decided not to use data from version 5 in most of the subsequent analysis because of these differences
in sample composition. While differences in observable characteristics could potentially be resolved
using matching techniques, the problem is actually deeper: It is very likely that households in the
Access Panel differ not only in observable characteristics from a random or quota sample, but also in
unobservable characteristics that are relevant for our substantive analysis. For instance, members of
an Access Panel typically have some survey experience, and their response behavior might therefore
differ from that in a representative sample.36
35 While the average household size in all four CAPI versions is about 1.9, the average household in the version 5
has about 3 persons. Specifically, the number of single households is much lower in the sample used for version 5.
Furthermore, in version 5, less households were interviewed in Eastern Germany. Also, there are significant differences
concerning education and the proportion of workers and employees between the four CAPI versions and version 5.
36 Such unobserved differences would violate the “ignorability” assumption that is required for the application of match-
ing techniques.
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3.4.1 Dependent variables
In the main part of our analysis, we use probit regressions with indicators for item nonresponse on
the household net income and on six asset questions as the dependent variables. In addition, we use
the incidence of focal (rounded) values in responses to the income question and the response to the
question of whether respondents would be willing to participate in a future wave of the SAVE survey
as additional dependent variables. Descriptive statistics for all dependent variables are reported in
Table 3.1.
3.4.2 Independent variables
The independent variables we use in the subsequent analysis fall into four categories: (i) characteristics
of the respondent, (ii) characteristics of the interviewer, (iii) self-reported feedback by the respondents,
and (iv) interview mode (i. e., the different versions of the survey assigned by our experimental design).
Summary statistics for the first three sets of independent variables are reported in Table 3.2.
The set of demographic and economic characteristics of the respondent contains age and, in some
regressions, household net income (and the squared values of these variables to allow for nonlinear
effects). Note that there is some nonresponse to the open-ended income question itself, so we imputed
these missing values using the information from the follow-up bracket question. To check whether these
imputations affect the regression results, we include a dummy for households with imputed values in
those regressions that contain income as an independent variable. Other respondent characteristics
we use are three dummy variables for level of education (the reference category is primary school); a
dummy for households in East Germany; a set of dummy variables for occupation and labor market
status (the reference category is white-collar employees)37; and a dummy variable for households in
small communities with a population of less than 5000.
As can be seen in Table 3.2, there are no striking differences in respondent and household charac-
teristics between versions 1, 3, and 4 which were randomly assigned to households within the quota
sample. One exception is income which will be used as an independent variable in the nonresponse
regressions for assets, but this variable was administered differently across versions38, so differences in
responses are not surprising.
A second set of variables contains characteristics of the interviewer. In total, 267 interviewers
administered the 1169 CAPI interviews, with a maximum of eight interviews by interviewer and a
minimum of one. Considering this rather small average number of interviews by interviewer, we refrain
from using interviewer dummies as explanatory variables. From the survey agency that administered
the survey, we obtained data on gender, age, the level of schooling of the interviewer, and his interview
experience (as measured by the number of years she has been working for the survey agency). In the
regressions, we use a dummy variable for experienced interviewers, defined as having more than median
experience (4 years); a dummy variable for female interviewers; a dummy variable for interviewers
who are older than the respondent; and two dummy variables for interviewers with lower and higher
37 The dummy variable for farmers is dropped from the regressions since we have only two farmers in the sample.
38 The income questions were asked in the drop-off part of the questionnaire.
3.4 Results 35
education level than the respondent (with the categories defined as described above). We experimented
with more complicated specifications for the age relation between interviewer and respondent, but
we did not find results that were qualitatively different for those based on just a dummy for older
interviewers, so we report only those results below.
The third set of explanatory variables is based on respondents self reports to an open-ended feedback
question that was administered at the end of the interview. We have classified the responses to this
question using a set of keywords which resulted in four indicator variables for whether the respondent
mentioned specific aspects in a negative or positive way. A negative statement is coded as -1, a positive
statement as 1, no statement as 0. The four aspects are: (1) overall reaction to the interview; (2)
concerns about privacy; (3) length of the interview; (4) questions easy to answer. We also constructed
a dummy variable that indicates whether at least one of these four aspects was mentioned in a positive
way.
The final set of variables controls for mode effects. We are interested in the effects of a CAPI
interview vs. a P&P drop-off questionnaire on nonresponse rates. In addition, we would like to
distinguish between drop-off questionnaires that are picked up by the interviewer (version 3) and
mailed back directly to the survey agency (version 4). We therefore include two dummy variables for
versions 3 and 4, respectively, in our regressions. The frequencies of the interview mode indicators are
reported in Table 2.2, Chapter 2.
3.4.3 Nonresponse regressions
Tables 3.3 through 3.9 contain probit estimates for nonresponse rates for absolute values of monthly
net household income and the balances held in six asset categories. We should note that in the case
of the asset regressions, the dependent variable is always nonresponse conditional on holding that
asset. For each of those assets, households were first asked whether they hold it, and they were asked
for the amount only if they do. Since ownership rates for the six assets vary, so do the numbers of
observations used in the asset nonresponse regressions. For all but savings accounts, they are actually
quite small, and we therefore discuss only the results of the regression for nonresponse on the income
and savings account questions in detail.
For the income nonresponse regression, we report two specifications, one with interviewer character-
istics and one without (Table 3.3). Few of the respondent and household characteristics are significant
– nonresponse rates are higher in East Germany, lower for blue-collar workers, and higher in small
communities. Interestingly, the willingness to report income is not affected by the interview mode –
the coefficients of the dummy variables for the P&P drop-off versions are not significant. These results
also hold when interviewer characteristics are included. The only interviewer variable that is signifi-
cant is the dummy for older interviewers; they seem to have a positive effect on willingness to report
income. Overall, nonresponse on the household net income question appears to be very heterogenous
and hard to explain with respondent and household characteristics, interview mode, and interviewer
characteristics. However, self-reported feedback measures that characterize how the respondents have
perceived the interview situation have explanatory power.
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The situation is different for assets. In the regression results for nonresponse to the question on
the balance held in saving account (Table 3.4), we see that respondent and household characteristics
still have few significant characteristics. Nonresponse is higher for the unemployed and lower in
small communities. The latter is an interesting sign change compared with the income regression.
Most importantly, we see strongly negative coefficients of the dummy variables for the P&P drop-off
versions. Respondents are more willing to report their saving account balance in the private P&P
interview mode. The dummy variable for imputed income (i. e., nonresponse to the income question)
is significantly positive which indicates that there is some consistency in nonresponse across questions.
Finally, there are effects of interviewer characteristics, and there is again some evidence that self-
reported feedback is related to item nonresponse.
We do not comment on the nonresponse regressions for the other five assets in detail because the
number of households who hold these assets is smaller. However, we should note that the negative
coefficients of the dummy variables for the P&P drop-off modes can be found in most of these re-
gressions. This is strong evidence for a mode effect in nonresponse to questions on asset holdings –
respondents are much more willing to answer if such questions are self-administered and private. In
some but not all cases, the coefficient of the version 4 dummy is larger in magnitude than that of the
version 3 dummy. This finding is consistent with even lower rates of nonresponse when the drop-off
questionnaire is mailed back rather than being picked up by the interviewer. However, as reported in
Table 2.2 in Chapter 2.B, response rates for the drop-off questionnaires are lower for version 4 than
for version 3 in the first place.
3.4.4 Other dimensions of survey response behavior
The incidence of focal points (“round” values) in the responses to open-ended questions is a direct
measure of data quality. There are two primary reasons why survey respondents give focal-point
responses to open-ended questions (see Tourangeau et al . (2000), section 8.1). First, rounding could
reflect uncertainty about the exact value of the quantity asked. Second, even if a respondent knows
the exact value of a quantity, she could round this value because of privacy concerns and other aspects
of the interviewer-respondent interaction. Moreover, there could be dependence between these two
effects. For instance, in the presence of an interviewer, a respondent who is uncertain about the
quantity in question might report a guess, reflected in a focal-point response (so as not to disappoint
the interviewer by a complete refusal). In contrast, in a self-administered mode, the respondent
might be more willing to admit that she does not have an exact answer by giving an explicit “Don’t
know” response. Finally, other aspects of the interviewing process such as time pressure (which
is more intense in personal interviews than in self-administered surveys such as a paper-and-pencil
questionnaire) could also induce the respondent to report a focal-point guess rather than thinking a
little longer – that is, evoking a more elaborate cognitive process – to come up with an exact answer.
The present study was not designed to disentangle these potential explanations of focal responses.
However, our data allow to assess whether the factors that influence item nonresponse also affect
the incidence of focal-point (rounded) rounded answers from those who respond. For this purpose,
we focus on the income question for which nonresponse regressions were reported above in Table
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3.3. Tables 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12 contain probit regressions in which the dependent variable is an
indicator of whether the response is a multiple of 100, 500, or 1000, respectively. The most interesting
observation in these regressions is that Version 3 (drop-off questionnaire picked up by the interviewer)
has generated the smallest fraction of focal responses. This is evidence against the hypothesis that
rounding is caused by privacy concerns or other aspects of the interviewer-respondent interaction.
Rather, rounding seems to be related to response uncertainty and the opportunity and incentives to
look up correct values. While these results are interesting, more research is needed to substantiate
these claims. In particular, having a direct measure of respondents’ uncertainty about the quantity in
question seems important; see Winter (2002b) for a recent attempt in that direction.
Finally, we analyze responses to the question of whether the respondent would be willing to partic-
ipate in a future wave of the SAVE survey. The fraction of “yes” responses varies between about 60%
and 70% in versions 1 through 4 which were administered with quota samples (see Table 3.1).39 To
check whether respondent and interviewer characteristics affect the willingness to participate in future
surveys, we run probit regressions similar to those for nonresponse reported in Section 3.4.3 above.
Table 3.13 reports the results. Few of the independent variables are significant. However, a consistent
pattern emerges: Respondents in version 3 (which included a drop-off questionnaire on financial items
collected by the interviewer) are less willing to participate in future surveys. In the specifications that
also control for income, dummies for version 3 also has a significant negative coefficients. From these
results, it follows that having to return the drop-off questionnaire to the interviewer at a future point
reduces stated willingness to participate in future surveys.
The present design does not allow to disentangle all possible explanations for this observation. One
explanation might be that the drop-off questionnaire is perceived as a burden – respondents know that
they have to do additional work after the interviewer has left. The absolute value of the coefficient of
the version 3 dummy is larger than that of the version 4 dummy; this is consistent with the hypothesis
that in version 4 (drop-off questionnaire mailed in rather than being picked up), respondents feel less
obliged to do the extra work of filling in the drop-off questionnaire. This corresponds the lower return
rate in version 4, 91% compared with 98% in version 3, see Table 3.1.
A weakness of this explanation is that the proxy variable for overall satisfaction (willingness to
participate in future surveys) was obtained before the drop-off questionnaire has been answered; it
might be possible that respondents are more willing to participate in future surveys after having
answered (because they realized that the burden was less than they expected) so that the mode
effect disappears. A reliable analysis of alternative explanations for the finding that the drop-off
modes reduce willingness to participate in future surveys would therefore require a more complex
experimental design; this is left for future research.
In any case, the survey protocol reflects that German law which requires that only those respon-
dents who agree explicitly to participate in future waves can be contacted for a re-interview. The
results on the reported willingness to participate in future surveys indicate that the higher response
rates on sensitive financial items achieved in interviews with drop-off questionnaires might come at a
39 Not surprisingly, it is significantly higher (about 90%) in version 5 that used a standing access panel of persons who
had already agreed to answer household surveys in the past.
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price. Drop-off questionnaires appear to increase the perceived burden of the interview and to reduce
respondents’ overall satisfaction.
The sample of the 2003 SAVE survey contains re-interviews of 2001 sample members who said they
are willing to participate in a future wave (augmented by a refreshment sample). This opens the door
to judge whether stated willingness to participate in future survey translates in actual behavior, but
this is an issue that deservers attention in future research.
3.5 Conclusions
The present Chapter investigated the effects of interview mode on nonresponse to sensitive questions
on items such as income and asset holdings using data from a field experiment. The main hypothesis
we tested was that a self-administered interview mode results in lower rates of nonresponse than a
personal interview, as suggested by models of survey response behavior developed in social psychology
and survey research. We found that in comparison to the CAPI mode, rates of nonresponse are lower
in a paper-and-pencil drop-off questionnaire that could be answered in private and independently of
the rest of the survey interview. This effect is very strong for all six asset categories we analyzed while
it is not significant for the question on household net income.
Respondent and household characteristics as well as interviewer characteristics do not appear to
have strong and consistent effects on nonresponse to sensitive financial questions. This raises the
question of whether correcting for item nonresponse using complex designs that require an explicit
model of the nonresponse process offer much gain over straightforward imputation schemes that invoke
a “missing at random” assumption. This aspect is certainly worth further investigation; our work
illustrates the usefulness of controlled survey experiments for such an analysis.
Another finding is that data quality for those households who actually answer also seems to be
better in the P&P drop-off modes, as judged by the lower frequency of focal-point responses (which
suggests that these responses are more accurate). This observation could be explained by the fact
that respondents have more time to answer a drop-off questionnaire. We know from survey research
that respondents are more likely to invoke more elaborate cognitive processes when they have more
time to answer questions. These more elaborate processes should result in more accurate responses.
Alternatively, respondents may be more likely to look up exact quantities when they fill in a drop-off
questionnaire than in a personal interview situation. We cannot distinguish between these explanations
with the experimental data obtained from the present study. This issue should be explored in future
research.
Our results have a number of practical implications. Data quality seems to be better if sensitive
questions on financial items are administered in a private interview mode, and drop-off questionnaires
seem to be a practical way to implement private data collection modes within a random or quota
sampling scheme (such as random route) that requires personal interviewer contact. However, it
should be noted that response rates for the drop-off questionnaire might cause a problem – while the
98% achieved in SAVE 2001 when the interviewer came back to pick up the drop-off questionnaire is
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acceptable, a 90.5% response rate for mail-back questionnaires might be too low. This aspect should
be analyzed in future work.
Finally, we have seen that stated willingness to participate in future surveys is lower if the survey
interview consists not only of the CAPI component but also has a drop-off questionnaire. While it is
unclear whether respondents would state that they are more willing to participate in a future survey
after they have actually filled in the drop-off questionnaire, the interview protocol that is typically
followed requires that the question on future surveys be asked at the end of the CAPI interview. A
piece of practical advice would be to move that question to the end of the drop-off questionnaire. In
any case, the effect that the interview mode chosen for sensitive financial questions has on participation
in a follow-up survey will be investigated with data from the upcoming SAVE 2003 wave.40
40 This is work in progress.
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3.A Tables
Table 3.1: Dependent variables: Response rates and willingness to participate in future surveys
Version 1 Version 3 Version 4
(CAPI) (P&P pickup) (P&P mail-in)
Income
HH refuse values 56 58 57
in % of HH 19.0% 19.7% 20.7%
Saving Accounts
HH owning 215 215 192
in % of all HH 72.9% 73.1% 69.6%
HH refuse values 100 50 31
in % of HH owning 46.5% 23.3% 16.2%
Building Society Contracts
HH owning 85 90 83
in % of all HH 28.8% 30.6% 30.1%
HH refuse values 38 23 22
in % of HH owning 44.7% 25.6% 26.5%
Life Insurances
HH owning 128 131 123
in % of all HH 43.4% 44.6% 44.6%
HH refuse values 71 46 36
in % of HH owning 55.5% 35.1% 29.3%
Retirment Savings
HH owning 43 45 34
in % of all HH 14.6% 15.3% 12.3%
HH refuse values 34 24 14
in % of HH owning 79.1% 53.3% 41.2%
Bonds
HH owning 38 38 49
in % of all HH 12.9% 12.9% 17.8%
HH refuse values 18 17 15
in % of HH owning 47.4% 44.7% 30.6%
Stocks, Funds
HH owning 97 92 55
in % of all HH 32.88 31.29 19.93
HH refuse values 50 23 11
in % of HH owning 51.6% 25.0% 20.0%
Would participate another time
yes 66.4% 58.8% 60.1%
no 26.4% 31.3% 30.8%
no answer 7.1% 9.9% 9.1%
Number of households 295 294 276
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Table 3.2: Independent variables: respondent and interviewer characteristics
Version 1 Version 3 Version 4
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Respondent
HH income 5731.8 8870.3 4499.9 3931.4 4396.3 2345.7
HH income imputed (D) 4.7% 21.3% 16.0% 36.7% 10.5% 30.7%
Age 45.0 13.4 46.6 13.3 46.6 13.4
Secondary school (D) 36.3% 48.2% 36.1% 48.1% 40.2% 49.1%
Graduation diploma (D) 13.2% 33.9% 11.9% 32.4% 10.1% 30.2%
University degree (D) 14.9% 35.7% 16.7% 37.3% 11.2% 31.6%
East Germany (D) 22.4% 41.7% 19.4% 39.6% 19.6% 39.7%
Worker (D) 19.7% 39.9% 14.1% 34.9% 19.6% 39.7%
Civil Servant (D) 5.8% 23.4% 5.2% 22.1% 5.4% 22.7%
Farmer (D) 0.3% 5.8% 0.3% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0%
Self-employed (D) 6.8% 25.2% 5.8% 23.5% 7.6% 26.6%
Retired (D) 17.6% 38.2% 21.4% 41.1% 17.8% 38.3%
Unemployed (D) 5.8% 23.3% 7.2% 26.0% 3.6% 18.8%
Small Community (D) 13.6% 34.3% 15.0% 35.7% 10.9% 31.2%
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) 43.8% 49.7% 61.4% 48.8% 55.1% 49.8%
Female (D) 43.7% 49.7% 59.5% 49.2% 29.7% 45.8%
Older than resp. (D) 51.2% 50.1% 58.5% 49.4% 55.4% 49.8%
Higher schooling (D) 38.3% 48.7% 37.1% 48.4% 42.0% 49.5%
Lower schooling (D) 25.1% 43.4% 26.9% 44.4% 19.9% 40.0%
Feedback
Positive opinion / Interesting subject 6.4% 52.1% 10.5% 57.8% 1.1% 56.9%
Privacy -15.6% 37.3% -18.4% 39.7% -10.5% 33.0%
Interview not too long -0.7% 16.5% -0.7% 16.5% 1.4% 12.0%
Easy to answer -1.4% 16.4% 0.3% 10.1% -0.4% 10.4%
at least one of the 4 latter positive -9.8% 67.5% -4.8% 73.3% -7.2% 66.8%
Note: Dummy variables are marked (D).
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Table 3.3: Nonresponse regressions: income
Income Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
Age -0.001 0.964 -0.007 0.813 -0.008 0.784 -0.010 0.735
Age squared 0.000 0.962 0.000 0.882 0.000 0.885 0.000 0.928
Secondary school (D) 0.053 0.695 0.090 0.551 0.048 0.754 0.049 0.747
Graduation diploma (D) -0.151 0.444 -0.070 0.751 -0.152 0.499 -0.138 0.537
University degree (D) -0.409 0.030 -0.355 0.111 -0.451 0.047 -0.448 0.048
East Germany (D) 0.313 0.019 0.345 0.013 0.383 0.006 0.392 0.005
Worker (D) -0.409 0.012 -0.413 0.013 -0.440 0.009 -0.435 0.010
Civil Servant (D) -0.442 0.118 -0.453 0.115 -0.453 0.122 -0.476 0.104
Self-employed (D) 0.262 0.175 0.301 0.126 0.319 0.111 0.334 0.094
Retired (D) 0.056 0.776 0.055 0.787 0.048 0.812 0.054 0.790
Unemployed (D) -0.264 0.279 -0.223 0.375 -0.207 0.414 -0.230 0.365
Small Community (D) 0.350 0.017 0.394 0.010 0.394 0.010 0.399 0.009
Version
Interview version 3 (D) 0.050 0.689 0.115 0.377 0.117 0.375 0.130 0.323
Interview version 4 (D) 0.093 0.460 0.157 0.226 0.181 0.169 0.169 0.195
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) -0.041 0.703 -0.008 0.940 -0.020 0.855
Female (D) 0.089 0.418 0.080 0.471 0.075 0.496
Older than resp. (D) -0.410 0.003 -0.431 0.002 -0.429 0.002
Higher schooling (D) -0.126 0.323 -0.147 0.254 -0.160 0.215
Lower schooling (D) -0.215 0.156 -0.188 0.220 -0.211 0.168
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject -0.182 0.064
Privacy -0.293 0.029
Interview not too long -0.503 0.209
Easy to answer 0.053 0.899
at least one of the 4 latter pos. -0.242 0.002
Constant -0.820 0.204 -0.272 0.698 -0.243 0.731 -0.172 0.808
Number of obs 847 836 836 836
LR 30.75 46.5 56.26 56.35
Prob larger chi2 0.0060 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.03710 0.05700 0.06890 0.06900
Log likelihood -399.43856 -384.90723 -380.03051 -379.98598
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Table 3.4: Nonresponse regressions: savings accounts
Saving Accounts Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
HH income -1.04E-06 0.978 1.97E-06 0.960 3.85E-06 0.922 3.97E-06 0.919
HH income squared 1.10E-10 0.880 1.19E-10 0.876 7.85E-11 0.918 7.20E-11 0.925
HH income imputed (D) 0.483 0.006 0.487 0.008 0.477 0.010 0.470 0.011
Age -0.020 0.559 -0.008 0.825 -0.007 0.842 -0.007 0.839
Age squared 0.000 0.568 0.000 0.686 0.000 0.705 0.000 0.703
Secondary school (D) 0.206 0.191 0.182 0.310 0.162 0.369 0.158 0.381
Graduation diploma (D) 0.039 0.859 -0.124 0.635 -0.161 0.541 -0.156 0.551
University degree (D) -0.182 0.429 -0.336 0.226 -0.408 0.147 -0.410 0.144
East Germany (D) -0.201 0.263 -0.181 0.328 -0.152 0.414 -0.152 0.414
Worker (D) -0.048 0.784 -0.126 0.489 -0.128 0.482 -0.119 0.512
Civil Servant (D) -0.204 0.416 -0.299 0.246 -0.303 0.245 -0.321 0.217
Self-employed (D) -0.414 0.126 -0.579 0.041 -0.578 0.045 -0.569 0.048
Retired (D) -0.159 0.508 -0.225 0.358 -0.213 0.384 -0.207 0.399
Unemployed (D) 0.554 0.067 0.513 0.098 0.542 0.081 0.528 0.089
Small Community (D) -0.442 0.035 -0.494 0.032 -0.498 0.031 -0.488 0.035
Version
Interview version 3 (D) -0.575 0.000 -0.529 0.000 -0.552 0.000 -0.532 0.000
Interview version 4 (D) -0.871 0.000 -0.785 0.000 -0.793 0.000 -0.789 0.000
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) -0.381 0.002 -0.352 0.006 -0.362 0.004
Female (D) 0.190 0.140 0.181 0.164 0.179 0.165
Older than resp. (D) 0.210 0.181 0.221 0.163 0.212 0.178
Higher schooling (D) 0.008 0.960 -0.017 0.913 -0.024 0.875
Lower schooling (D) 0.342 0.063 0.368 0.048 0.360 0.052
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject -0.113 0.291
Privacy -0.261 0.121
Interview not too long -0.128 0.751
Easy to answer -0.024 0.953
at least one of the 4 latter pos. -0.168 0.054
Constant 0.233 0.754 -0.266 0.742 -0.308 0.704 -0.282 0.728
Number of obs 586 579 579 579
LR 58.38 74.6 78.19 78.32
Prob larger chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0868 0.113 0.1184 0.1186
Log likelihood -307.28906 -292.87995 -291.08286 -291.01689
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Table 3.5: Nonresponse regressions: buildings society savings
Build. Soc. Contr. Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
HH income 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.043
HH income squared 1.83E-09 0.093 2.07E-09 0.080 2.11E-09 0.070 2.07E-09 0.080
HH income imputed (D) 0.641 0.067 0.6281 0.089 0.709 0.060 0.6327 0.091
Age 0.026 0.610 0.0190 0.710 0.015 0.775 0.0188 0.712
Age squared 0.000 0.868 0.0001 0.802 0.000 0.701 0.0001 0.799
Secondary school (D) 0.028 0.906 0.1107 0.676 0.158 0.557 0.1122 0.673
Graduation diploma (D) -0.173 0.597 -0.0694 0.863 0.017 0.967 -0.0684 0.865
University degree (D) -0.156 0.646 -0.0949 0.814 -0.001 0.998 -0.0903 0.825
East Germany (D) -0.272 0.278 -0.3151 0.241 -0.324 0.235 -0.3182 0.242
Worker (D) 0.011 0.964 -0.0356 0.889 -0.039 0.879 -0.0365 0.886
Civil Servant (D) -0.221 0.471 -0.1658 0.599 -0.230 0.476 -0.1646 0.602
Self-employed (D) -0.385 0.456 -0.4252 0.409 -0.474 0.369 -0.4282 0.407
Retired (D) -0.717 0.093 -0.8189 0.056 -0.897 0.041 -0.8214 0.056
Unemployed (D) 0.193 0.673 0.1207 0.796 0.071 0.880 0.1213 0.795
Small Community (D) -0.598 0.078 -0.6907 0.067 -0.697 0.067 -0.6903 0.068
Version
Interview version 3 (D) -0.491 0.029 -0.4658 0.057 -0.449 0.075 -0.4675 0.058
Interview version 4 (D) -0.473 0.034 -0.4587 0.047 -0.469 0.050 -0.4607 0.048
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) -0.1575 0.434 -0.220 0.293 -0.1592 0.432
Female (D) -0.0342 0.866 -0.038 0.854 -0.0325 0.873
Older than resp. (D) 0.5641 0.032 0.572 0.031 0.5649 0.032
Higher schooling (D) 0.0590 0.799 0.079 0.738 0.0618 0.792
Lower schooling (D) 0.0010 0.997 -0.039 0.890 0.0015 0.996
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject -0.034 0.833
Privacy 0.337 0.216
Interview not too long 0.060 0.917
Easy to answer 0.191 0.787
at least one of the 4 latter pos. 0.0106 0.937
Constant -0.440 0.683 -0.9369 0.416 -0.844 0.466 -0.9371 0.416
Number of obs 243 241 241 241
LR 26 29.98 29.98 29.98
Prob larger chi2 0.0745 0.1190 0.1190 0.1499
Pseudo R2 0.0866 0.1014 0.1014 0.1014
Log likelihood -137.1763 -132.81767 -132.81767 -132.81456
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Table 3.6: Nonresponse regressions: life insurance contracts
Life Insurances Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
HH income -0.0001 0.057 -0.0001 0.063 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.062
HH income squared 2.90E-09 0.053 2.96E-09 0.053 3.03E-09 0.045 2.96E-09 0.053
HH income imputed (D) 0.238 0.303 0.272 0.248 0.285 0.228 0.276 0.244
Age -0.040 0.366 -0.028 0.531 -0.027 0.551 -0.028 0.530
Age squared 0.000 0.365 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.432 0.000 0.425
Secondary school (D) -0.034 0.862 -0.138 0.529 -0.113 0.610 -0.135 0.540
Graduation diploma (D) 0.010 0.971 -0.181 0.566 -0.120 0.709 -0.176 0.578
University degree (D) -0.304 0.250 -0.518 0.112 -0.464 0.160 -0.511 0.120
East Germany (D) -0.025 0.903 0.067 0.752 0.069 0.746 0.064 0.761
Worker (D) 0.074 0.734 0.006 0.979 0.023 0.919 0.006 0.978
Civil Servant (D) -0.161 0.543 -0.201 0.458 -0.236 0.393 -0.199 0.465
Self-employed (D) -0.069 0.781 -0.103 0.684 -0.097 0.703 -0.106 0.676
Retired (D) -0.221 0.435 -0.292 0.307 -0.300 0.295 -0.293 0.305
Unemployed (D) -0.669 0.067 -0.810 0.030 -0.837 0.026 -0.811 0.030
Small Community (D) -0.612 0.013 -0.651 0.013 -0.654 0.013 -0.651 0.013
Version
Interview version 3 (D) -0.400 0.019 -0.309 0.087 -0.304 0.094 -0.310 0.086
Interview version 4 (D) -0.669 0.000 -0.679 0.000 -0.702 0.000 -0.679 0.000
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) -0.172 0.255 -0.211 0.171 -0.173 0.252
Female (D) -0.230 0.144 -0.225 0.159 -0.229 0.146
Older than resp. (D) 0.240 0.198 0.239 0.201 0.241 0.196
Higher schooling (D) 0.018 0.923 0.029 0.877 0.021 0.910
Lower schooling (D) 0.357 0.080 0.341 0.096 0.357 0.080
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject -0.0340454 0.785
Privacy 0.2400224 0.203
Interview not too long 0.1096004 0.798
Easy to answer 0.0428822 0.954
at least one of the 4 latter pos. 0.0144056 0.883
Constant 1.489 0.129 1.067 0.305 1.073081 0.306 1.064985 0.307
Number of obs 368 364 364 364
LR 37.24 42.77 44.55 42.79
Prob larger chi2 0.0031 0.0050 0.0132 0.0073
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.0883 0.092 0.0884
Log likelihood -226.31737 -220.66524 -219.77686 -220.6544
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Table 3.7: Nonresponse regressions: retirement savings contracts
Retirement Sav. Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
HH income 0.000 0.393 0.000 0.284 -0.0001953 0.209 -0.0001593 0.293
HH income squared 0.000 0.398 0.000 0.307 8.49E-09 2.57E-01 7.76E-09 0.301
HH income imputed (D) 0.801 0.106 0.782 0.121 0.660 0.223 0.650 0.221
Age -0.012 0.888 -0.015 0.859 0.007 0.939 -0.025 0.771
Age squared 0.000 0.940 0.000 0.789 0.000 0.977 0.000 0.711
Secondary school (D) 0.526 0.191 0.400 0.390 0.409 0.390 0.386 0.406
Graduation diploma (D) 0.298 0.556 0.132 0.847 0.119 0.867 0.195 0.777
University degree (D) 0.518 0.312 0.369 0.576 0.337 0.615 0.357 0.589
East Germany (D) -1.052 0.006 -1.244 0.005 -1.397 0.003 -1.188 0.008
Worker (D) 0.143 0.742 0.069 0.879 0.056 0.903 0.084 0.852
Civil Servant (D) 0.164 0.784 0.172 0.790 0.146 0.825 0.163 0.801
Self-employed (D) 0.009 0.981 -0.046 0.902 -0.102 0.801 -0.008 0.982
Retired (D) 0.356 0.598 0.235 0.732 0.169 0.811 0.325 0.645
Unemployed (D) -0.377 0.538 -0.393 0.539 -0.477 0.477 -0.375 0.555
Small Community (D) -0.405 0.317 -0.447 0.303 -0.576 0.198 -0.437 0.316
Version
Interview version 3 (D) -0.865 0.010 -0.889 0.018 -0.844 0.031 -0.850 0.025
Interview version 4 (D) -1.055 0.002 -1.132 0.002 -1.102 0.004 -1.149 0.002
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) 1.504 0.427 -0.200 0.505 -0.276 0.396 -0.204 0.500
Female (D) 0.076 0.812 0.087 0.796 0.057 0.860
Older than resp. (D) 0.518 0.144 0.499 0.187 0.504 0.158
Higher schooling (D) -0.431 0.270 -0.567 0.164 -0.445 0.256
Lower schooling (D) -0.141 0.746 -0.186 0.674 -0.155 0.722
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject -0.007 0.980
Privacy 0.122 0.739
Interview not too long dropped
Easy to answer dropped
at least one of the 4 latter pos. -0.160 0.430
Constant 1.504 0.427 1.514 0.462 1.387 0.512 1.720 0.406
Number of obs 115 114 110 114
LR 24.16 27.73 27.96 28.35
Prob larger chi2 0.1151 0.1850 0.2619 0.2028
Pseudo R2 0.154 0.178 0.2619 0.182
Log likelihood -66.370471 -64.029633 -60.788319 -63.717127
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Table 3.8: Nonresponse regressions: bonds
Bonds Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
HH income 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.127 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.113
HH income squared 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.109 2.48E-09 0.081 2.33E-09 0.096
HH income imputed (D) 0.357 0.405 0.320 0.491 0.465 0.330 0.323 0.487
Age -0.059 0.512 -0.072 0.447 -0.092 0.352 -0.076 0.427
Age squared 0.000 0.665 0.000 0.633 0.001 0.524 0.001 0.595
Secondary school (D) -0.614 0.141 -0.721 0.127 -0.472 0.344 -0.647 0.178
Graduation diploma (D) -1.321 0.019 -1.921 0.007 -2.057 0.006 -1.892 0.008
University degree (D) -0.660 0.162 -1.173 0.094 -0.902 0.216 -1.087 0.127
East Germany (D) -0.003 0.994 0.061 0.880 -0.096 0.826 0.006 0.988
Worker (D) -0.592 0.206 -0.667 0.204 -0.629 0.248 -0.636 0.230
Civil Servant (D) -0.282 0.701 -0.591 0.472 -0.288 0.729 -0.602 0.463
Self-employed (D) -0.653 0.242 -0.928 0.135 -1.645 0.054 -1.030 0.106
Retired (D) -0.413 0.369 -0.534 0.270 -0.579 0.240 -0.568 0.245
Unemployed (D) 0.200 0.774 0.224 0.782 0.309 0.720 0.319 0.700
Small Community (D) -1.713 0.002 -1.961 0.002 -1.893 0.003 -1.968 0.002
Version
Interview version 3 (D) 0.498 0.233 0.832 0.082 0.830 0.103 0.880 0.069
Interview version 4 (D) -0.283 0.458 -0.151 0.720 -0.245 0.584 -0.155 0.715
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) -0.425 0.247 -0.416 0.279 -0.434 0.237
Female (D) -0.013 0.971 -0.012 0.976 -0.003 0.993
Older than resp. (D) -0.257 0.518 -0.217 0.606 -0.261 0.508
Higher schooling (D) 0.055 0.885 0.112 0.778 0.087 0.820
Lower schooling (D) 0.911 0.066 0.767 0.137 0.886 0.076
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject 0.374 0.190
Privacy -0.367 0.377
Interview not too long dropped
Easy to answer -0.275 0.814
at least one of the 4 latter pos. 0.196 0.357
Constant 2.917 0.173 3.648 0.133 4.067 0.109 3.721 0.128
Number of obs 116 115 112 115
LR 30.32 38.29 42.3300 39.14
Prob larger chi2 0.0241 0.0170 0.0166 0.0192
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.2518 0.2856 0.2574
Log likelihood -61.322773 -56.872127 -52.930077 -56.445915
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Table 3.9: Nonresponse regressions: stocks
Stocks Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
HH income 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.136
HH income squared 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.118 1.29E-09 0.126 1.30E-09 0.121
HH income imputed (D) 0.216 0.479 0.164 0.602 0.222 0.495 0.161 0.614
Age -0.024 0.706 -0.030 0.652 -0.036 0.590 -0.030 0.651
Age squared 0.000 0.574 0.001 0.461 0.001 0.403 0.001 0.460
Secondary school (D) 0.054 0.858 0.125 0.697 0.153 0.637 0.125 0.698
Graduation diploma (D) 0.020 0.958 0.267 0.533 0.333 0.444 0.267 0.532
University degree (D) -0.053 0.880 0.247 0.561 0.293 0.495 0.245 0.565
East Germany (D) 0.021 0.938 -0.093 0.749 -0.085 0.771 -0.092 0.753
Worker (D) -0.347 0.288 -0.313 0.358 -0.316 0.355 -0.313 0.358
Civil Servant (D) -0.125 0.686 -0.059 0.850 -0.056 0.858 -0.060 0.849
Self-employed (D) -0.099 0.778 -0.090 0.801 -0.098 0.788 -0.089 0.804
Retired (D) -0.661 0.116 -0.652 0.129 -0.671 0.121 -0.654 0.130
Unemployed (D) -0.655 0.319 -0.513 0.433 -0.536 0.419 -0.514 0.433
Small Community (D) -0.280 0.321 -0.239 0.423 -0.196 0.515 -0.240 0.423
Version
Interview version 3 (D) -0.570 0.011 -0.496 0.042 -0.516 0.036 -0.496 0.042
Interview version 4 (D) -0.673 0.008 -0.593 0.025 -0.588 0.028 -0.594 0.025
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) -0.017 0.935 0.004 0.983 -0.016 0.941
Female (D) 0.074 0.710 0.072 0.723 0.074 0.715
Older than resp. (D) 0.378 0.126 0.403 0.106 0.379 0.126
Higher schooling (D) 0.330 0.197 0.364 0.160 0.330 0.198
Lower schooling (D) -0.159 0.563 -0.191 0.493 -0.158 0.565
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject 0.010 0.959
Privacy -0.221 0.402
Interview not too long 0.465 0.316
Easy to answer 0.328 0.626
at least one of the 4 latter pos. -0.007 0.957
Constant 0.643 0.647 0.073 0.960 0.067 0.964 0.072 0.961
Number of obs 223 219 219 219
LR 19.88 22.91 24.97 22.91
Prob larger chi2 0.2806 0.4068 0.5205 0.4658
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.0849 0.0926 0.085
Log likelihood -128.01658 -123.40718 -122.37628 -123.40573
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Table 3.10: Focal points in responses to the income question (multiples of 100)
Focal Points 100 Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
Age 0.005 0.894 0.014 0.731 0.021 0.605 0.014 0.730
Age squared 0.000 0.796 0.000 0.906 0.000 0.815 0.000 0.904
Secondary school (D) 0.423 0.023 0.350 0.102 0.330 0.127 0.347 0.105
Graduation diploma (D) 0.410 0.142 0.241 0.456 0.255 0.441 0.236 0.467
University degree (D) 0.439 0.076 0.321 0.312 0.303 0.352 0.309 0.333
East Germany (D) -0.583 0.001 -0.534 0.004 -0.547 0.004 -0.527 0.005
Worker (D) -0.069 0.731 -0.069 0.734 -0.002 0.992 -0.067 0.741
Civil Servant (D) -0.103 0.753 -0.140 0.673 -0.212 0.526 -0.138 0.678
Self-employed (D) 0.459 0.317 0.422 0.351 0.405 0.380 0.423 0.348
Retired (D) -0.492 0.070 -0.431 0.115 -0.475 0.087 -0.433 0.114
Unemployed (D) 0.069 0.823 0.085 0.785 0.068 0.828 0.084 0.787
Small Community (D) 0.319 0.237 0.292 0.300 0.333 0.247 0.288 0.306
Version
Interview version 3 (D) -0.312 0.074 -0.336 0.067 -0.319 0.088 -0.334 0.070
Interview version 4 (D) -0.296 0.094 -0.266 0.138 -0.254 0.167 -0.267 0.136
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) -0.047 0.754 -0.066 0.670 -0.040 0.792
Female (D) 0.155 0.313 0.153 0.329 0.152 0.323
Older than resp. (D) -0.263 0.186 -0.261 0.195 -0.262 0.186
Higher schooling (D) -0.088 0.630 -0.111 0.556 -0.096 0.602
Lower schooling (D) 0.166 0.488 0.203 0.412 0.163 0.495
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject -0.027 0.824
Privacy 0.177 0.361
Interview not too long -0.800 0.077
Easy to answer -1.435 0.039
at least one of the 4 latter pos. -0.042 0.669
Constant 0.984 0.255 1.152 0.207 1.022 0.265 1.153 0.207
Number of obs 684 676 676 676
LR 28.31 32.1 42.83 32.28
Prob larger chi2 0.0129 0.0304 0.0073 0.0404
Pseudo R2 0.06590 0.07500 0.10010 0.07540
Log likelihood -200.63494 -197.93678 -192.57297 -197.84542
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Table 3.11: Focal points in responses to the income question (multiples of 500)
Focal Points 500 Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
Age 0.031 0.286 0.038 0.189 0.038 0.186 0.038 0.191
Age squared 0.000 0.374 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.215 0.000 0.217
Secondary school (D) 0.205 0.117 0.157 0.300 0.151 0.321 0.155 0.308
Graduation diploma (D) 0.443 0.022 0.344 0.125 0.328 0.147 0.341 0.128
University degree (D) 0.383 0.029 0.281 0.205 0.263 0.238 0.273 0.220
East Germany (D) -0.701 0.000 -0.679 0.000 -0.677 0.000 -0.675 0.000
Worker (D) -0.083 0.570 -0.058 0.698 -0.044 0.769 -0.058 0.698
Civil Servant (D) 0.295 0.202 0.268 0.249 0.257 0.267 0.267 0.250
Self-employed (D) 0.681 0.007 0.767 0.003 0.768 0.003 0.773 0.003
Retired (D) -0.190 0.321 -0.158 0.414 -0.165 0.394 -0.158 0.416
Unemployed (D) -0.405 0.077 -0.322 0.170 -0.323 0.168 -0.321 0.171
Small Community (D) -0.020 0.903 0.036 0.834 0.045 0.796 0.034 0.842
Version
Interview version 3 (D) -0.228 0.062 -0.272 0.035 -0.260 0.045 -0.270 0.036
Interview version 4 (D) -0.188 0.128 -0.166 0.183 -0.156 0.212 -0.167 0.182
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) 0.041 0.700 0.048 0.656 0.045 0.676
Female (D) 0.203 0.060 0.198 0.067 0.200 0.063
Older than resp. (D) -0.142 0.300 -0.139 0.312 -0.141 0.301
Higher schooling (D) -0.092 0.486 -0.100 0.450 -0.096 0.466
Lower schooling (D) 0.066 0.675 0.073 0.642 0.064 0.685
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject -0.006 0.947
Privacy -0.027 0.851
Interview not too long -0.140 0.672
Easy to answer -0.445 0.294
at least one of the 4 latter pos. -0.032 0.657
Constant -0.460 0.470 -0.511 0.453 -0.535 0.433 -0.507 0.457
Number of obs 684 676 676 676
LR 68.93 76.28 77.81 76.48
Prob larger chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.07370 0.08260 0.08420 0.08280
Log likelihood -433.16659 -423.8715 -423.10341 -423.77277
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Table 3.12: Focal points in responses to the income question (multiples of 1000)
Focal Points 1000 Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
Age 0.001 0.985 0.009 0.759 0.010 0.747 0.009 0.760
Age squared 0.000 0.955 0.000 0.731 0.000 0.727 0.000 0.732
Secondary school (D) 0.188 0.160 0.074 0.635 0.074 0.638 0.073 0.637
Graduation diploma (D) 0.141 0.461 -0.052 0.815 -0.053 0.811 -0.052 0.813
University degree (D) 0.396 0.025 0.173 0.439 0.175 0.436 0.172 0.443
East Germany (D) -0.637 0.000 -0.568 0.000 -0.568 0.000 -0.567 0.000
Worker (D) -0.123 0.417 -0.112 0.466 -0.096 0.535 -0.112 0.466
Civil Servant (D) -0.160 0.456 -0.196 0.362 -0.210 0.330 -0.196 0.362
Self-employed (D) 0.296 0.171 0.324 0.141 0.326 0.142 0.326 0.141
Retired (D) -0.317 0.113 -0.271 0.180 -0.270 0.182 -0.271 0.180
Unemployed (D) -0.314 0.205 -0.257 0.309 -0.275 0.279 -0.257 0.310
Small Community (D) -0.145 0.371 -0.097 0.569 -0.082 0.631 -0.097 0.569
Version
Interview version 3 (D) -0.201 0.105 -0.254 0.051 -0.236 0.073 -0.254 0.051
Interview version 4 (D) -0.096 0.438 -0.076 0.546 -0.067 0.593 -0.076 0.545
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) 0.101 0.350 0.094 0.389 0.102 0.349
Female (D) 0.162 0.134 0.161 0.139 0.162 0.135
Older than resp. (D) -0.167 0.219 -0.167 0.223 -0.167 0.219
Higher schooling (D) -0.145 0.286 -0.155 0.257 -0.145 0.286
Lower schooling (D) 0.139 0.364 0.136 0.377 0.139 0.366
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject 0.012 0.891
Privacy 0.077 0.594
Interview not too long 0.136 0.678
Easy to answer -0.506 0.241
at least one of the 4 latter pos. -0.005 0.948
Constant -0.309 0.635 -0.324 0.642 -0.340 0.627 -0.323 0.644
Number of obs 684 676 676 676
LR 38.12 44.49 44.49 44.5
Prob larger chi2 0.0005 0.0008 0.0027 0.0013
Pseudo R2 0.04330 0.05110 0.05320 0.05110
Log likelihood -421.00946 -413.15682 -412.24823 -413.15466
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Table 3.13: Willingness to participate in future surveys
Would participate Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
another time
Respondent
HH income 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.266 0.000 0.352 0.000 0.352
HH income squared 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.160 -6.21E-10 0.209 -6.11E-10 0.216
HH income imputed (D) -0.202 0.181 -0.228 0.140 -0.166 0.287 -0.168 0.280
Age 0.000 0.996 0.005 0.863 0.007 0.817 0.009 0.759
Age squared 0.000 0.813 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.679 0.000 0.628
Secondary school (D) 0.064 0.619 -0.010 0.946 0.035 0.811 0.024 0.868
Graduation diploma (D) 0.144 0.430 0.003 0.989 0.092 0.667 0.063 0.765
University degree (D) -0.134 0.433 -0.287 0.175 -0.172 0.424 -0.191 0.373
East Germany (D) 0.246 0.070 0.285 0.044 0.240 0.095 0.241 0.093
Worker (D) 0.174 0.228 0.132 0.369 0.148 0.320 0.136 0.356
Civil Servant (D) 0.113 0.593 0.082 0.703 0.040 0.853 0.074 0.731
Farmer (D) -0.755 0.426 -0.924 0.341 -1.121 0.266 -1.076 0.288
Self-employed (D) -0.124 0.529 -0.174 0.387 -0.216 0.292 -0.223 0.273
Retired (D) 0.302 0.097 0.273 0.139 0.274 0.139 0.271 0.143
Unemployed (D) 0.147 0.502 0.260 0.255 0.201 0.383 0.245 0.287
Small Community (D) 0.493 0.002 0.559 0.001 0.601 0.000 0.577 0.001
Version
Interview version 3 (D) -0.407 0.001 -0.352 0.004 -0.344 0.006 -0.375 0.003
Interview version 4 (D) -0.367 0.002 -0.350 0.005 -0.364 0.004 -0.356 0.004
Interviewer
Experienced > 4 years (D) -0.199 0.051 -0.260 0.013 -0.233 0.024
Female (D) -0.104 0.302 -0.090 0.380 -0.093 0.361
Older than resp. (D) -0.056 0.656 -0.058 0.646 -0.051 0.685
Higher schooling (D) -0.018 0.887 0.007 0.956 0.023 0.852
Lower schooling (D) 0.259 0.069 0.235 0.106 0.271 0.060
Feedback
Positive / Interesting subject 0.249 0.004
Privacy 0.471 0.000
Interview not too long 0.591 0.080
Easy to answer -0.206 0.594
at least one of the 4 latter pos. 0.283 0.000
Constant 0.490 0.419 0.553 0.394 0.556 0.396 0.463 0.478
Number of obs 773 764 764 764
LR 38.65 49.69 73.85 66.4
Prob larger chi2 0.0032 0.0010 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.0381 0.0495 0.0736 0.0662
Log likelihood -487.86982 -476.60255 -464.51875 -468.24662
Chapter 4
Extensions to Saving in Germany
4.1 Introduction
This chapter represents a seamless extension to the paper of Bo¨rsch-Supan and Essig (2003), “Saving
in Germany”. They exploited the 2001 SAVE study to shed more light on the the Germans’ savings
behavior.
The main findings of Bo¨rsch-Supan and Essig (2003), briefly, are: Overall, they find extraordinarily
stable savings patterns. More than 40% of German households save regularly a fixed amount. About
25% of German households plan their savings and have a clearly defined savings target in mind. Most
of German household saving is in the form of contractual saving, such as saving plans, whole life
insurance and building society contracts; see Walliser and Winter (1999) for review. This makes the
flow of saving rather unresponsive to economic fluctuations, such as income shocks. Most households
prefer to cut consumption if ends do not meet. In particular the elderly do not like to use credit cards,
and they eschew debt.
This chapter will add new insight to the results from Bo¨rsch-Supan and Essig (2003) with the new
available SAVE data from the year 2003.41 These new data are composed by two different subsamples.
The first one is a panel sample from households being asked in both available waves, while the second
one is an additional ‘refreshment sample’. Methodological aspects of the SAVE data will not be
discussed in this chapter; they are summarized in Chapter 2. In order to distinguish year and sample
effects, all results will be presented pooled and separately for each subsample if possible.42
At the time field work for this survey has been done (June 2001 and June 2003) several political
incidents had strong influence
The gap between the June 2001 and June 2003 - when the field work has been done - was a time of
destructive political events worldwide, beginning with the attacks against the WTC, followed by the
war against Afghanistan and ending with the third, still ongoing gulf war. These events brought up a
time of insecurity all over the world.
In Germany, two additional events took place in that time span. First, the Euro was introduced
as hard cash in Germany on January 1, 200243, and ever since there was a discussion of an addi-
tional inflation induced by that introduction. Even the German Minister of Finance, Hans Eichel,
41 This chapter was written excluding the 2004 TPI subsample, cf. Table 2.1, since this subsample was not available until
the end of August 2004. An exception is Section 4.4 where results for the new included risk variables are presented.
42 Panel analysis is, by construction, only possible for the CAPI 2001 and 2003 subsamples.
43 while it was already introduced as the official currency of the European Monetary Union on January 1, 1999
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publicly called to boycott presumed inflationary industries using the Euro to ‘raise prices and profits’
in May 2002. While some researches demonstrate that this inflationary feeling is due to risen prices of
only some products in the basket44, see Ifo Institut (2002), others refer to psychological phenomena
like biased assimilation and attitude polarization, see Frey et al . (2002). Second, even though the
demographic changes of the aging population in Germany are well known for years, there has not
been a large public debate on the pension and social security system in Germany. This definitely
changed with the installation of the so-called ‘Ruerup-Commission’45 in 2003; recommendations of
the commission were also published before the field work of the second wave. The main message of
the commission’s report are, very briefly, that private old-age provision and health-care will become
more and more important. Even if the majority of the population might have implicitly doubted the
long-run stability of the social security systems, the problem is now much more obvious.
So, indeed, the situation in 2003 is different to the one in 2001 in many respects. And for that
reason reading the SAVE data again might be an instructive exercise.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the present, the past and the future of
the Germans’ judgement of their well-being in the light of the possible worsening of the population’s
confidence. Section 4.3 reports findings for respondents’ information level on and expectations for the
public pension systems. Section 4.4 describes results for the recently included46 risk questions. It tests
the reliability of the experimental question design and links self-assessed risk to respondents’ financial
behavior. Section 4.5 summarizes the findings on these three topics.
Due to sampling issues of the SAVE dataset (see Chapter 2), three major questions will be discussed
in this chapter. First, will there be difference in the strict panel structure of the data, i.e., what are,
if any, the changes between 2001 and 2003 of households being exclusively observed in both years?
This clearly offers the most interesting research fundament since values can compare households one
by one. Second, do households differ in the two 2003 subsamples? If not, this would allow pooling of
the two 2003 subsamples, as was the case in 2001, see Bo¨rsch-Supan and Essig (2003). Third, pooling
subsamples in years, are there significant changes between 2001 and 2003? The abundance of tables
and figures requires showing only significant ones. All other not shown but mentioned results will be
available by the author on request.
All presented values underlying every table and figure in this chapter will be weighted across
subsamples. See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the data’s representativeness and the construction
of used weights. The chosen weights from Chapter 2.4.2 refer to the dimensions subsamples, net
household income, and age.
4.2 Well-being and living situation
This section shows values for the respondents’ evaluation of the present, the past and the future.
Bo¨rsch-Supan and Essig (2003) found that the majority of those surveyed consider that their situation
44 which were often due to higher taxes, e.g. on alcohol and tobacco
45 Cf. the report of the Kommission zur Nachhaltigkeit der Finanzierung der sozialen Sicherungssysteme (2003)
46 In the SAVE 2004 wave, surveyed in June/July 2004.
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is really positive, what may be a surprise because of the Germans’ rather pessimistic reputation. The
question asked here is whether these findings can be affirmed two years later.
4.2.1 The present
What variables would be influenced by the time change between 2001 and 2003? This is the topic of
this subsection. As argued in the introduction, the exogenous shocks in 2001, 2002 and 2003 might
have caused or induced a change of behavior. But has it also changed personal contentment? This will
be analyzed looking at five variables: health, work, housing, income, and the general living situation.47
It might well be the case that in general, respondents feel worse in general 2001 than in 2003 (living
situation), but when directly asked to certain specific categories, one does not observe significant
changes at all.
Panel results
Figure 4.1 compares households observed in both years,48 while Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of
the differences between the two years. Taking a scale from 0 to 10, which ranges from “completely
discontent” to “very content”, the majority of those surveyed classed themselves in the middle (the
rating 5) or to the right of this (values 6 to 10). One can see no tremendous change in the pictures of
the satisfaction items. The influence of deteriorated exogenous factors on the individual well-being is
thus not directly reflected in the contentment variables. Running Ordered probit regressions49 separate
for all of these five variables on a constant and a dummy for the second wave one can see the results
suggested by Figure 4.1 proved: only in the regression of the general living contentment variable
shows a significant deterioration in 2003 can be observed. This seems to back the hypothesis from
the previous paragraph that respondents, when asked specifically, will not translate these changed
environmental conditions into an adaption of evaluating present contentment.50
Other results
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the analog results for the comparison of the two SAVE 2003 subsamples and
between the pooled 2001 and 2003 subsamples. The figures leave us with two insights. First, there
47 The exact wording was: “You will see a list of things that carry a certain significance in life. Please state according
to a scale of 1 to 10 in how far you are content with the respective aspect. 0 means very discontented and 10 means
very content. How content are you in regard to: (a) your health? (b) Your job? (c) Your housing? (d) Your income?
(e) Your standard of living in general?”
48 A so-called ‘flag’ filter (a variable controlling for respondent identity within each household) was introduced to
eliminate observations when a respondent change in 2003 was suspected (e.g., the partner of the year 2001 is the
respondent in 2003); this was done when the gender of the interviewee differed. One thereby loses 4 observations (2
in each wave since only a fully balanced panel is considered.). A different flag filter based on the interviewee’s birth
year proved to be problematic since it changed sometimes only by one year, leaving the possibility that respondents
rather fib about their age (32 cases) than actually observing a real respondent change. This is much less less likely
for the gender variable, reducing the type-I – error (incorrectly dropping observations) practically to zero.
49 Not shown here, but available on request.
50 Calculating t tests for the means of these variables, we see in every case lower means in 2003 than in 2001, only one
of them (for housing) being significant. The problem of this procedure is that values of these variables cannot be
interpreted as cardinal values.
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are no profound differences between the two SAVE 2003 subsamples,51 and second, the satisfaction
level did not change in a large scope between 2001 and 2003. A figure comparable to Figure 4.2 is of
course not feasible since this can only be done when we observe households more than once.
4.2.2 The past
Panel results
These assessments are supported by past experience. Table 4.1 focuses the attention on the income
situation. Those surveyed were asked to compare their current income situation with the situation
five years ago.52 The table shows that more households are in a significantly better situation than are
in a significantly worse situation. The improvement in income in the middle category is particularly
noticeable: whereas 25.1% of households verify that their income situation is ‘slightly better’ than it
was five years ago, only 13.8% ascertain that they are in a slightly worse position. Just under a third
of those households surveyed remain at the same level.53
Table 4.1: Change of the income situation
2001
2003 Significantly better Slightly better About the same Slightly worse Sign. worse
Significantly better 28 16 9 3 0
31.5% 11.4% 6.5% 5.9% 0.0%
Slightly better 28 54 26 7 7
31.5% 38.6% 18.8% 13.7% 18.0%
About the same 17 46 64 15 8
19.1% 32.9% 46.4% 29.4% 20.5%
Slightly worse 9 14 25 14 8
10.1% 10.0% 18.1% 27.5% 20.5%
Significantly worse 7 10 14 12 16
7.9% 7.1% 10.1% 23.5% 41.0%
Source: SAVE 2001 / 2003
Note: Row values add to 100% per column.
The direct comparison of the evaluation of the income situation is shown in Figure 4.5. Compared
to the evaluation in 2001, the evaluation in 2003 is more evenly distributed: the share of respondents
claiming that their income situation worsened in the last five years almost doubled in 2003 compared
to 2001.
51 Remember, all tables and figures present weighted values.
52 The exact wording was: “Is your income situation, compared with five years ago (a) significantly better (b) slightly
better (c) about the same (d) slightly worse (e) significantly worse?” This question was followed by: “During the last
five years, did your income (a) Fluctuate significantly (b) Fluctuate slightly (c) Not fluctuate at all?”
53 Zaller (1992) investigates variability over time for attitude changes within a four months period. The five item answers
(where one of them was a “don’t know”-item) were only equivalent in 48% of the cases; in Table 4.1, we find equivalent
answers after two years in 38.5% of the cases (which are marked along the cross-diagonal in the table). On the one
hand, keeping the Zaller’s results in mind, one has to be careful interpreting the observed changes as real time effects;
on the other hand, we observe a skewness towards a more pessimistic assessment, analog to the results in Section
4.2.1.
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Table 4.2: Income fluctuations during the last 5 years
2001
2003 Significant fluctuation Slight fluctuation No fluctuation at all
Significant fluctuation 35 41 16
40.7% 18.7% 11.3%
Slight fluctuation 37 121 62
43.0% 55.3% 43.7%
No fluctuation at all 14 57 64
16.3% 26.0% 45.1%
In households where any change at all occurred, it appears that these tended to be minimal, as
can be seen in Table 4.2. Only around a quarter of those surveyed indicated significant fluctuations
in income.
Other results
Figure 4.6 expands the results from the past section to all SAVE 2001 and 2003 subsamples. The
results show that differences between the two years, if pooling the subsections by year, is not pro-
nounced.
4.2.3 The future
From this view of the past it might be interesting to compare the results to the view of the future.
Figure 4.9 shows the future expectations of the households surveyed. First, I look at the situation
of the individual. The perspectives for their own health, the health of their partners and their own
financial situation are largely seen in a positive light. This is all the more astonishing because the
overall economic situation at the time the survey was conducted in spring 2001 and 2003 already
showed considerable signs of a downturn - a fact that was very clear in the survey (chart on the
left “Economic trends in Germany”). The objection that the households in SAVE are considerably
wealthier than in the average population if no weighting is applied (see Tables 2.9 and 2.10) does
not explain this observation, because the weighted income does not show any statistically significant
differences over and above the 2000 and 2002 micro-census.
The insight gained at the end of this section is that, in contrast to current voices of foreboding
in respect of the downturn in the economy (which tends to be cyclical and therefore perhaps not so
very surprising for many people) but also the threat to economic growth resulting from the general
pessimism following the terrorist attacks, it can be seen that people give their responses in a context
of a healthy assessment of their own situation and an economic basis of this kind.
Panel results
In contrast to the results for the present contentment variables presented in Section 4.2.1, we see a
rather pronounced shift for the expectations of the economic situation. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show that
especially for the economic development of Germany, households became more pessimistic in 2003;
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the lowest value, zero, indicating a pure pessimistic expectation, was chosen five times as often in
2003 than in 2001 (from 3 to 15% of all respondents). In contrast, the own health situation as well as
the health situation of the partner has not changed significantly. This supports the hypothesis from
the introduction that indeed households adapted to the changed environmental conditions; Figures
4.7 and 4.8 also prove that there is no general gloomy prophecy but households rather know to differ
between dimensions indeed affected by environmental changes between 2001 and 2003 of the kind
we discussed before, and dimensions like health, which are rather exogenous due to these changes.
Another interesting result which is also known from other studies and from psychological literature
can be seen in Figures 4.7 and 4.8: households tend to think that they might not be beaten as hard
as the average when conditions worsen.
Effects on financial behavior Given the reduced optimism concerning Germany’s future economic
development, one might interested whether this translates into changed financial behavior. I will ex-
amine this question by two topics. First, will the precautionary saving motive become more important,
and second, do households hold less stocks.54
Table 4.3: Differences in stock ownership rates by expectations for Germany’s economic development
2001 2003 Difference
Non-Pessimists 29.7% 23.1% 6.6%
Pessimists 32.5% 22.4% 10.2%
Notes: Unweighted values. The difference-in-difference value of 3.6% is significant at the 1%-level
Table 4.3 shows differences for stock ownership rates stratified by expectations for Germany’s eco-
nomic development. Pessimists were defined as respondents whose difference between the expectations
of 2001 and 2003 was below the median value of -2. The significant larger drop of ownership rates of
the pessimists seems to support the findings of Bo¨rsch-Supan and Essig (2003) that intentions, or in
this case, assessments, are supported by households’ actions.
Saving motives The SAVE questionnaire asks for judging the importance of nine savings motives on
a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘completely unimportant’ and 10 ‘very important’, respectively.55
Figure 4.12 shows the panel results for nine savings motives as the share of respondents judging the
motives being important (defined as judgements ranging from 8 to 10).
The analogue presentation to the previous paragraph can thus be done only implicitly since the
answers to the savings motives are measured on an ordinal scale (cf. Footnote 50), and so a difference-
in-difference approach is presented implicitly in Figure 4.12. We see slightly positive differences for
the pessimistic households.
To identify the effect of deteriorated confidence in Germany’s economic development, I apply the
following methodology. Again, pessimists were defined as respondents whose difference between the
54 The small sample size for this panel analysis is a serious issue and limits some analysis to bivariate correlation tables.
This leaves room for more detailed analysis at a later stage of the SAVE panel when more observations will be
available.
55 Chapter 5 will analyze the importance of each of the nine saving motives in detail. In this chapter, the point of
interest is whether we can observe changes in judging the savings motives over time.
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expectations of 2001 and 2003 was below the median value of -2. This adaption of expectations will be
called the ‘treatment’, i.e. whether respondents reacted to the possibly changed economic environment.
On the other hand, the ‘control group’ are respondents who did not adjust their expectations in that
manner. Since the CAPI subsample was observed in 2001 and 2003, it is possible to control for effects
which were experienced by both groups (‘time effect’). When a control group is present, the design in
psychology has been called the untreated control group design with pretest and posttest; see Meyer
(1995). This can be identified with the difference-in-difference technique.
Table 4.4 shows results from difference-in-difference ordered probit regressions of savings motives
on dummy variables for the year 2003 and for pessimistic households56.
Again, the outcome, savingmotiveXi, was modeled by the following equation
savingmotiveXi = α + βT imei + γPessimisti + δ(Timei · Pessimisti) + εi (4.1)
where
α = constant term
β = time trend common to control and treatment group
γ = treatment group specific effect (to account for average permanent
differences between treatment and control)
δ = true effect of treatment
εi = random, unobserved ‘error’ term which contains all
determinants of savingmotiveXi which the model omits
Of course, this is not some difference-in-difference model in the classical sense, since in this model
here, respondents self-selected themselves into the treatment group. In other words, I take account
for the fact that the time trend is not common to all respondents, dividing them into two different
groups. The objections to such an approach are summarized in Meyer (1995) who gives an excellent
review for the validity threats to models of this kind.
Table 4.4 reveals three very interesting results. First, respondents becoming more pessimistic sig-
nificantly rate the precautionary savings motive more importantly (the highly significant positive
treatment dummy takes account for that fact). Second, savings for non-durable consumption like
travelling is negatively affected by pessimistic evaluations. Third, the old-age provision savings mo-
tive does not seem to be affected by more pessimistic economic evaluations (all parameters being
insignificant in that regression), not even a pure time effect seems to be relevant. Coming back to the
reasoning in Section 4.1, one can state the following: events having taken place between 2001 and 2003
affect the evaluation of Germany’s economic development in a negative way. Respondents whose drop
in this rating is more negative than the median also rate the precautionary savings motive as well as
supporting their offspring more important. The ongoing discussion about the German pension system
56 Pessimism, again, is defined as the difference between the expectations of 2001 and 2003 being below the median
value of -2.
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Table 4.4: Ordered probit estimates: savings motives by time and pessimism
Purchase of Precautions for Paying off debts Old-age provision Travelling
real estate unexpected events
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Time effect -0.099 0.227 -0.202 0.009 -0.045 0.572 -0.010 0.902 -0.090 0.234
Group effect -0.397 0.212 -0.485 0.092 0.071 0.812 -0.402 0.168 0.530 0.071
Treatment effect 0.304 0.365 0.762 0.012 -0.100 0.750 0.368 0.232 -0.621 0.045
Major purchases Education / support of Bequests for Taking advantage
children /grandchildren children / grandchildren of state subsidies
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Time effect -0.284 0.000 -0.035 0.653 -0.079 0.326 -0.023 0.769
Group effect -0.051 0.859 -0.661 0.037 -0.358 0.268 -0.381 0.214
Treatment effect 0.143 0.638 0.546 0.100 0.253 0.455 0.251 0.437
Notes: Cut-off parameters are not reported. Significant parameters are highlighted.
and the rising importance of private contributions for old-age did not seem to affect respondents’
evaluation of this savings motive.
4.3 Pensions
The German private pension system (“public retirement insurance” / ‘Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung’
[GRV]) which covers about 85% of the German workforce57 has undergone continuous reforms concern-
ing retirement payments58 and pathways into retirement59. Bo¨rsch-Supan and Wilke (2003) provide
a description of the recent history of institutional changes of the German pension system.
This section will not go into details of the pension system’s institutional background. Rather,
it checks whether the broad discussion on the future of the German pension system which was in-
tensified by the 2001 “Riester”-Reform and reinforced by proposals of the 2003 Ru¨rup-commission
induced changes of expectations concerning the generosity of the pension system with respect to the
replacement rate (direct financial effect) and the pension entry age (indirect financial effect).








αt = pension replacement rate in year t
YA−1 = income in last year before pension entry
T = time of death
A = pension entry age
57 Cf. Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003)
58 Cf. Bo¨rsch-Supan et al . (2004c)
59 Cf. Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003)
4.3 Pensions 61
PW = discounted pension wealth
rt = discount factor in year t
While T and rt are exogenous for the insured persons, this is only true for the pension entry
age A and the replacement rate α, when there exists no compulsory retirement age. In an actuarial
fair pension system, α and A are directly connected: the higher the pension entry age, the higher
will be the replacement rate to compensate for (1) the shorter time span of pension receipts until T
and (2) for higher accrued claims during the working life (since the expected pension wealth should
equal the accrued pension contributions at time A). Actuarial fairness would then determine the
replacement rate αt to ascertain this equality. Departures from actuarially fair replacement rates
generate incentive effects, mostly to early retirement due to more ‘generous’ pension reforms. Many
studies have looked at these incentives effects by microeconometric modelling (Bo¨rsch-Supan (1992),
Schmidt (1995), Siddiqui (1997), Bo¨rsch-Supan (2000), Bo¨rsch-Supan (2001), and Bo¨rsch-Supan et al .
(2004c). See also Bo¨rsch-Supan et al . (2004a) for a review on the Germans’ knowledge on the pension
system and willingness to accept pension reforms.
This section is structured as follows. First, I will analyze whether the mentioned discussion about
the future of the German security systems induced changes on respondents’ information level by
exploring refusals and ‘don’t know’ answers to pension parameter questions. As a second step, I
examine whether respondents changed and their expectations concerning parameters of Equation 4.2,
namely, the pension entry age, A, and the replacement rate, α. Third, I will inspect the importance
of private pensions before and after the pension reform discussion.
4.3.1 Information level on pension parameters
Table 4.14 shows probit regression results for refusals for the expected pension entry age. Several
results are worth noting. First, as expected, refusal is a function of age. But interestingly, the age
polynomial’s minimum is about 37 - 38 years.60 One would rather suspect that the closer one is
away from the event of pension entry, the higher the probability that the actual year is known.61
Interpreting refusals for this question as insecureness for knowledge, this seems surprising. Second,
the year dummy for 2003 is highly negative significant in the respondents’ regression. This can be
interpreted that respondents in the year 2003 cared more about retirement than in 2001. Third, there
seems to be evidence that refusals and therefore knowledge about own and partner’s pension entry is
correlated: respondents giving answers for themselves have a higher probability of answering also to
the partner’s question.
60 This means that after that age, nonresponse will rise with age
61 Or, that the variance of knowledge is a positive function of time to retirement: the closer the retirement age, the
better the knowledge and the smaller the variance.
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4.3.2 Pension age
In the SAVE questionnaire, several pension related questions were asked. As mentioned in the in-
troduction, one of the interesting research topics of savings behavior is the relevance of households’
information and expectations about their pension level. As mentioned earlier in Section 4.2, one would
expect some reaction from households to changed economic and political environments. Apart from
relatively soft questions like expectations, we are interested whether there is also some significant
reaction concerning more specific questions. One major debate of the year 2003 was the adaption
of Germany’s pension system to the challenge of demographic changes. By that time, one of the
most discussed questions was the increase of the normal pension entry age from 65 to 67 years. Did
respondents react to that discussion, and if so, how large was the reaction? Table 4.5 shows average
pension entry ages, observed ones (from the GSOEP and the VDR) and expected values from SAVE .
Table 4.5: Estimated and expected pension entry age
SOEP 1999a VDR 2001b SAVE 2001c SAVE 2003c
Men Women Men and Women Men Women Men Women
Mean 59.7 60.7 60.2 62.9 61.9 63.5 63.0
Median / / / 64 62 65 65
Standard Deviation / / / 3.22 2.89 4.01 3.72
Standard Error / / / 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.13
N / / / 941 340 852 830
a Source: Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003)
b Source: Own calculations / data were supported by Christina B. Wilke.
c Notes: Weighted values, pooled over subsamples. T-Tests for differences between 2001 and 2003 SAVE values are
significant.
The expected pension entry age is higher in SAVE than average observed values in the GSOEP
and in data we received from the Verband der Rentenversicherungstra¨ger (VDR). This divergence can
have several sources. One might be that respondents are more confident concerning their future health
or employment situation, or they are more pessimistic with regards to future pension regulations.
Table 4.13 shows regression results from the expected pension entry age on a set of household
and respondent characteristics. The strong positive significant effect of the time gap from 2001 to
2003 seems to support the formerly stated hypothesis that expectations have differed between 2001
and 2003. Also, while in the second specification dummies for both 2003 subsamples are significantly
positive, they are not significantly different from each other. The time effect is strong. A very good
and likely explanation is the exacerbated pension system discussion in 2002 and 2003.
Given these findings, a compelling question arises: Do changed expectations concerning the future
pension entry age alter the savings motive for old-age provision? The reason for that might be that
respondents whose expected pension entry age difference between 2003 and 2001 is above the median
might be more pessimistic concerning the future generosity of the pension system; their loss of faith in
the pension system might therefore correspond to a higher emphasize for private old-age provisions.62
62 Raising the pension entry age actually stabilizes the pension system and should induce more faith in the public
pension system. The argument here works the other way around: if there is a necessity to cut benefits (in any form,
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The results for this procedure are insignificant. In that sense, the evaluation of the importance of
savings motives is not affected by the changes in expectations concerning pension entry age. Adding
first differences in expectations for the future development of Germany’s economic situation does not
bring qualitative changes.
4.3.3 Pension levels
How well are people informed about pension levels? This is as much a serious question as the estimated
pension entry age.
Table 4.15 lists probit estimation results for ‘don’t knows’ and refusals for the replacement rates
of pension payments in relation to the last income before retirement, while Table 4.16 lists results for
the estimation for partner’s values.63
Coefficients for age are highly significant64 as one would expect them to be: the closer a person
comes to retirement, the higher the probability that he will inform himself about future pension
payments. Astonishingly, the coefficients for females are insignificant when looking at the information
level for the partner; the female dummy in the refusal regression is even significantly negative. Since
typically males are the financial officers65 in a household and typically have more complicated working
histories which in turn make replacement rate calculation more complicated66, one would suspect their
knowledge on their partner’s replacement rates to be higher. This is not supported by the data.
Pension level and pension age
As Equation 4.2 implies, pension entry age and the replacement rate are positively interrelated, since
the replacement, if adapted actuarially fair, is the degree of freedom parameter to equal retirement
contributions and pension payments when the pension entry age is chosen.
4.3.4 Private pensions
This Section compares the ownership rates for private pensions between 2001 and 2003.
Table 4.8 lists descriptive findings of private pension ownership rates for 2001 and 2003. At first
glance, the different rates for item nonresponse seem disturbing, but since the questioning was slightly
more complex for 2003, this can easily explain the different rates. The ownership rate presented for
2003 therefore can be viewed as a lower bound for ownership, since the rate was calculated assuming
the missing values to be zero. Just calculating the ratio for the values present would raise it from
like reducing the pension payment period by altering the entry age), one might begin to wonder how weak the system
already is.
63 The exact wording of the question was: “What percentage of your last wage/salary do you estimate your pension and
your partner’s pension will be?”
64 with a negative influence on the ‘don’t know’ and a positive influence on the ‘refusal’ probability
65 E.g. in about 75% of respondents claiming to be the household’s financial officer are male in the GSOEP
66 Opposingly, one could argue that women’s pensions levels are more difficult to calculate (effect of chid-raising al-
lowance, incomplete work histories, low wages etc.), but the author favors the previous argument
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Table 4.6: Expectations for pension entry age and replacement rates by age
Men Women
Age Pension entry age Replacement rate Pension entry age Replacement rate
under 30 63.6 50.9% 63.7 48.0%
30-39 64.0 57.6% 62.7 52.2%
40-49 63.0 59.4% 62.8 59.4%
50-59 62.8 62.5% 62.9 61.5%
60 and older 64.1 59.4% 63.2 61.6%
Notes: Means for weighted values. Random sample 2003 only. Self-employed respondents were excluded.
Table 4.7: Expectations for pension entry age and replacement rates by age
2001 2003
Men Women Men Women
Age Age Repl. rate Age Repl. rate Age Repl. rate Age Repl. rate
under 30 62.7 59.7% 61.8 52.9% 63.7 52.4% 63.7 48.4%
30-39 63.2 61.3% 61.6 60.9% 64.0 58.8% 62.8 52.7%
40-49 62.5 61.8% 61.8 62.0% 63.1 60.7% 62.7 59.6%
50-59 62.5 65.9% 61.4 61.1% 63.0 63.8% 62.8 61.4%
60 and older 64.2 63.9% 63.2 61.1% 64.1 59.8% 63.1 61.6%
Notes: Means for weighted values. Self-employed respondents were excluded.
20.4% to 22.7%, and assuming all missing values were indeed respondents not willing to admit or not
knowing the ownership, the ratio would rise to 30.6% as an upper bound.
Table 4.17 shows probit regression results for private pension ownership. Again, the time effect is
strongly significant: the ownership rates rose between 2001 and 2003.
Table 4.18 depicts probit estimation results for the three second pillar pension types the SAVE
questionnaire asks for. Income and age are significant for occupational pension schemes and other
private old-age provisions, while income is insignificant for ‘Riester’-type pensions - an interesting
Table 4.8: Private pension ownership rates
2001a 2003
N Percent N Percent
Private Pensions 297 16.53 529 20.4
Occupational pensions ./. 285 10.99
‘Riester’ pensions ./. 122 4.7
Other private pensions ./. 219 8.45
Refusals 15 0.83 265 10.22
Number of observations 1797b 2593b
Note: Unweighted values.
a Difference in question design: in 2003, private pensions were asked for each category separately, whereas in 2001, the
question directly addressed to all forms of private pensions.
b Observations differ from full sample (1829 obs. in 2001 and 2667 in 2003) because of not returned drop-off parts.
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insight. Further, as already was pointed out by Bo¨rsch-Supan and Essig (2003), there is evidence for
a relationship between households’ self-assessment and actual behavior: the old-age provision motive
is highly significant in any of the three regressions - the higher the rated importance of savings for
old-age, the higher the probability to own any of the second pillar or two third pillar pension types.
For the ‘Riester’-type pensions, the motive to take advantage of state/tax subsidies is also highly
significant.
Private pensions: panel results
Table 4.9 shows private pension ownership rates for households asked in 2001 and 2003.
Table 4.9: Private pension ownership rates: panel results
2001
2003 No Yes Refusals Total
No 279 21 2 302
71.4% 31.8% 50.0% 65.5%
Yes 91 39 1 131
23.3% 59.1% 25.0% 28.4%
Refusals 21 6 1 28
5.4% 9.1% 25.0% 6.1%
Total 391 66 4 461
Private pension ownership more than doubled. This result has to be taken with caution, as already
mentioned in Section 4.3.4, since the questionnaire has changed between both periods of time.67
A further analysis determining the contribution rates to private pensions can be found in Chapter
7.3.2.
4.4 Risk behavior
I now turn to topic remote to ones discussed in the two previous sections. In this section, I will present
first empirical results for risk measures, which I will link to financial behavior.
The SAVE survey contains risk variables on five different domains: health, job, financial, leisure
and sports, and when driving. Additionally, the SAVE 2005 sample will include questions for engaging
on four different activities, followed by a judgement on how risky these activities are evaluated. In
very recently received data68, these questions were already included to pretest their feasibility in the
field. Moreover, the new risk engagement and evaluation questions allow a consistency test for the
existing five risk domain questions.
67 And since in 2003, the survey design was more detailed than in 2001, it is possible that this leads to overestimation,
or, in 2001, to underestimation of private pensions rates, and thereby, pension wealth.
68 The 2001 TPI subsample was surveyed again in June/July 2004; data were received by August 20, 2004. This panel
panel sample contains 487 observations, which corresponds to a relatively high net percentage of 74% of the original
660 observations from 2001. I will not refer to any other survey results except the risk questions in this chapter.
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Table 4.10: Risk assessment question
“To what extent do the following statements apply to you. Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10,
where 0 means ‘does not apply at all’ and 10 means ‘applies very well’.
I do not mind taking risks with respect to :
1. My own health
2. My career
3. In money matters
4. With respect to leisure time and sports
5. When driving”
This section proceeds in the following way. First, I briefly summarize the sets of risk questions
contained in SAVE and show descriptive and regression results for the newly added questions. Second,
I describe the influence of risk measures on the financial behavior, mainly, on the portfolio composition.
4.4.1 Risk variables in SAVE
Risk assessment questions
In order to allow to link savings behavior to risk, the SAVE survey contains risk questions common
to all subsamples. The exact format of that question is shown in Table 4.10.
Weber et al . (2002) distinguish between five content domains:69 Financial, health/safety, recre-
ational, ethical and social decisions. Applying this scheme to the risk questions in SAVE , we see
that the five direct risk questions distinguish between 3 content domains: (a) Health /Safety (1. +
5.), (b) financial (3.) and (c) recreational (4). Considering the results from Weber et al . (2002), the
correlation coefficients between the risk domains would be positive, but significantly lower than 1.70
Table 4.11 shows that the highest correlation coefficient is 0.61 - well below 1.
Table 4.11: Correlations between risk domains
Health Career Money matters Leisure and sports
Health 1
Career 0.4852 1
Money matters 0.4277 0.5211 1
Leisure and sports 0.5061 0.5264 0.5419 1
When driving 0.4418 0.4583 0.5001 0.6072
Notes: N = 4476. Weighted values by income and age.
Source: All SAVE subsamples
The distributions of responses for the risk variables are shown in Figure 4.14, separately for each
subsample. Two things are worth noting. First, the value 0 is used particularly often in respect of
69 This bases on the work of Slovic and Lichtenstein (1986).
70 Simply spoken, this accounts for the fact that the preference for one risk domain is relatively offset by a less pronounced
risk preference in a different domain.
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Table 4.12: Risky activities
“Four different activities are described below. What is the probability that you would do one of
the following activities:
1. Walking around alone in an unknown neighborhood
2. Investing 5% of your yearly income in one stock
3. Putting a day’s income on a bet
4. Go climbing”
health, driving and investments, whereas 5 is fairly frequent for career and leisure/sport. Zero values
are also given more frequently by the respondents in the Random Route subsample. Second, changes
over time within subsamples, e.g. between the two times the TPI sample was surveyed, are very low,
thus indicating a high stability of the answers.
In Tables 4.19 and 4.20, the results of Figure 4.14 are analyzed multi-dimensionally. In the 2001
and 2004 TPI samples, respondents have a higher probability associating higher values to the risk-
assessment than the respondents in the 2001 CAPI set for all risk categories. Freelancers and self-
employed respondents describe themselves as showing more risky behavior in the fields of career and
money matters, which coincidences with the widespread outlook for these two employment categories.
Income variables are jointly significant for the risk categories money matters, leisure and sports, and
when driving, but not for career and health categories. A higher schooling degree also raises the
probability for higher risk values in four of the five categories. Still, one puzzling result is that civil
servants do not describe themselves as being less risky in career matters. Women have an overall
lower probability of associating high values to risk assessment. This is also in line with other findings
from sociopsychological literature, cf. Slovic (1997). Age is jointly significant for all risk domains; age
decreases the probability for high risk values. This means that older respondents, though not having
to care for children, are more risk averse.
Risky activities
It has been found in the psychological sciences that risk-taking is influenced by both, the characteristics
of the decision-maker and by the situation (cf. Bromiley and Curley (1992)). The SAVE TPI 2004
subsample thus was enriched by additional questions: engaging on four different activities. The exact
wording is shown in Table 4.12. The following two subsections present the results for these variables
using the data from the SAVE TPI 2004 subsample; a more thorough analysis will be possible after
the reception of the 2005 Random Route subsample data.
This question is followed by the request to judge the riskiness of each of the listed activities on
a scale from 0 to 10. The descriptive results are shown in Figure 4.15. It can be well seen that on
average, risk evaluation and the probability for exercising the activity are negatively correlated, thus
indicating that the questions were very well understood. Furthermore, and quite amazing, response
rates are close to 100%.
68 4 Extensions to Savings in Germany
Interaction of both sets of risk variables
The next step of analysis is to analyze the link between the two blocks of risk questions. This is
done by regressing the probabilities of exercising each of the four activities on a set of respondent
and household characteristics and the risk judgement of the corresponding activity, as well as the
five abstract risk variables using an Ordered Probit regression model. The results, which are shown
in Table 4.21, prove two things. First, the findings of Figure 4.15 that risk judgement and exercise
are positively correlated also holds in a more differentiated framework: for each regression, the risk
judgement associated with the risky activity is strongly negative significant. Second, for each activity,
the risk assessment question corresponding to each risky activity is positively significant. A high
self-assessed risk for leisure and sports raises the probability of walking alone through an unknown
neighborhood, which is also true for money matters risk and investing 5 % of household income in one
stock and for betting a day’s income; risking more concerning own’s health raises the probability of
climbing. These results show that obviously the abstractness of the risk questions does not prevent
respondents giving thoughtful and coherent answers. The next section will thus analyze the connection
of risk assessment and financial behavior.
Lottery questions
Before leaving this field, it might be interesting to take a look at a third set of risk attitude questions.
In 2004 and 2005, SAVE contains so-called lottery questions. Lottery, or gamble questions, can be
used to elicit individual value functions71, see Farquhar (1984), Abdellaoui (2000), Pennings and
Smidts (2003), or Wakker and Deneffe (1996). While lottery questions are a relatively common tool in
the economic literature to assess risk parameters, it is less common in the psychological literature in
which risk is assessed by directly asking for certain situations/events. The risk associated with these
situations then has to be evaluated by the respondent; see Weber et al . (2002).
In the SAVE lottery questions, respondents are given a set of hypothetical choices where each choice
is between a certain cash value and the toss of a coin when head pays a different value from tail. In
the first three lottery questions, the value of a head draw increases from 1,700 to 2,000 and 2,300 e,
where tail pays nothing and the certain cash value is 1,000 e. In the second set of lottery questions,
the certain cash value is 0, head brings a loss of 100 e, and the value of a tail draw changes from -150
to -200 and to -250 e.72 Figure 4.16 show the share of respondents choosing the toss of a coin when
the expected value of the lottery is increased. Again, as with the risk activity questions, we see that
values are consistent, since the fraction of respondents choosing the risky alternative rises when the
incentives to do so are increased. The risky alternative choice is also more frequent for the second set
of lotteries when payments are on a lower level, even if the the risky choice of the last question of the
first set offers the highest gain over the certainty equivalence. Overall, the choice probabilities for the
71 Value functions assign subjective values to a stated (objective) value, cf. Schunk and Betsch (2004).
72 This means that in the first set, a large number of repetitions would present the choice between 1,000 and 850, then
1000 and 1000, then 1000 and 1150 e, while in the second set, the values are 0 and 25, 0 and 50, and 0 and 75 e.
Risk neutral agents would simply compare these values and choose the alternative with the higher payments, while
risk avers agents need to be reimbursed for the taken risks, and risk seeking agents are willing to pay for the chance
of a higher gain.
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coin toss are relatively low given that, at least in the second set and partly in the first set, the choice
of the uncertain alternative offers the higher expected value.
Table 4.22 shows Probit and Ordered Probit regression results for the sets lottery questions. For the
Ordered Probit case, the depend variable was constructed in the following way. It takes on the value
0 if no lottery was chosen, 1 if only the lottery with the highest payoff, 2 if additionally the lottery
with the second highest and 3 if the lottery with the lowest expected payoff was chosen. In most
cases, respondents choosing lower expected value payoff lotteries also chose higher payoff lotteries.
This can be seen by comparing the results from the Ordered Probit regression results with the Binary
Probit regressions73, which are very similar. A very interesting effect, again, is that the shown risk
and lottery questions are reasonably connected. In Table 4.22, I included for all four regression types
three risk variables dealing with monetary risk. This is the direct self-assessed general monetary risk
questions, the probabilities of investing 5% of net income in a stock and for betting a day’s income.
The risky activity most directly connected to lotteries is betting. It is positively significant in all four
regressions which means that respondents more willing to place money on a bet are also more likely
to accept the lottery instead of the security equivalent. In the second set of lotteries, monetary risk
taking also rises the probability of choosing the lottery. Nearly every other personal and household
characteristic does not provide additional explanatory power.
Of course, one might tend to argue that TPI sampled households are highly selective since they
are used to those kinds of questions. This is not the entire truth. TPI comprises topics from market
research, consumption and living habits, to political and personal attitudes to the knowledge about
newest technologies. Additionally, in the case of the lottery and risk questions, the two set of questions
were rather remote in the questionnaire; between the two blocks lie about 25 minutes of interview
time,74 where the most complex interview part is in between. Even more surprising is the strong
consistency of the data.
Summarizing the results, the risk data are a promising base to work with. Skeptics might check
the additional data when risk questions will be incorporated into the Random Route and CAPI panel
subsamples in 2005.
In the following subsection, I will investigate the interrelation between risk questions and portfolio
compositions, controlling for personal and household characteristics.
4.4.2 Risk and portfolio composition
This section checks whether self-assessed risk affects financial behavior; I investigate this by using
portfolio shares of financial wealth asset categories.
73 The dependent variable takes on the value 1 if any of the lotteries was chosen instead of the risk-free payoff and 0,
otherweise.
74 Compared with the interview time from CAPI interviews; TPI interview mode is P&P thus offering no time tracking.
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Portfolios in SAVE
In this paragraph, I will very quickly review the portfolio choice for SAVE 2001 and 2003. This work
has been done prior to the arrival of the SAVE 2004 subsample.
Figure 4.13 shows ownership rates for the six financial wealth categories. Ownership rates are
comparable between subsample but for one item: stock ownership is more than twice as high for the
TPI 2001 subsample compared to the RR 2003 sample, considering weighted values. The values are
altogether higher than compared to the EVS for stock ownership.
Figure 4.17 shows the portfolio shares of each financial category to total financial wealth.75. Again,
subsample effects are strong: The relative value of saving accounts is almost twice as high in the RR
2003 sample as in the TPI 2001 sample. This cannot be attributed to a low number of cases: the
number of observations for conditional stock asset shares in the TPI sample is 160, as much as for
the CAPI 2001 sample, and more than for the RR 2003 sample. Dividing Figure 4.17 into three age
classes adds the insight that especially younger households in the TPI sample are more prone for stock
holding, cf. Figure 4.18.
Regression results
I proceed in the following way. Since the additional risk and lottery questions are not available but
for the TPI 2004 subsample, I limit the analysis to the set of risk questions present in all subsamples.
This means that there is only one question connected to monetary behavior, which will be included
in the analysis: self-assessed risk for money matters. Respondent were also given a question to what
extent seven statements apply to them. I picked one of them, optimism76, which in several other
analyses seemed to characterize households very well.
Since not every household holds all financial wealth categories, an OLS approach would not account
for this selectivity. I therefore apply the Heckman selection model. Finding the correct exclusion
restrictions is not an easy task since most variables are very likely to affect both, asset ownership and
the amount invested. Specification problems quickly lead to non-convergence of the ML-estimation of
the selection model. I therefore apply a very slim specification for the regression stage which lead to
convergence for all six asset categories.77
The regression results are presented in Tables 4.23 - 4.25.78 For the two most extreme asset cat-
egories79, saving accounts and stocks/fonds, the effects are very pronounced. Risk averse households
have a higher probability for saving account ownership, and their portfolio share rises with risk aver-
sion, as the negative significant coefficient for monetary risk indicates. For stocks and fonds, the
75 As numbers might be difficult to retrieve, results are also depicted in Figure 4.26
76 One of the seven questions was also whether respondents were pessimistic. This statement is basically redundant,
but was added as a plausibility check. The consistency of the response to the two contrary statements optimism
and pessimism is very high. The response scale ranges from 0 to 10 for the statements, and, hence, the sum of the
evaluations for optimism and pessimism should equal 10. 79% of respondents had this sum ranging from 8 to 12.
77 This was a second order polynomial for net income and age, and the risk variable.
78 I included the TPI 2004 panel for these regressions.
79 in the sense of return risk
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opposite applies. The probability of ownership rises with risk preference, and also the relative amount
of financial wealth invested in stocks.
For the other four wealth categories, the effects are a little less clear. Bond ownership rises with
risk preference, but not the portfolio share, which also applies to private old-age provisions.80 As for
whole life insurances, risk preferences increases the ownership probability, but affects the portfolio
share negatively.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter adds three branches to the investigation of Bo¨rsch-Supan and Essig (2003). The first one
is whether a deterioration in households’ contentment and confidence can be observed on a general
level. While the judgement of the present and the past is comparable between 2001 and 2003, the
evaluations for future expectations became more pessimistic. This can be linked to a re-evaluation of
the savings motive for old-age, which became more important.
The second checks whether this deterioration translates into one specific aspect for households’
saving behavior: the old-age provision, namely the public pension system. I observe two things: the
nonresponse and the ‘don’t know’ level have fallen between 2001 and 2003. The political discussion thus
might have been the catalyst to induce more individual concern for the respective pension situation.
Second, a slight rise of the expected pension entry age and a drop in the expected pension level can
be observed. This does not translate into an adaption of the evaluation of savings motives.
Risk assessment theoretically seems a promising procedure when determining household financial
behavior. The empirical implementation in SAVE was done including 5 risk questions covering 3 risk
domains. Using the ‘monetay risk’ variable, I find significantly higher probabilities of stock ownership
and portfolio shares. The opposite is true when looking at saving accounts.
In addition to these results, I analyze the experimental risk questions included in SAVE 2004. In
contrast to possibly sceptical objections to this kind of risk questions, these results prove two things.
First, nonresponse is neglectably low. Considering the unusual character of these questions even for
interview-skilled TPI respondents, this is a very positive result. Second, responses are sensible for
both sets of risk questions, lotteries and risk assessments / risky activities. Risk assessment can be
linked to financial behavior, as the regression results indicate. This is a promising base for further
analysis concerning risk and portfolio choice. The SAVE 2005 samples will show whether the response
quality level can be maintained for less interview skilled respondents.
80 In 2001, this category was asked less differentiated than in 2003 and 2004; I therefore summarize the three questions
for private pensions from 2003 and 2004 in one category.
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4.A Tables
Table 4.13: Expected pension entry age
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Net HH income / 10000 0.395 0.207 0.396 0.172
(Net HH income) squared / 10000 0.000 0.363 0.000 0.309
Age -0.074 0.054 -0.074 0.054
Age squared 0.001 0.047 0.001 0.046
Secondary school (D) 0.474 0.006 0.487 0.005
Graduation diploma (D) 0.707 0.002 0.710 0.002
University degree (D) 1.253 0.000 1.256 0.000
Partner (D) -0.365 0.021 -0.394 0.014
East Germany (D) 0.027 0.881 0.026 0.887
Female (D) -0.724 0.000 -0.726 0.000
Job: blue collar (D) 0.330 0.115 0.324 0.122
Job: civil servant (D) -1.190 0.000 -1.188 0.000
Job: freelancer (D) 1.271 0.006 1.285 0.006
Job: self employed (D) 0.171 0.564 0.171 0.563
Work parttime (D) 0.084 0.758 0.068 0.801
Work little (D) 0.797 0.009 0.773 0.011
Work not (D) 0.250 0.322 0.233 0.357
Unemployed (D) -0.350 0.223 -0.345 0.229
Village (D) -0.140 0.545 -0.119 0.608
Year 2003 (D) 0.814 0.000
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D) -0.276 0.201
Sample: Panel 2003 (D) 0.579 0.031
Sample: RR 2003 (D) 0.647 0.003
Constant 64.064 0.000 64.276 0.000
Number of obs 2799 2799
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.048 0.048
Adj. R-squared 0.041 0.041
Root MSE 3.496 3.496
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Table 4.14: Probit regression results for nonresponse to the pension entry age
Respondent Partner
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net HH income/10’ -0.163 0.415 -0.101 0.593 -0.294 0.177 -0.292 0.180 -0.620 0.016
Net HH income/10’ sq. 0.053 0.160 0.041 0.240 0.064 0.125 0.064 0.124 0.112 0.020
Age/10 -0.443 0.010 -0.469 0.006 -0.820 0.000 -0.827 0.000 -0.912 0.000
Age/10 squared 0.060 0.001 0.063 0.001 0.107 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.121 0.000
Secondary school (D) -0.148 0.098 -0.178 0.044 -0.050 0.568 -0.053 0.545 -0.014 0.889
Graduation diploma (D) -0.265 0.033 -0.262 0.033 -0.275 0.036 -0.280 0.032 -0.276 0.073
University degree (D) -0.093 0.441 -0.092 0.440 -0.041 0.720 -0.039 0.737 0.006 0.961
Partner (D) 0.116 0.194 0.166 0.056
East Germany (D) -0.104 0.308 -0.110 0.278 -0.259 0.015 -0.262 0.014 -0.294 0.019
Female (D) 0.107 0.227 0.129 0.141 -0.359 0.000 -0.350 0.000 -0.779 0.000
Job: blue collar (D) 0.038 0.732 0.058 0.598 -0.110 0.336 -0.107 0.349 -0.170 0.205
Job: civil servant (D) -0.117 0.478 -0.121 0.459 -0.207 0.193 -0.208 0.192 -0.222 0.237
Job: freelancer (D) -0.031 0.902 -0.059 0.815 -0.676 0.072 -0.678 0.071 -0.694 0.101
Job: self-employed (D) -0.260 0.132 -0.256 0.137 -0.533 0.017
Work parttime (D) -0.059 0.691 -0.034 0.817 -0.358 0.065 -0.351 0.069 -0.218 0.362
Work little (D) 0.160 0.291 0.198 0.187 -0.022 0.890 -0.016 0.921 0.152 0.398
Work not (D) 0.473 0.000 0.503 0.000 0.317 0.004 0.321 0.003 0.398 0.001
Unemployed (D) -0.362 0.011 -0.362 0.011 -0.301 0.053 -0.292 0.059 -0.400 0.024
Village (D) -0.110 0.410 -0.152 0.249 0.036 0.761 0.033 0.785 0.030 0.826
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D) -0.290 0.004 -0.004 0.966 -0.072 0.379
Sample: Panel 2003 (D) -1.047 0.000 -0.145 0.292 0.625 0.153
Sample: RR 2003 (D) -0.524 0.000 -0.053 0.606
Year 2003 (D) -0.424 0.000 0.613 0.167 0.096 0.312
Refusal respondent(D) 2.434 0.000
Constant -0.327 0.403 -0.494 0.193 0.613 0.167 0.625 0.153 0.477 0.348
Number of obs 2879 2879 2250 2250 2250
LR chi2 129.1 110.73 274.81 274.24 704.71
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R squared 0.076 0.066 0.141 0.141 0.362
Log likelihood -780.487 -789.672 -835.104 -835.387 -620.155
Notes: Observations were excluded if partner was retired or self-employed.
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Table 4.15: Probit regression results for ‘don’t know’ and refusals for own pension replacement rates
Don’t Know Refusal Don’t Know or Refusal
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net HH income/10’ -0.207 0.038 -0.213 0.032 0.008 0.968 0.126 0.538 -0.210 0.033 -0.203 0.040
Net HH income/10’ sq. 0.020 0.157 0.021 0.138 -0.015 0.734 -0.040 0.406 0.017 0.227 0.016 0.259
Age/10 0.247 0.102 0.245 0.103 -0.575 0.000 -0.563 0.000 -0.244 0.079 -0.241 0.082
Age/10 squared -0.049 0.006 -0.048 0.007 0.080 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.018 0.273 0.017 0.285
Secondary school (D) -0.093 0.136 -0.088 0.156 -0.096 0.246 -0.119 0.147 -0.137 0.029 -0.142 0.023
Graduation diploma (D) -0.168 0.048 -0.167 0.049 -0.134 0.234 -0.121 0.275 -0.225 0.008 -0.224 0.008
University degree (D) -0.135 0.118 -0.136 0.115 -0.204 0.084 -0.211 0.073 -0.220 0.010 -0.219 0.011
Partner (D) 0.030 0.599 0.015 0.790 -0.228 0.004 -0.148 0.053 -0.060 0.296 -0.042 0.463
East Germany (D) 0.028 0.675 0.029 0.668 0.059 0.511 0.057 0.524 0.046 0.487 0.045 0.497
Female (D) 0.134 0.031 0.131 0.033 0.135 0.097 0.144 0.076 0.194 0.002 0.196 0.001
Job: blue collar (D) -0.119 0.110 -0.122 0.100 0.085 0.410 0.103 0.313 -0.084 0.256 -0.080 0.275
Job: civil servant (D) -0.600 0.000 -0.599 0.000 -0.050 0.746 -0.060 0.694 -0.543 0.000 -0.544 0.000
Job: freelancer (D) 0.193 0.242 0.197 0.232 0.110 0.627 0.099 0.655 0.255 0.115 0.250 0.121
Job: self employed (D)
Work parttime (D) 0.164 0.092 0.160 0.099 0.011 0.936 0.020 0.886 0.163 0.093 0.167 0.086
Work little (D) 0.166 0.117 0.158 0.136 0.326 0.016 0.356 0.008 0.326 0.003 0.334 0.002
Work not (D) 0.252 0.005 0.248 0.006 0.495 0.000 0.507 0.000 0.538 0.000 0.543 0.000
Unemployed (D) 0.020 0.845 0.020 0.843 -0.248 0.051 -0.241 0.057 -0.155 0.143 -0.155 0.143
Village (D) -0.057 0.511 -0.047 0.584 -0.066 0.586 -0.116 0.334 -0.081 0.346 -0.093 0.276
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D) 0.113 0.149 -0.524 0.000 -0.136 0.077
Sample: Panel 2003 (D) 0.034 0.730 -0.617 0.000 -0.244 0.012
Sample: RR 2003 (D) -0.003 0.964 -0.417 0.000 -0.209 0.006
Year 2003 (D) -0.068 0.210 -0.133 0.076 -0.130 0.016
Constant -0.335 0.291 -0.249 0.422 0.079 0.828 -0.326 0.354 0.978 0.001 0.872 0.003
Number of obs 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835
LR chi2 181.16 178.88 126.78 97.84 242.76 239.47
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R squared 0.047 0.046 0.065 0.050 0.062 0.061
Log likelihood -1835.521 -1836.659 -917.202 -931.671 -1839.564 -1841.207
Notes: Observations were excluded if respondent was retired or self-employed.
Table 4.16: Probit regression results for ‘don’t know’ and refusals for partner’s pension replacement rates
Don’t Know Refusal Don’t Know or Refusal
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net HH income/10’ -0.573 0.002 -0.569 0.002 -0.118 0.609 -0.054 0.813 -0.625 0.000 -0.597 0.001
Net HH income/10’ sq. 0.086 0.018 0.085 0.019 0.031 0.484 0.018 0.692 0.100 0.004 0.094 0.007
Age/10 -0.057 0.753 -0.054 0.767 -0.472 0.024 -0.451 0.031 -0.394 0.034 -0.385 0.038
Age/10 sq. 0.000 0.981 -0.001 0.966 0.066 0.005 0.063 0.007 0.045 0.032 0.044 0.036
Secondary school (D) -0.031 0.680 -0.032 0.668 -0.095 0.321 -0.109 0.251 -0.087 0.254 -0.098 0.198
Graduation diploma (D) -0.106 0.310 -0.105 0.314 -0.101 0.447 -0.095 0.472 -0.164 0.120 -0.165 0.117
University degree (D) 0.023 0.820 0.023 0.822 -0.361 0.009 -0.354 0.010 -0.159 0.121 -0.156 0.128
East Germany (D) -0.016 0.848 -0.016 0.848 -0.070 0.530 -0.072 0.518 -0.048 0.569 -0.051 0.545
Female (D) 0.009 0.912 0.008 0.915 -0.097 0.354 -0.078 0.449 -0.041 0.612 -0.033 0.677
Job: blue collar (D) -0.110 0.209 -0.109 0.213 0.025 0.830 0.038 0.740 -0.107 0.228 -0.098 0.268
Job: civil servant (D) -0.130 0.259 -0.129 0.261 0.220 0.128 0.211 0.143 -0.029 0.801 -0.031 0.789
Job: freelancer (D) -0.258 0.225 -0.260 0.220 -0.031 0.915 -0.088 0.761 -0.255 0.219 -0.275 0.184
Work parttime (D) 0.103 0.381 0.103 0.378 -0.090 0.587 -0.073 0.655 0.065 0.587 0.078 0.514
Work little (D) -0.132 0.311 -0.130 0.320 0.053 0.755 0.088 0.604 -0.114 0.390 -0.091 0.492
Work not (D) -0.095 0.388 -0.095 0.384 0.230 0.104 0.245 0.081 0.030 0.791 0.040 0.718
Unemployed (D) 0.104 0.426 0.103 0.429 0.010 0.949 0.013 0.934 0.119 0.379 0.120 0.376
Village (D) -0.263 0.011 -0.267 0.009 0.131 0.310 0.089 0.486 -0.187 0.069 -0.211 0.038
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D) -0.044 0.612 -0.384 0.001 -0.240 0.006
Sample: Panel 2003 (D) -0.106 0.358 -0.350 0.021 -0.286 0.015
Sample: RR 2003 (D) -0.119 0.174 -0.218 0.044 -0.233 0.008
Year 2003 (D) -0.092 0.188 -0.053 0.552 -0.113 0.106
Constant 0.599 0.136 0.568 0.154 -0.091 0.851 -0.348 0.465 1.664 0.000 1.503 0.000
Number of obs 1922 1922 1922 1922 1922 1922
LR chi2 38.67 38.39 51.69 39.02 53.49 45.75
Prob > F 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R squard 0.0145 0.014 0.036 0.027 0.021 0.018
Log likelihood = -1312.436 -1312.573 -695.871 -702.207 -1255.600 -1259.466
Notes: Observations were excluded if partner was retired or self-employed.
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Table 4.17: Probit regression results for private pension ownership
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net HH income/10’ 0.310 0.050 0.288 0.069
Net HH income/10’ sq. -0.082 0.033 -0.075 0.050
Age/10 0.533 0.000 0.515 0.000
Age/10 squared -0.066 0.000 -0.064 0.000
Secondary school (D) 0.123 0.051 0.126 0.046
Graduation diploma (D) 0.285 0.001 0.277 0.001
University degree (D) 0.252 0.002 0.256 0.002
Partner (D) 0.161 0.007 0.142 0.018
East Germany (D) -0.016 0.804 -0.015 0.820
Female (D) -0.030 0.606 -0.020 0.729
Job: blue collar (D) -0.114 0.162 -0.115 0.157
Job: civil servant (D) -0.389 0.001 -0.386 0.001
Job: freelancer (D) 0.293 0.080 0.293 0.081
Job: self-employed (D) 0.503 0.000 0.513 0.000
Work parttime (D) -0.039 0.706 -0.038 0.709
Work little (D) -0.415 0.000 -0.419 0.000
Work not (D) -0.446 0.000 -0.443 0.000
Unemployed (D) 0.010 0.926 0.012 0.916
Village (D) 0.200 0.013 0.213 0.008
Sample: CAPI 2001 (D) -0.231 0.003
Sample: Panel 2003 (D) 0.426 0.000
Sample: RR 2003 (D) 0.324 0.000
Year 2003 (D) 0.492 0.000
Constant -2.203 0.000 -2.008 0.000
Number of obs 3894 3894
LR chi2 398.84 409.23
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R squared 0.102 0.105
Log likelihood -1748.039 -1742.840
Notes: A t-test showed that the hypothesis of equality of the two 2003 subsample dummies could not be rejected.
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Table 4.18: Probit regression results for ownership of different private pension types
Occ. pensionsa ‘Riester’ pensions Other old-age provisions
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net HH income/10’ 0.540 0.023 0.235 0.765 1.092 0.083
Net HH income/10’ sq. -0.115 0.043 -0.399 0.505 -0.852 0.070
Age/10 0.549 0.001 0.763 0.008 0.437 0.032
Age/10 squared -0.050 0.003 -0.099 0.002 -0.062 0.005
Secondary school (D) 0.121 0.224 0.254 0.049 -0.092 0.398
Graduation diploma (D) 0.394 0.005 0.282 0.102 0.115 0.413
University degree (D) 0.312 0.016 0.192 0.285 0.252 0.060
Partner (D) 0.135 0.147 0.235 0.073 -0.057 0.577
East Germany (D) -0.558 0.000 0.241 0.057 0.109 0.309
Female (D) -0.020 0.825 0.013 0.914 -0.085 0.366
Job: blue collar (D) -0.161 0.221 0.228 0.189 -0.176 0.235
Job: civil servant (D) 0.057 0.813 -0.086 0.649
Job: freelancer (D) 0.574 0.031
Job: self-employed (D) 0.165 0.468 0.747 0.000
Work parttime (D) -0.285 0.050 0.196 0.304 -0.031 0.846
Work little (D) -0.557 0.001 -0.054 0.815 -0.372 0.064
Work not (D) -0.694 0.000 0.059 0.729 -0.266 0.051
Unemployed (D) -0.526 0.023 0.237 0.206 -0.107 0.551
Village (D) 0.267 0.047 0.089 0.598 0.079 0.576
Saving Reason: State subsidies 0.053 0.000
Saving Reason: Old-age provision 0.027 0.038 0.046 0.019 0.072 0.000
Constant -2.563 0.000 -3.982 0.000 -2.473 0.000
Number of obs 2002 2158 2209
LR chi2 190.65 116.21 209.74
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R squared 0.129 0.131 0.152
Log likelihood -646.715 -385.181 -582.202
a Self-employed, civil servants and freelancers were excluded from the regression.
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Table 4.19: Ordered probit regressions: self-assessed risk: health, career, money matters
Health Career Money matters
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net income / 10,000 0.106 0.730 0.124 0.687 0.736 0.016
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.105 0.730 -0.067 0.823 -0.365 0.215
Age / 10 0.726 0.000 0.704 0.000 0.583 0.000
Age / 10 sq. -0.053 0.000 -0.055 0.000 -0.075 0.000
Secondary school (D) 0.004 0.919 0.061 0.147 0.067 0.107
Graduation diploma (D) 0.018 0.757 0.153 0.009 0.273 0.000
University degree (D) -0.040 0.449 0.143 0.009 0.214 0.000
Kids (D) -0.008 0.892 0.005 0.930 -0.145 0.013
Kids living in same house (D) 0.050 0.285 0.042 0.388 0.061 0.204
Job: blue collar (D) 0.046 0.408 -0.087 0.121 -0.127 0.026
Job: civil servant (D) 0.072 0.357 -0.018 0.813 0.113 0.145
Job: freelancer (D) 0.158 0.215 0.552 0.000 0.273 0.031
Job: self-employed (D) 0.101 0.204 0.374 0.000 0.287 0.000
Retired (D) -0.023 0.779 -0.368 0.000 -0.054 0.516
Work parttime (D) 0.014 0.853 0.116 0.110 -0.030 0.688
Work little (D) 0.120 0.115 0.116 0.137 0.010 0.900
Work not (D) -0.068 0.319 -0.264 0.000 -0.180 0.010
Unemployed (D) -0.014 0.866 0.213 0.012 -0.074 0.382
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.146 0.002 0.128 0.007 0.014 0.772
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.047 0.385 -0.035 0.536 0.033 0.544
Partner (D) -0.024 0.661 0.010 0.865 0.055 0.321
Separated or divorced (D) 0.217 0.001 0.140 0.035 0.162 0.013
Widowed (D) 0.158 0.019 0.117 0.091 0.145 0.036
Female (D) -0.258 0.000 -0.304 0.000 -0.407 0.000
Sample: TPI 2001 (D) 0.230 0.000 0.337 0.000 0.190 0.001
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D) 0.009 0.891 -0.046 0.496 0.030 0.651
Sample: RR 2003 (D) 0.055 0.264 0.149 0.004 0.027 0.592
Sample: TPI 2004 (D) 0.266 0.000 0.361 0.000 0.119 0.066
Number of obs 4516 4176 4483
LR chi2(29) 290.51 727.77 636.18
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0161 0.0416 0.0373
Log likelihood -8896.788 -8379.676 -8214.139
F-Test income variables 0.940 0.863 0.003
F-Test age variables 0.001 0.000 0.001
Notes: Self-assessed risk is coded from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘does not apply at all’ and 10 ‘does fully apply’. The
wording of the questions is shown in Table 4.10
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Table 4.20: Ordered probit regressions: self-assessed risk: leisure and sports, when driving
Leisure and sports When driving
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net income / 10,000 0.552 0.071 0.637 0.039
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.274 0.363 -0.420 0.160
Age / 10 -0.201 0.012 -0.171 0.046
Age / 10 sq. 0.001 0.932 0.003 0.721
Secondary school (D) 0.030 0.461 0.121 0.004
Graduation diploma (D) 0.175 0.002 0.187 0.001
University degree (D) 0.138 0.008 0.140 0.010
Kids (D) 0.001 0.984 -0.079 0.185
Kids living in same house (D) -0.012 0.797 0.022 0.653
Job: blue collar (D) 0.016 0.776 -0.017 0.762
Job: civil servant (D) 0.060 0.435 -0.105 0.179
Job: freelancer (D) 0.201 0.112 0.054 0.674
Job: self-employed (D) 0.084 0.287 0.109 0.169
Retired (D) 0.013 0.870 0.036 0.671
Work parttime (D) 0.061 0.398 -0.059 0.432
Work little (D) 0.124 0.100 -0.102 0.198
Work not (D) -0.156 0.021 -0.274 0.000
Unemployed (D) -0.002 0.982 0.007 0.932
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.096 0.037 0.066 0.164
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.120 0.025 -0.045 0.419
Partner (D) -0.023 0.677 0.010 0.866
Separated or divorced (D) 0.093 0.150 0.191 0.004
Widowed (D) 0.130 0.054 0.004 0.949
Female (D) -0.385 0.000 -0.446 0.000
Sample: TPI 2001 (D) 0.318 0.000 0.094 0.098
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D) 0.062 0.335 -0.069 0.299
Sample: RR 2003 (D) 0.113 0.021 0.042 0.401
Sample: TPI 2004 (D) 0.357 0.000 0.235 0.000
Number of obs 4477 4364
LR chi2(29) 786.13 603.74
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0416 0.0359
Log likelihood -9062.239 -8110.990
F-Test income variables 0.030 0.056
F-Test age variables 0.000 0.000
Notes: Self-assessed risk is coded from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘does not apply at all’ and 10 ‘does fully apply’. The
wording of the questions is shown in Table 4.10
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Table 4.21: Ordered probit regressions: exercising risky activities
Walk alone at night 5% in stocks Bet a day’s inc. Climbing
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net income / 10,000 -0.852 0.269 1.893 0.015 2.668 0.002 2.786 0.002
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. 0.323 0.402 -0.726 0.063 -1.117 0.016 -1.206 0.006
Age / 10 0.790 0.101 0.072 0.884 -0.218 0.679 0.296 0.606
Age / 10 sq. -0.090 0.077 -0.023 0.660 0.007 0.907 -0.069 0.266
Secondary school (D) 0.276 0.037 0.292 0.031 0.269 0.068 0.287 0.066
Graduation diploma (D) 0.303 0.091 0.343 0.062 0.148 0.453 0.021 0.919
University degree (D) 0.142 0.409 0.259 0.141 -0.125 0.515 -0.048 0.817
Kids (D) 0.368 0.076 0.140 0.515 0.244 0.288 0.144 0.554
Kids living in same house (D) -0.050 0.741 0.134 0.391 -0.101 0.549 -0.027 0.882
Job: blue collar (D) 0.000 0.999 0.023 0.900 -0.049 0.802 0.302 0.124
Job: civil servant (D) 0.067 0.771 -0.060 0.801 0.035 0.887 0.136 0.613
Job: freelancer (D) 0.894 0.091 -0.350 0.504 -0.617 0.282 -0.641 0.295
Job: self-employed (D) -0.222 0.346 0.118 0.613 0.567 0.017 -0.195 0.471
Retired (D) -0.102 0.733 -0.222 0.451 0.280 0.378 0.070 0.843
Work parttime (D) 0.058 0.812 -0.182 0.445 0.485 0.054 0.244 0.362
Work little (D) -0.140 0.603 0.316 0.217 0.071 0.801 -0.143 0.637
Work not (D) 0.074 0.784 0.404 0.118 -0.001 0.996 0.278 0.374
Unemployed (D) -0.016 0.958 -0.504 0.102 0.095 0.782 -0.235 0.531
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.007 0.962 0.111 0.448 0.036 0.819 -0.035 0.835
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.027 0.884 0.026 0.892 -0.146 0.480 0.023 0.920
Partner (D) 0.077 0.775 0.635 0.025 -0.205 0.487 0.361 0.268
Separated or divorced (D) -0.009 0.973 0.446 0.102 -0.260 0.382 -0.314 0.306
Widowed (D) 0.243 0.392 0.568 0.050 0.348 0.242 0.159 0.619
Female (D) -0.861 0.000 -0.180 0.248 -0.140 0.418 -0.105 0.573
Risk judgement of act. -0.247 0.000 -0.171 0.000 -0.179 0.000 -0.225 0.000
Risk: health 0.013 0.596 -0.033 0.179 0.003 0.922 0.020 0.476
Risk: career 0.016 0.512 0.008 0.759 0.017 0.541 0.016 0.567
Risk: money matters -0.014 0.610 0.147 0.000 0.115 0.000 -0.075 0.022
Risk: leisure and sports 0.048 0.064 0.011 0.686 0.022 0.459 0.176 0.000
Risk: driving 0.016 0.520 -0.013 0.608 0.054 0.052 0.031 0.308
Number of obs 434 432 433 433
LR chi2(29) 300.79 178.08 191.32 229.23
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1524 0.102 0.1334 0.1649
Log likelihood -836.62743 -783.98228 -621.18513 -580.62361
Notes: Self-assessed risk is coded from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘does not apply at all’ and 10 ‘does fully apply’. The
wording of the questions is shown in Table 4.12
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Table 4.22: Ordered probit and probit regressions: lottery questions
Lottery set 1 Lottery set 2
Ordered probit reg. Probit reg. Ordered probit reg. Probit reg.
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net income / 10,000 0.056 0.981 0.065 0.980 0.078 0.971 0.110 0.960
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. 0.504 0.855 0.197 0.950 2.161 0.441 1.790 0.547
Age / 10 0.751 0.435 0.666 0.509 -0.405 0.504 -0.365 0.555
Age / 10 sq. -0.101 0.345 -0.092 0.409 0.052 0.419 0.051 0.435
Secondary school (D) 0.159 0.503 0.239 0.339 0.052 0.766 0.101 0.562
Graduation diploma (D) -0.104 0.741 0.032 0.921 -0.441 0.070 -0.390 0.115
University degree (D) 0.156 0.615 0.351 0.278 0.045 0.834 0.116 0.604
Kids (D) -0.185 0.577 -0.348 0.322 -0.355 0.188 -0.370 0.177
Kids living in same house (D) -0.199 0.475 -0.099 0.738 0.010 0.959 -0.051 0.794
Job: blue collar (D) 0.184 0.507 0.304 0.305 0.446 0.049 0.445 0.059
Job: civil servant (D) -0.506 0.297 -0.697 0.197 -0.251 0.446 -0.286 0.406
Job: freelancer (D) 0.227 0.782 0.439 0.614 -0.210 0.788 -0.114 0.870
Job: self-employed (D) 0.083 0.802 0.115 0.744 0.187 0.508 0.169 0.573
Retired (D) -0.384 0.509 -0.311 0.605 -0.482 0.199 -0.618 0.107
Work parttime (D) 0.119 0.768 0.012 0.976 -0.427 0.221 -0.368 0.281
Work little (D) 0.093 0.844 0.129 0.788 0.647 0.041 0.821 0.013
Work not (D) 0.255 0.584 0.257 0.590 0.358 0.261 0.451 0.174
Unemployed (D) -0.976 0.127 -1.145 0.090 -0.311 0.417 -0.423 0.284
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.177 0.460 -0.087 0.728 -0.198 0.294 -0.190 0.334
Unemp.> 6 months (D) 0.379 0.238 0.428 0.200 0.344 0.154 0.364 0.144
Partner (D) -0.081 0.846 -0.088 0.846 -0.131 0.710 -0.239 0.502
Separated or divorced (D) 0.105 0.813 0.063 0.896 0.470 0.167 0.520 0.136
Widowed (D) 0.109 0.781 0.180 0.673 -0.177 0.643 -0.100 0.793
Female (D) -0.312 0.275 -0.242 0.406 0.180 0.359 0.269 0.181
Risk: money matters 0.002 0.960 -0.008 0.868 0.093 0.003 0.106 0.002
Risky act.: invest 5% in stocks 0.054 0.107 0.075 0.036 -0.029 0.272 -0.019 0.491
Risky act.: bet a day’s inc. 0.169 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.080 0.007 0.092 0.004
Constant -2.637 0.253 -0.286 0.849
Number of obs 434 434 427 435
LR chi2(29) 82.25 84.32 54.14 64.11
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.1945 0.265 0.078 0.1246
Log likelihood -170.301 -116.925 -319.951 -225.121
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Table 4.23: Portfolio shares: saving accounts and building society contracts. Heckman selection regression
Saving accounts Buiding society contracts
Regression stage Selection stage Regression stage Selection stage
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net income / 10,000 -0.375 0.011 1.883 0.000 1.229 0.000 2.493 0.000
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. 0.159 0.246 -1.310 0.001 -1.100 0.000 -2.140 0.000
Age / 10 -0.199 0.000 -0.055 0.635 0.154 0.038 0.500 0.000
Age / 10 sq. 0.026 0.000 0.018 0.114 -0.023 0.002 -0.063 0.000
Secondary school (D) 0.119 0.046 0.056 0.036
Graduation diploma (D) 0.192 0.033 0.099 0.025
University degree (D) 0.035 0.664 0.113 0.002
Kids (D) -0.005 0.951 0.032 0.383
Kids living in same house (D) -0.145 0.038 -0.003 0.917
Job: blue collar (D) -0.057 0.496 0.070 0.055
Job: civil servant (D) 0.188 0.137 0.051 0.264
Job: freelancer (D) -0.161 0.412 -0.063 0.389
Job: self-employed (D) -0.347 0.008 -0.008 0.884
Retired (D) 0.180 0.127 0.006 0.910
Work parttime (D) -0.338 0.003 -0.003 0.949
Work little (D) -0.328 0.004 0.000 0.999
Work not (D) -0.352 0.001 0.040 0.469
Unemployed (D) -0.171 0.157 -0.054 0.456
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.129 0.071 0.032 0.301
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.190 0.018 -0.039 0.260
Partner (D) 0.167 0.031 0.036 0.382
Separated or divorced (D) -0.190 0.041 -0.024 0.650
Widowed (D) -0.042 0.684 0.093 0.064
Female (D) 0.075 0.199 0.010 0.765
Exp.: Germany’s ec. developm. -0.006 0.647 0.004 0.511
Exp.: own ec. developm. 0.085 0.000 0.019 0.004
Sample: TPI 2001 (D) 0.195 0.029 0.136 0.001
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D) -0.096 0.316 0.096 0.045
Sample: RR 2003 (D) -0.292 0.000 0.063 0.070
Sample: TPI 2004 (D) 0.011 0.914 0.179 0.000
Self-assess: optimist -0.008 0.451 -0.005 0.378
Risk: money matters -0.027 0.000 -0.021 0.059 -0.003 0.624 -0.001 0.960
Constant 0.879 0.000 -0.500 0.121 -0.682 0.000 -2.248 0.000
Number of obs 2755 2755
Uncensored obs 1641 701
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
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Table 4.24: Portfolio shares: whole life insurances and private old age provisions. Heckman selection regression
Whole life insurances Private old age provisions
Regression stage Selection stage Regression stage Selection stage
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net income / 10,000 0.031 0.859 1.777 0.000 -0.870 0.000 1.420 0.028
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.078 0.554 -0.897 0.042 0.511 0.013 -0.947 0.104
Age / 10 0.336 0.000 0.952 0.000 0.354 0.004 0.876 0.000
Age / 10 sq. -0.035 0.000 -0.107 0.000 -0.037 0.008 -0.106 0.000
Secondary school (D) 0.190 0.005 0.060 0.500
Graduation diploma (D) 0.104 0.293 0.207 0.090
University degree (D) 0.108 0.232 0.253 0.027
Kids (D) -0.004 0.965 -0.118 0.364
Kids living in same house (D) 0.033 0.687 0.042 0.693
Job: blue collar (D) -0.066 0.473 0.041 0.713
Job: civil servant (D) -0.025 0.841 -0.344 0.035
Job: freelancer (D) 0.182 0.383 0.255 0.285
Job: self-employed (D) 0.083 0.542 0.588 0.000
Retired (D) 0.115 0.409 -0.164 0.412
Work parttime (D) -0.096 0.443 0.001 0.992
Work little (D) -0.112 0.416 -0.235 0.192
Work not (D) -0.227 0.060 -0.200 0.199
Unemployed (D) -0.184 0.228 0.226 0.210
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.142 0.076 0.037 0.712
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.163 0.076 0.044 0.710
Partner (D) 0.155 0.108 -0.112 0.391
Separated or divorced (D) -0.073 0.503 -0.295 0.056
Widowed (D) -0.246 0.041 -0.078 0.605
Female (D) -0.055 0.434 -0.068 0.455
Exp.: Germany’s ec. developm. 0.005 0.745 0.010 0.600
Exp.: own ec. developm. 0.075 0.000 0.020 0.301
Sample: TPI 2001 (D) 0.237 0.008 0.011 0.437
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D) 0.016 0.878 0.000 0.982
Sample: RR 2003 (D) -0.162 0.055 0.244 0.040
Sample: TPI 2004 (D) -0.074 0.520 0.581 0.000
Self-assess: optimist -0.003 0.804 0.256 0.023
Risk: money matters -0.013 0.002 0.016 0.174 0.006 0.375 0.761 0.000
Constant -0.263 0.245 -3.345 0.000 -0.419 0.186 -3.474 0.000
Number of obs 2755 2755
Uncensored obs 790 289
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000





Table 4.25: Portfolio shares: bonds and stocks, fonds. Heckman selection regression
Bonds Fonds, Stocks
Regression stage Selection stage Regression stage Selection stage
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net income / 10,000 -0.200 0.360 1.046 0.103 0.098 0.632 2.181 0.000
(Net inc./ 10,000) sq. 0.043 0.739 0.005 0.993 -0.111 0.438 -0.918 0.064
Age / 10 -0.110 0.150 0.366 0.058 -0.106 0.124 0.385 0.019
Age / 10 sq. 0.013 0.071 -0.023 0.235 0.013 0.072 -0.029 0.081
Secondary school (D) 0.202 0.042 0.322 0.000
Graduation diploma (D) 0.159 0.277 0.397 0.000
University degree (D) 0.313 0.007 0.442 0.000
Kids (D) -0.063 0.656 -0.151 0.179
Kids living in same house (D) -0.108 0.349 -0.016 0.859
Job: blue collar (D) -0.115 0.421 -0.099 0.362
Job: civil servant (D) -0.160 0.361 -0.120 0.370
Job: freelancer (D) -0.057 0.845 0.227 0.308
Job: self-employed (D) 0.039 0.830 0.011 0.942
Retired (D) -0.017 0.930 -0.109 0.489
Work parttime (D) -0.194 0.325 0.139 0.330
Work little (D) -0.219 0.289 -0.034 0.829
Work not (D) 0.021 0.905 0.013 0.923
Unemployed (D) -0.158 0.512 -0.030 0.869
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.223 0.071 0.084 0.341
Unemp.> 6 months (D) 0.224 0.119 -0.252 0.020
Partner (D) 0.099 0.436 0.168 0.127
Separated or divorced (D) -0.252 0.130 -0.058 0.664
Widowed (D) 0.082 0.627 0.096 0.502
Female (D) 0.083 0.388 0.004 0.959
Exp.: Germany’s ec. developm. -0.008 0.665 0.025 0.123
Exp.: own ec. developm. 0.083 0.000 0.084 0.000
Sample: TPI 2001 (D) 0.068 0.599 0.562 0.000
Sample: CAPI 2003 (D) 0.111 0.432 0.066 0.593
Sample: RR 2003 (D) -0.176 0.129 -0.027 0.782
Sample: TPI 2004 (D) -0.199 0.224 0.473 0.000
Self-assess: optimist 0.011 0.550 -0.015 0.324
Risk: money matters -0.013 0.189 0.067 0.000 0.020 0.010 0.127 0.000
Constant 0.665 0.082 -3.653 0.000 0.426 0.064 -3.649 0.000
Number of obs 2755 2755
Uncensored obs 232 548
Prob > chi2 0.007 0.002
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Table 4.26: Financial wealth allocations by subsamples and income
TPI 2001 CAPI 2001 CAPI 2003 RR 2003
Own.a inc.b PF share Own. inc. PF sh. Own. inc. PF sh. Own. inc. PF sh.
Nc 657 324 1125 576 462 208 1973 773
Saving 71.20% 2128.4 33.4% 70.8% 2247.0 48.7% 62.1% 2357.8 48.9% 58.9% 2754.2 57.4%
accounts 467 264 797 481 287 170 1162 614
Build.soc. 45.0% 2143.8 17.2% 25.6% 2268.2 11.3% 25.6% 2339.6 9.2% 23.9% 3156.1 13.2%
contracts 296 164 288 175 118 66 471 221
Whole 50.0% 2330.5 22.9% 39.2% 2460.7 23.1% 32.4% 2299.7 21.3% 26.3% 3210.2 15.8%
life ins. 328 184 441 256 150 85 520 212
Private old- 19.7% 1896.0 6.3% 11.7% 2577.5 2.7% 26.6% 2512.5 7.0% 20.2% 3189.8 4.2%
age provisions 129 52 131 58 119 44 380 93
Bonds 16.7% 2412.4 4.2% 13.3% 3402.3 4.8% 11.6% 2703.2 5.5% 7.8% 2908.1 3.3%
109 54 150 79 54 29 153 64
Stocks/ 38.6% 2309.6 16.1% 23.8% 3091.4 9.4% 20.10% 2810.6 8.2% 5.1% 3513.1 6.1%
Fonds 253 160 268 160 93 47 298 123
None of these 12.8% 1117.4 16.5% 1242.1 23.9% 1242.1 25.2% 1978.6
items 84 185 185 497
Refusals 0.8% 1022.6 43.5% 1.2% 1638.9 38.7% 6.9% 2327.7 24.9% 12.6% 3413.9 47.6%
5 249 14 364 33 69 267 703
Notes: Weighted values. Percentages and absolute observations presented.
a Ownership of the asset category.
b Conditional income means on item ownership.
c Nonmissing observations on ownership question.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Living situation
CAPI 2001 CAPI 2003
Present living situation
Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Panel results: observations if observed in 2001 and 2003
CAPI samples. Answers are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘completely dissatisfied’ and 10 ‘totally
satisfied’.
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Living situation
Differences in present living situation
Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Panel results: observations if observed in 2001 and 2003
CAPI samples.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Living situation
CAPI 2003 RR 2003
Present living situation
Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Values for both 2003 subsamples.


































































































Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Pooled samples in 2001 and 2003.
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sign. better slightly better same slightly worse sign. worse
Past income development
CAPI 2001 CAPI 2003
Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Panel results: observations if observed in 2001 and 2003
CAPI samples.
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Past income development
TPI 2001 CAPI 2001
CAPI 2003 RR 2003
Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Partner’s health situation
CAPI 2001 CAPI 2003
Expectations about economic and health situation
Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Panel results: observations if observed in 2001 and 2003
CAPI samples.






















































Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Panel results: observations if observed in 2001 and 2003
CAPI samples.
4.B Figures 89









































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Partner’s health situation
CAPI 2003 RR 2003
Expectations about economic and health situation
Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age.









































































0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Partner’s health situation
2001 2003
Expectations about economic and health situation
Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Pooled samples in 2001 and 2003.
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−10−9−8−7−6−5−4−3−2−10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910
Old−age provision
Non−pessimists Pessimists
Savings motives by future expectations
Notes: Unweighted values. Pessimists are defined as respondents whose expectation for Germany’s economic development
deteriorated by more than two points on a scale from 0 to 10.
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TPI 2001 CAPI 2001 CAPI 2003 RR 2003
Saving accounts Build.Soc.agreem.
Whole life ins. Priv. old−age prov.
Bonds Stocks/Fonds
Notes: Weighted values. Private old-age provision question changed between 2001 and 2003.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
When driving
TPI 2001 CAPI 2001
CAPI 2003 RR 2003
TPI 2004
I do not mind taking risk in ..
Note: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age.
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Walk alone in unknown neighbourhood
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Invest 5% of yearly net inc. in one stock








0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bet a day’s income








0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Go climbing
do activity judge risk of activity
Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Values for the 2004 TPI subsample only. Weighted values.
0 means very unprobable to engage in activity / not judging risky at all.
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n. vs. −100 / 150 n. vs. −100 / 200
n. vs. −100 / 250
Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Values for the 2004 TPI subsample only.
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Saving accounts Build.Soc.agreem.
Whole life ins. Priv. old−age prov.
Bonds Stocks/Fonds
Notes: Weighted values. Private old-age provision question changed between 2001 and 2003.

















Sav.a.Build.c. Life.i. Old−a. Bonds Stocks Sav.a.Build.c. Life.i. Old−a. Bonds Stocks
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CAPI 2003 RR 2003
<35 35−54
55 and older
Notes: Weighted values. Private old-age provision question changed between 2001 and 2003.
Chapter 5
Precautionary savings and old-age provisions:
Do subjective savings motive measures work?
5.1 Introduction
The theory of precautionary saving has challenged and enriched the literature on consumers’ behavior.
Precautionary saving leads to consumption cut-backs and the accumulation of wealth to insure against
several sorts of uncertainty or risk, the income risk being the most frequently stated (see, e.g., Deaton
(1992), Carroll and Samwick (1998)). Lusardi (1998) emphasizes that, within the life cycle / permanent
income model, saving and wealth are not only related to the first moment of income, but also to higher
moments, especially to the second one (variance of income).
The empirical approaches to precautionary savings have to deal with a couple of major challenges
all of which make it hard to disentangle and identify its quantitative effects. As briefly reviewed
in Section 5.2, economic theory provides a good deal of foundations and predictions for household
behavior.
In this chapter, I will first take advantage of already used different empirical procedures to identify
and quantify the precautionary savings motive. The SAVE data provide a variety of subjective
measures for income uncertainty which have been used in the existing literature. As a next step, I
adopt a new approach to map the importance of precautionary savings. I use short-run and long-run
savings motives to describe differences in savings, saving rates and wealth accumulation. Even though
these measures are also subjective and not quantitative like the ones used in Kennickell and Lusardi
(2004), they can provide additional information explaining the heterogeneity in households’ saving
behavior.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, I briefly reconsider the importance of precau-
tionary savings and summarize different groups of the most important results along with problems to
identify precautionary savings. In Section 5.3, I examine the two main variables of the SAVE data set
concerning precautionary savings at hand: (a) the measure of subjective earnings variance and (ab)
the savings motives for precautionary savings and old-age provision (as an extended precautionary
savings motive). Section 5.4 shows results for the two measures on wealth accumulation, while Section
5.5 leaves with some concluding remarks.
I will use the SAVE 2003 data random route subsample, since thereby I can circumvent possible
sample selection problems; see Chapter 2 for a review of the different SAVE sample characteristics.
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Like in the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS ), it is only the individual deemed most knowledgeable
about the family’s assets, debts, and retirement planning, who is asked questions on demographics,
savings, housing, net worth and income of the family.
5.2 Precautionary savings: theory and empirical findings
The life cycle [Modigliani and Brumberg (1954)]-permanent income [Friedman (1957)] model [LCPI]
has become the basic theoretical framework for analyses on saving. The theory has opened the door
to many refinements over the years; and its importance has thus repeatedly been acknowledged over
decades, see Meghir (2004) for an actual recognition. The fundamental insight of this model describes
household consumption smoothed over the life cycle, which in turn implies that individuals spend more
in earlier stages of the life and build up wealth in the middle part of the life cycle. The “underlying
idea of the life-cycle hypothesis - that people save for their old age - is of course not new; nor is it
Modigliani’s own. His achievement lies primarily in the rationalization of the idea into a formal model
which he has developed in different directions and integrated within a well-defined and established
economic theory, and secondly in the drawing of macroeconomic implications from that model and in
performing a number of empirical tests of these implications”81. The LCPI builds the basis for many
empirical investigations; e.g. it has proved an ideal tool for analyses of the effects of different pension
systems and the discussion whether an introduction of a general pension system leads to a decline in
private saving. See Barro (1974 and 1978) and Feldstein (1974 and 1978) for a controversial discussion
on this topic.
Figure 5.1 depicts the simplest form of the life cycle-permanent income model.



























Source: Bo¨rsch-Supan and Essig (2002)
81 Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for
1985.
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One of the extensions to the LCPI is the theory of precautionary savings. It says that savings
are not only functions as an income reallocation over the life cycle, but also as an insurance against
income shocks. This theory implicitly presupposes some classes of utility functions. Leland (1968),
Sandmo (1970) and Kimball (1990) showed that degree of prudence depends on the third derivative
of the utility function (and so a quadratic utility function cannot represent the precautionary savings
motive since the third derivative is zero).
Figure 5.2: Example for a two-period-model with a certain income Y1 and uncertain income Y2, which can
take on the two values Yu and Yo with a probability of 0.5
Source: Rodepeter (1999)
Figure 5.2 shows that savings depends on the the range of the Yu and Yo. The degree of prudence
depends of the third derivative of the utility function. If the third derivative is zero, the first derivative
of the utility function is linear, and individuals will face no utility loss through income uncertainty,
since E(u′(Y )) = u′(E(Y )).
The inability of quadratic utility functions to model the precautionary motive leads to the more
realistic modelling by the family of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) functions.82 The problem in
assuming CRRA utility functions, which means skipping the problematic but convenient83 assumption
of quadratic utility is that closed form solutions can no longer be derived; see Zeldes (1989).
The basic trigger for the precautionary savings motive is that insurance markets are not existent or
imperfect. The theory of precautionary saving from literature on consumer’s behavior predicts that in
this case, risk depresses consumption and increases the accumulation of wealth. Alternatively, house-
holds could try to hedge themselves by a social network like family / friends. Wealth accumulation
thus can be less important if this social network is large enough and can easily be accessed. This would
mean that one needs to distinguish who has access and who doesn’t. Social Security represents another
















83 in the sense of computability
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source of insurances. Two incentive problems for privately insuring against shocks by accumulation
wealth accompany the presence of these insurances. Firstly, social security insurances tend to main-
tain a relative living standard (since the minimum level depends on the average working income); this
means that the absolute insurance level rises with the productivity progress, allowing a higher living
standard in a worst-case scenario. Secondly, if social security insurances are means-tested, incentives
for wealth holding are lowered, see Hubbard et al . (1995).
Dre`ze and Modigliani (1972) have shown that consumption and portfolio decisions are not separable.
But so far, many of the saving and portfolio choice models have been estimated separately. Heaton
and Lucas (2000) find that business owners (taking a high income risk) have a lower probability to
invest in stocks. In SAVE, business owners have a highly significant positive probability of owning
stocks (Probit results show marginal effects of about 14 to 15%, depending on specification).
5.2.1 Literature review
The literature on precautionary savings leaves us with quite mixed results. E.g. Skinner (1988)
calculates precautionary savings up to 54% of total life cycle saving and that precautionary savings
are higher when consumers are more risk averse and when borrowing constraints are more immediate,
in accordance with Zeldes (1989). Other simulation results (Caballero (1991) and Gourinchas and
Parker (2002)) studies do support these theoretical findings. Cagetti (2003) finds in his simulations
that wealth accumulation is driven mostly by precautionary motives at the beginning of the life cycle,
whereas savings for retirement purposes become significant only closer to retirement.
Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) list the main contributions to
empirical evidence for precautionary saving; the results are rather mixed. More precisely, these papers
can be grouped to have shown four different ranges of results:
1. Skinner (1988) and Dynan (1993) find little or no evidence for precautionary savings.
2. Guiso et al . (1992), Lusardi (1997, 1998 and 2000) and Arrondel (2002) report modest values
for the accumulation of precautionary wealth using subjective risk measures.
3. Dardanoni (1991), Hubbard et al . (1995), Kazarosian (1997), Carroll and Samwick (1997 and
1998), Engen and Gruber (2001) and Carroll (1997), in contrast, find that precautionary savings
produce a considerable share of wealth. E.g. Dardanoni (1991), using data on British households,
found the average consumption across occupation and industry groups to be significantly lower when
income variance is greater; he estimates that more than 60 percent of saving is due to precautionary
motives.
4. Murata (2003) and Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) provide mixed results for different types of
households each of which associated with different risk exposure.
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5.2.2 Problems associated with the empirical assessment of the precautionary savings
motive
The meanwhile more or less basic procedure for identifying the existence and degree of the precau-
tionary motive in the empirical literature is to identify the relation between household wealth Wh,
permanent income Y Ph , a set of covariate control variables Xh typically including all sets of household
variables (socio-economic variables like age, job variables and other characteristics) and some risk
measure Rh:
f(Wh) = g(Y Ph , Xh, Rh) (5.1)
As mentioned in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), the large range of estimates are due to differences
in the data and the methodologies used. The two most important variables to deal with are wealth
and risk, both very difficult to assess. In the following, I quickly review the problems mentioned in
Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) associated with the assessment of these variables.
Wealth
The basic question associated with wealth is: which wealth measure should be used in estimations?
Wealth consists of different components, which differ in terms of accessibility and liquidity. E.g. the
total wealth measure in SAVE consists of 13 different wealth items (8 of them being financial wealth
items with different liquidity). Typically, the largest share is housing wealth, as Table 5.1 shows.
Unconditional values confirm the typical positively skewed distribution: few large values, many small
values, especially zeros.
Table 5.1: Shares of different wealth items
Owner occ. housing Other hous. Business Financial Creditsa Other real wealth
Unconditional
Mean 42.89% 3.61% 1.65% 50.28% 41.85% 1.57%
Median 26.53% 0 0 30.00% 0 0
Std. Error 1.57% 0.47% 0.34% 1.61% 13.07% 0.32%
Obs. 787 787 787 787 787 787
Conditionalb
Mean 83.56% 36.00% 32.42% 57.02% 171.53% 16.88%
Median 91.35% 30.95% 23.70% 77.21% 26.59% 7.53%
Std. Error 0.99% 2.60% 4.60% 1.67% 52.59% 2.87%
Obs. 404 79 40 694 192 73
a Total wealth was calculated gross of credits (which makes look shares larger than they are since the denominator is
thus larger). Therefore, shares, neglecting credits, sum to 1.
b Conditional on having positive values of that share; this means that medians are larger than 0.
Source: SAVE 2003 Random sample.
As emphasized in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), business owners might cause problems for assessing
the precautionary motive since their behavior differs largely from the rest of the sample. In SAVE
2003, they hold 23.0% of total wealth, though representing only 4.7% of the sample (problem: 5.3
% nonresponse to question of business wealth ownership.) There are 40 observations for wealth if
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respondent is a business owner, 1109 altogether. Numbers are not as high as in Gentry and Hubbard
(2000) where this group accounts for 42.1%; but in their sample, 11.4% are business owners.84
The quintessential point here is that it might be highly misleading to neglect certain wealth cate-
gories and simply concentrate on liquefiable financial assets like saving accounts, since that procedure
might neglect a much higher stock of more long-run precautionary wealth. This, again, recurs the ques-
tion of the time horizon of precautionary savings, or, more principally, what exactly is precautionary
savings? Against which risk should it protect / insure households?
Risk measurement
As mentioned in the introduction, precautionary savings are supposed to be some sort of replacement
for incomplete or even non-existing insurance markets. Much of the typical long-term risks are nor-
mally covered by compulsory insurance plans, like the insurance against the longevity risk (public and
private pension systems / occupational pension plans, and also the public long term care insurance),
and insurances against health risks (public and private health insurances). Also many of the more
short-run risks are typically insured by compulsory public insurances, like unemployment insurance.
See Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004b) for a review of the history, negative incentives and possible threats to the
German social security system.
So the question remains, which risks does the household need to insure against and build up a
wealth stock to rely on. Long-run and mostly unforseen shocks are those affecting the life time income
path (cf. Figure 5.1) due to job loss or wanted, undesired changes to a less-paid job, wealth shocks,
premature death of he bread-earner, or the political risk of pensions, only to name some. This would
change the curvature of life time income thus lowering the possible permanent consumption path. A
second risk would be the mentioned transitory short-run income risk proposed by Friedman (1957).
These reasons lead to the usage of income risk most common in the empirical literature on precau-
tionary savings.
The empirical problem, though, remains. What are good measures for income risk? This is typically
proxied by the variance of total income. Still, there are two objections to this approach. (1) Caballero
(1991) and Browning and Lusardi (1996) point out that the calculated income variation could be
well-known by the respondent and hence already been insured against privately. (2) Measurement
errors could possibly wrongly be identified as transitory income in panel analysis.
To circumvent the mentioned problems, one can use subjective measures for income and risk. Of
course, as with all subjective data, the door is open to all sorts of cognitive problems. Do respondents
process the information given in the questionnaire well? There is now an extensive literature in survey
research on cognitive processes that generate survey responses and on pitfalls that should be avoided in
survey design; Sudman et al . (1996) and Tourangeau et al . (2000) provide overviews of the literature
on survey response behavior and question design in cognitive and social psychology. Cognitive issues
in households’ reports of financial variables, in particular with respect to reports of household income,
are discussed by Moore et al . (1999).
84 Same measurement: when respondents answered to owning business assets, they were classified as business owners
even if the business ownership value is zero or below zero.
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The longevity and health risk are risk factors less frequently used in empirical studies, mostly for
the reason of a lack of available data, and for the existence of the above mentioned social security
systems. I will use two subjective variables rudimentarily covering these two risk factors, see Section
5.3.1.
Permanent income
Another possible challenge is the determination of the third variable entering Equation 5.1: how can
the household’s permanent income Y Ph be identified? In panel studies, this issue raises possible iden-
tification problems already mentioned (to differ between measurement error and transitory income).
But in cross sectional analysis, data are not available but for one single income observation which
requires a rather different approach. King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) propose a measure of permanent
income which can be calculated from cross-sectional data which was also used by Starr-McCluer (1996)
and Kazarosian (1997)85 to measure the effects of health insurances on precautionary savings. Since I
will use the SAVE RR 2003 subsample only leaving me with one cross-sectional data base I will follow
this approach and therefore quickly review the basic ideas of this measure.
Permanent income is modelled as function of Ziγ, a vector of observable characteristics with γ, the
associated parameter vector, and si being an unobservable variable measuring characteristics (skills,
luckiness, power), and c(Ai) controlling for technical progress and, therefore, sets younger individuals
better off (cohort effect).
lnY perm.i = Ziγ + si − c(Ai) (5.2)
Permanent and current income differ for two reasons: (i) the existence of an age-earnings profile
and (ii) the transitory earnings component uit such that
lnY currenti = lnY
perm.
i + h(Ai −A) + ui, (5.3)
where h represents the age-earnings profile, restricted to be constant across the population. Inserting
5.2 into 5.3 gives the estimation equation
lnY currenti = Ziγ − c(Ai) + h(Ai −A) + si + ui. (5.4)
Since the earnings profile and the cohort effect cannot be separately identified in this equation, King
and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) suggest to use data from outside the sample. I will use the wage index
development86 in Germany separately for respondents and for their partners in the regression, assuming
that every cohort enters the labor market at age 20. With the parameter estimates γˆ and cˆ it would
be possible to impute lnY perm.i if it was possible to disentangle the error term si + ui to receive the
individual-specific effect si. King and Dicks-Mireaux propose the share of si of the total error term
to be 0.5 after considering longitudinal studies on earnings. Therefore, the measure of of permanent
income I will use here is the predicted value Yˆi from the earnings regression plus half of the difference
between observed and imputed income.
85 This work expands this model using panel data
86 Alternatively, Kapteyn et al . (2004) use GDP per capita as a cohort productivity measure.
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I use the permanent income imputation only for households which have at least one member not yet
retired. The reason for this is that pension income, in contrast to permanent earnings, is determined
once a person has entered retirement.87 One could have, though, used all households since pensions
represent claims which were earned during the working life thus reflecting a fraction (typically about
70% of net earnings, see Braun et al . (2000)) of working life permanent earnings.
The SAVE 2003 RR sample has a rather high fraction of female respondents. This might cause a
problem if the wage earner is the husband, and thus regressing reported household income on a set
of regressors to use the predictions from this regression as a proxy for permanent income should not
only include the respondents’ characteristics, but also the partners’.
An alternative would be to consult an external data source, as proposed by Browning et al . (2003)
for improving the precision of consumption question by asking a non-exhaustive list of consumption
questions in a survey and imputing total consumption using the country’s official consumption and ex-
penditure survey; in this case, the German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS ). For expenditures,
this is done in Chapter 6. For income, this is due to further research.
At the time being, I will content myself with the within-survey imputation of permanent income
using the prediction of household earnings from a regression as proxy. As regressors I choose a set
of respondent and, since I cannot separate incomes for each earner, of partner characteristics. This
is especially important since the SAVE questionnaire does not seek explicitly the household head as
respondent which typically is the main income earner, see last paragraph in Section 5.1.
I include all households if either the respondent, the partner or both are fully employed. This is
depicted in Figure 5.3. All variables are therefore interacted accordingly to this selection, e.g. partner’s
variables are set to zero if there is no partner.





The chance of losing observations due to missing values in one of the variables is rather high because
of the large number of regressors. This can lead to more missing observations of predicted permanent
income than observed earnings. Two correction steps follow: (1) I replace those missing predicted
missings of Y perm.HH with the observed values of Y
obs.
HH . (2) Also, since nothing restricts predicted income
values being positive, I replace all negative predicted values by the observed household earnings.
Regression results are listed in Table 5.7. I used two specifications, one where absolute marginal
effects are modelled constantly (absolute income as dependent variable), and another where percentage
marginal effects are modelled constantly (income in logarithm), which is the more common estimation
87 The main sources of variation of pension income is policy interventions like, e.g. the shift from gross to net earnings
indexation, or changes in household composition (divorce or death of the partner).
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procedure in the literature. The single elements of the fourth-order age polynomials are more or less
insignificant. Still, they are jointly highly significant, tested separately for the respondent’s and the
partner’s age.
Further problems to deal with
There are other sources of problems associated with the measurement of precautionary savings I will
only briefly discuss. All the following examples are thoroughly highlighted in Kennickell and Lusardi
(2004), so I refer to that source for further reading. The arguments are mentioned here to show
possible problems in the following estimation procedure.
Liquidity constraints can affect individuals differently, which may lead to different wealth accumu-
lation other things being equal since households could borrow in emergency situations.
Restrictions on the functional form can lead to difficulties if it systematically excludes certain
groups of households. E.g. if one restricts the function f(W ) in Equation 5.1 being logarithmic,
this automatically excludes zero and negative wealth (indebted households). For transformation: see
Burbidge et al . (1988) who revisited the inverse hyperbolic sine function proposed by Johnson (1949);
MacKinnon and Magee (1990) who developed them further and Carroll et al . (2003) for an application
of wealth data.
Unfortunately, there exist no embedded ado-files containing the Inverse Hyperbolic sine function
transformation ML-implementation. There seems to be a group of people working on it and this imple-
mentation is “in the pipeline”88, so it can and should be used in further research. The transformation
parameter θ from the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of y is
g(y, θ) =








Carroll et al . (2003) estimated the parameter θ to be 3.87 in a regression using Equation (5.5) for Wyp
for SCF 1983 data. I will compare three values for θ: 1, 2 and 3.89 Figure 5.4 shows the transformed
wealth values for θ: 1, 2 and 3 and also for θ = 1.05 and ln (wealth). The transformations for the
θ = 1.05 and the ln function nearly coincide (for strictly positive wealth values);90 since the ln function
is the preferred transformation in the literature, I will use 1.05 for θ in all transformations. I stress
here that normally, functional form restrictions are typically set without further mentioning. The most
common values for θ, for the Box-Cox transformation (yθ − 1)/θ are θ = 0 and θ = 1, giving the log
and the linear form, respectively. Assuming θ = 1, further restrictions imposed in wealth regressions
are: lnW using only W > $4000 [Diamond and Hausman (1984)], lnW/Y P using only W > $2500
[King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982)], ln[W −min(W, 0)+1] [Starr-McCluer (1996), Carroll and Samwick
88 10th UK Stata Users Group meetings: Abstracts Monday, 28 June 2004. “A comment on infrequency of purchase
models in Stata” by Julian A. Fennema, j.a.fennema@hw.ac.uk, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation,
Heriot-Watt University.
89 Using l’Hopital’s rule it is easy to show that lim
θ→0
g = y.
90 For smaller wealth values, the difference is slightly larger; the higher the values, the smaller the gap.
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(1997 and 1998)]; in the first two cases, the authors confronted the selection problem by the Heckman
correction method.
While there has been an extensive discussion of the importance of macro shocks in the estimation
of Euler equations,9 this topic has been largely ignored in the estimation of precautionary saving.
However, this problem is important in this context as well. It is not possible to estimate the extent
of precautionary accumulation using a single cross-section of wealth data. The problem may be best
understood by using a simple example. Suppose that, because of a national housing market bust, the
wealth of home-owners was substantially reduced. Suppose further, as it is not unreasonable, that
home-owners are less likely to face high earnings risk. Simple regressions of wealth on income risk
lead to biased estimates of the extent of precautionary accumulation.
In cross sectional analyses, macro shocks may cause problems due to biases. E.g., if the stock
market went up, and if stock owners are more likely to have risky earnings, then estimating the extent
of precautionary wealth accumulation possibly leads to biased estimates. This argument also holds
for portfolio choice models.
Apart from the precautionary motive, other reasons may be and presumably are present which
also account for a great deal of the wealth accumulation. The two most prominent long run motives
certainly are the wealth accumulation for old age (which I argued before can also be viewed as a long
run precautionary motive), and the bequest motive. But though a substantial amount of empirical
evidence contradicts the predictions of the life-cycle model, this does not necessarily support the latter
motive necessarily. Still, especially in Germany, the life-cycle profile of discretionary household saving
is rather flat, much flatter than, e.g., in the US. The question emerges why saving remains positive
in old age, even for most low income households. This is particularly puzzling given the generous
pensions and health insurance in Germany, and still, German households do not seem to draw it down
but even accumulate real and financial wealth. This is why Bo¨rsch-Supan et al . (2001) refer to that
observation as the “German savings puzzle.”
Another important theoretical insight concerning factors determining savings and wealth accumu-
lation are time and risk preferences91. Even if households face the the same source and hight of risk,
they might completely differently deal with it. Risk preferences can be inferred domain-specifically,
see Weber et al . (2002). They also find that situational characteristics as well as person-centered
characteristics jointly influence risk-taking. For precisely assessing preferences, a relatively large num-
ber of domain-specific risk questions is needed which normally prohibits the implementation of these
questions in general purpose surveys. E.g. the HRS experimentally contained risk and preferences
questions; the estimates of the coefficient of risk aversion, varies substantially, see Barsky et al . (1997).
Another threat to the validity of estimates is the possible self-selection into safe jobs. Kimball
(1990) or Lusardi (1997) refer to this as the prudence motive92; this causes an endogeneity problem
since people choose occupations on the basis of their degree of risk aversion.
91 Or risk attitudes.
92 Kimball (1990), p.54, gives ‘the name “prudence” to the sensitivity of the optimal choice of a decision variable to
risk..[] The term is meant to suggest the propensity to prepare and forearm oneself in the face of uncertainty, in
contrast to “risk aversion”, which is how much one dislikes uncertainty and would turn away from uncertainty if
possible.’ And, on the same page, in Footnote 4: ‘In different contexts, “prudence” will have different meanings. In
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This section describes the measures used to determine the importance of precautionary savings. In
brief, theory tells us that precautionary savings is mainly driven by income risk. I will compare the
effects of three different sets of measures for identifying precautionary savings.
The first set are respondents’ expectations concerning the development of three domains (Ger-
many’s economic situation, the own economic situation, and the own and partner’s health situation);
more specifically, included in SAVE are also questions concerning the near future (job, labor income,
inheritances). Additionally, I use information about the income development over the past five years
(level and fluctuations, measured on a scale from 1 to 5). These questions of the SAVE questionnaire
were influenced by Kotlikoff (1989) who states that new surveys are needed covering two issues to
empirically assess precautionary savings: (1) implicit family insurance agreements and (2) the extent
of subjective uncertainty.93
The second set contains the job variables available for the household and construct risk classes.
Lusardi (1997 and 1998) argues that jobs might be selected by risk preferences since risk averse house-
holds would have a higher probability choosing a safer job. In that case, the estimated coefficient would
be biased downwards. A crude instrumental procedure would be to use regional information about
unemployment rates, assuming that households do not choose the living region by its unemployment
rate. While this assumption might be plausible for some countries, it is definitely problematic for
Germany with its extreme east-west slants of employment and the still ongoing migration of younger
households caused by that. Nevertheless, I will use this approach for comparability reasons to other
papers.
A third set of measures are the direct questions for savings motives implemented in the SAVE
questionnaire. I will analyze what household characteristics influence these motives, and in a second
step, I will test whether these motives are a proper way to map savings and wealth accumulation.
5.3.1 Subjective measures
A different approach to disentangle the influence of savings motives are subjective measures capturing
the individual assessment of the different motives. Since empirical work is in nearly no domain free
from any problems, these measures also entail two types of potential problems, see Ju¨rges (2001).
The first one is misreporting of the motives, consciously or unconsciously. There might be errors in
different stages of the cognitive process involved in answering to survey questions. Apart from having
problems with allocating probabilities or importance weights to questions, there might also be the
problem of privacy effects and social desirability, see Tourangeau et al . (2000) for an overview or
the paradigmatic example of the consumption-saving decision under uncertainty, “prudence” represents the intensity
of the precautionary saving motive.’
93 One of the first surveys covering a subjective probability question of earnings was the 1989 Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW ), run every two years by the Bank of Italy. It was established in 1965. It is a series
of independent cross sections, including a small panel component. See Guiso et al . (1992). Another data set which
implemented subjective probability questions was the Health and Retirement Survey, (HRS). These data were used
in Lusardi (1998).
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Stocke´ (2001) for a study from social psychology. The second problem might be the endogeneity of
the wealth formation processes and the savings motives.
Expectations for the future which are held less concrete than income questions were also included
in the SAVE questionnaire. They cover three domains, Germany’s economic development (macro level
income), own economic development, own and partner’s health development. Figure 5.6 shows the
histograms for each of the four variables. Partner’s and own health development are nearly congruent;
if health is age-dependent and the age differential between couples is not too large, this is also rational.
Since the partner does not file for that question himself, a more simple explanation is that respondents
simply assign the same value for both if the health differential is not too large. A little bit more striking
is the pessimism concerning Germany’s development compared to the own one, or putting it differently,
the overconfidence for the own situation rating macro and micro risks differently on a larger scale.
As mentioned in Section 5.1, the SAVE data contain, additionally to objective measures, expec-
tation measures for different domains. Concerning earnings expectations, two questions are included.
The first one asks for the the self-reported probability94 of a net income raise in comparison to the
previous year for the respondent and his/her partner. The second question asks for expectations con-
cerning the employment situation (exactly, about how probable it is that respondent and/or partner
will become unemployed in next year). Additionally, as a third variable, I use the self-assessed variable
measuring the probability that respondents receive an inheritance in the following two years.
Since the SAVE questionnaire measures income and savings on a household basis, the single prob-
abilities for respondents and partners have to be combined to the joint probability that at least one
of self/partner is affected:
prob(X)household = prob(X)respondent ∨ prob(X)partner
= 1− {[(1− prob(X)respondent)]× [(1− prob(X)partner)]} (5.6)
Table 5.2: Subjective probabilities for job loss, income raise, and inheritances
Job lossc Income raise Inheritance within 2 years
Respondent Partner Respondent Partner Respondent Partner
Zeros 61.0% (594) 62.0% (490) 65.8% (1438) 66.5% (936) 89.6% (1956) 89.8% (1281)
Refusals 0.5% (5) 1.0% (8) 0.87% (19) 1.3% (19) 0.6% (12) 0.6% (8)
Mean perc. 14.6 12.9 13.0 12.5 3.5 3.6
Na 970b 782b 2165 1408 2172 1419
a Number of reported nonmissing values.
b If respondent or partner is not at least part-time employed and retired or unemployed, zero values will be imputed for
further use.
c This question is identical to the one asked in the HRS and applies only if respondent or partner is at least partially
employed.
The variance of net income can directly be computed by the household measure (see Equation
5.6) using the corresponding values from the first two columns of Table 5.2 and the income variance
expression p(1 − p)(1 − α)2Y 2 where α is the replacement rate in case of job loss, which is 67% if
94 Probabilities were given as 10%-steps on a scale from 0 to 100%.
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person has at least one child and 60% without children corresponding to the definition of children
after the tax law (§32 EStG).95
The other two variables from Table 5.2 will be used directly as a crude proxy for some positive
income risk, since it cannot be linked directly to current household’s income. They do not contain
information on the amount of additional permanent income (income raise) or wealth (inheritances),
just on the probabilities.
Table 5.3 contains the corresponding values from the mentioned variables measuring respondents’
expectations for three domains.96
Table 5.3: Expectations for economic and health situation development
Economic Development Health Development
Germany Own Respondent Partner
Zeros 17.7% (387) 5.0% (110) 1.8 % (39) 1.1% (15)
Refusals 0.6% (13) 0.7% (15) 0.6% (14) 1.0% (14)
Median valuea 3 5 7 7
N 2171 2169 2170 1413
a Median instead of mean values are reported since values are measured on an ordinal scale.
Table 5.4 lists values for the measures on past income development.97 These two questions have
been asked within the drop-off part of the questionnaire.
Table 5.4: Assessment of past income development
N Percent N Percent
significantly better 215 10.27 Fluctuate significantly 535 25.8
slightly better 363 17.34 Fluctuate slightly 868 41.85
about the same 731 34.91 Not fluctuate at all 671 32.35
slightly worse 415 19.82
significantly worse 370 17.67
Refusals 25 45
95 Of course, this is only an approximation since these replacement rates can only be claimed for a certain time horizon
(6-32 months depending on years of contribution payment). Replacement rates drop to 57% / 53% of a generalized
net income after that time period Arbeitslosenhilfe. This might cause biased estimates of the motive since the variance
would be measured too low.
For simplification reasons and since the SAVE data set does not contain information on the age of the children, I
define having children in the sense of the law if at least one child still lives in the same household. Also, since there
are no information on the duration of unemployment in the data set, I settle for the Arbeitslosengeld (67% / 60%)
replacement rates.
96 The exact wording of that question was: “We would now like to know a little about your views on future developments.
Please indicate, according to a scale of 1 to 10. 0 means very negative 10 means very positive. (a) The economic
development of Germany (b) Your own financial situation (c) Your own health situation (d) The health situation of
your partner”
97 The exact wording was: “Is your income situation, compared with five years ago (a) significantly better (b) slightly
better (c) about the same (d) slightly worse (d) significantly worse?” This question was followed by: “During the last
five years, did your income (a) Fluctuate significantly (b) Fluctuate slightly (c) Not fluctuate at all?”
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In Table 5.5 Ordered Probit results for the unemployment probabilities are shown. I included
respondent’s characteristics for partner’s probabilities to check whether they might be connected or
even dominate partner’s characteristics in their explanatory power. This is obviously not the case.
Past unemployment is highly significant, especially in the regression for partner’s probabilities.
There is one major problem with the reported subjective probabilities of unemployment, income
change and inheritances, and that is the time horizon. In the first two cases (unemployment and
income change), the time horizon is only about 6 months (since data were collected in June 2003,
and the questions ask for changes until the end of the current year), while for inheritances, the time
horizon is 2 years. First of all, respondents might have problems of adapting exactly to the time
horizon given. Secondly, the short time horizon might make it difficult to extend the measure of
uncertainty to human wealth uncertainty (see Lusardi (1997)). Thirdly, zero values were often given
as answers to that question which might be due to the fact that most labor contracts are already
determined for the given time period and respondents don’t face any uncertainty for the given period.
Guiso et al . (1992) propose two assumptions to estimate the effect of uncertainty on consumption and
wealth accumulation: (1) the degree of persistence in the income generating process is identical for all
households and (2) the probability distribution from which earnings are drawn is time-invariant. The
second argument, though, might interact with the objection mentioned above that labor contracts
might already be determined for the concerning time period, but undergo further negotiations in
different points of time.
5.3.2 Environment measures
Apart from the subjective measures in Section 5.3.1, it is possible to construct a risk variable con-
structed by the job risk information contained in the job variables available in SAVE. Lusardi (1997)
shows that saving rates are more or less independent from occupations using the 1989 SHIW data.
Table 5.6 shows Tobit and OLS regression results for gross savings and saving rates98. Interestingly,
having a riskier occupation like freelancers or a safer like civil servants do not show different savings
behavior from the basic occupation category, employees. This is not the case for self-employed respon-
dents, whose saving rates are significantly higher. This might be due to the fact of a higher polynomial
degree of the income function which is not mapped here. I therefore also included a dummy variable
for net household income larger than 10,000 e which turned out to be negatively significant, but it
does not take away explaining power of the self-employed dummy. I also controlled for limited job
contracts (not reported in Table 5.6), but the coefficient is totally insignificant.
The findings of Table 5.6 are generally in line with results from Lusardi (1997), Skinner (1988),
and Jappelli and Pagano (1994).
These results suggest that a construction of risk index by occupation characteristics is little promis-
ing. I instead follow the procedure in Lusardi (1997) which in turn was motivated by Carroll (1992)
and Engen and Gruber (2001) to use regional information on unemployment since unemployment is
98 Gross savings were the direct savings measure given by the respondents and not corrected for net credit uptake /
downpayments for the reason of otherwise higher data loss.
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one of the major sources for income variation. Table 5.8 lists the available unemployment data for
the 16 German states. There are two minor differences to the SAVE data states: (1) Berlin is, in
contrast to official data, still separated in Berlin-West and Berlin-East in SAVE. (2) Rheinland-Pfalz
and Saarland are pooled in SAVE, so I used the average of the unemployment rates weighted by unem-
ployed persons for these two states (which then is 8.1%). The income variance will be constructed as
in Section 5.3.1 (p(1−p)(1−α)2Y 2) where p is the states’ unemployment rate. p will be set to zero for
respondents who are either civil servants, retired or otherwise not working (unemployed, housewife,
student etc.).99
The implied restriction in the use of these index unemployment rates is that individuals are equally
affected by this unemployment risk.
5.3.3 Savings motives
Another set of possible variables to explaining savings and thereby wealth accumulation might be
preferences, not only with regard to risk exposure, but also by the curvature of the utility function
itself. Of course, determining risk preferences and the utility function is quite a hard task; individual
heterogeneity causes the curvature of utility functions to vary between people. Schunk and Betsch
(2004) suggest that there exists a relationship between the mode in which a person usually makes a
decision and the curvature of the individual utility function. Their results suggest that individually
stable traits might help explain observed economic behavior, such as portfolio choice and stock market
decisions. Contributions in economic and psychological literature have investigated the question how
people resolve decision problems under risk and uncertainty for quite a long time. Starmer (2000) gives
a comprehensive review of the evolvement of the different approaches of both fields and their raising
approach; see, e.g., the emergence of the whole field of behavioral finance, especially the prospect
theory (Kahnemann/Tversky, 1979 and 1992), and their importance highlighted again by Laibson and
Zeckhauser (1998).
As this discussion shows, the determination of individual utility functions is not trivial, though
important. As a proxy for the utility function, the SAVE questionnaire also includes direct questions
concerning the importance of a list of nine different savings motives.
Figure 5.5 shows histograms for the nine different savings motives. The bimodality is less pro-
nounced for the saving motives precautionary savings (“unforseen events”) and old-age provision
(especially compared to “home”). The high fraction of zeros for repaying debts accounts for non-
indebted households which in turn rate the motive for repaying debts low. Saving for buying a home
is very bimodal; either households are interested in buying a house and therefore rate this motive high
or mutatis mutandis very low.
How do respondents evaluate the savings motives and how do they compare to other findings? This
is shown in Tables 5.9 - 5.11, where results are listed from ordered probit regressions for the nine listed
savings motives. I do not comment each single regression or parameter estimate, since I will focus in
the following on the two motives of interest in this context: the short run and long run precautionary
99 The results from the subjective probabilities for p will be discussed in Section 5.4.
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savings (unforseen events and old-age provision). Only one comment to the regression for leaving
bequests: it it obvious that the the parameter estimate for children is highly significant reflection the
accentuated bimodality of this saving motive which certainly inheres in this motive’s nature.
Business owners or older households were found significant when identifying the precautionary
motive in Kennickell and Lusardi (2004), are not likely to allocate higher values to the precautionary
savings motive (cf. Table 5.9). In fact, the dummy for business owners is not significant but for the
regression of the bequest motive.
Kennickell and Lusardi (2004) use the 1995 and 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Included in
this survey is also a question for savings motives; respondents are given a list of 12 savings motives (and
additional items “no reason” and “have no money to save”), but in difference to SAVE, respondents
should only name the most important savings reason. These were the “emergency”, or precautionary
motive (36.2%), and the old-age provision motive (32.4 %). SAVE : even though a direct comparison
is not possible, since SAVE only provides an ordinal measurement of the savings motives, the results
are very similar: the precautionary motive has, on average, the highest importance (on a scale from 0
to 10), followed by the old-age provision motive.
As described in Section 5.3.1, I will interact the savings motives with the financial decision maker
dummy.
5.4 Estimation results for precautionary savings measures
This section presents results for each of the mentioned three groups of variables. Dependent variables
are saving rates, savings and a relative wealth measure. In addition to disentangle the more ‘abstract’
or long-rung saving goals from short ones for consumption reasons, I add another constructed variable
to each of the regressions to control for this savings motive. In the SAVE questionnaire there is small
set of questions included whether households seek to reach a definite savings goal.100 It was then
asked how large the desired saved amount is and by when it should be reached. The control variable
I constructed from these three variables is whether a household has a savings goal, whether it should
be reached within the next two years and whether its value is below e 20,000 to catch all planned
larger expenditures (including holidays, cars etc.).
Concerning the use of the scaled variables discussed in Section 5.3, I circumvent the problem of
ordinal measurement of the relevant variables by building three classes, the low one ranging from 0 to
2, the middle one from 3 to 7 and the high one from 8 to 10.101 This procedure was not chosen for
the probability questions in which case I interpret the percentage classes cardinally to calculate the
household probabilities.
I interacted the household probability for receiving inheritances within the next two years with
the follow-up question whether this inheritance would at least slightly improve the income situation.
100 The exact wording of that question was: “Do you or your partner currently have a fixed objective in mind for which
you are saving at least 500 e? If yes, what it is your objective?” Nonresponse is very small (1.1%).
101 This classification was chosen such that at the low and high class comprise the same amount of values. See Bo¨rsch-
Supan and Essig (2003) who used the same classification.
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This means that I will have 43 positive probabilities in the sample. In all specifications for wealth
or financial wealth accumulation and saving rates, the expectation of significant inheritances is not
significant. This can be linked to the discussion between Barro and Thaler (1990) whether agents
rationalize and privately offset different wealth sources. In this case, the expectance of a windfall
income like inheritances or bestowals should ceteris paribus reduce the wealth accumulation, which is
not the case with the data at hand.
5.4.1 Estimation procedure
Dependent variables
For each of the three set of explanatory variables, I check their influence on saving rates, which is a
rather short-run measure since it is only measured at one point in time and represents no accumulation
over time; the second dependent variable is financial wealth relative to permanent income, and the
third one is total wealth over permanent income, both latter dependent variables being transformed by
the inverse hyperbolic sine function with θ = 1.05.102 For saving rates and relative financial wealth, I
choose the Tobit regression model since only positive values are observed. Total wealth can be negative
if the household is indebted.
Independent variables common for all regressions
In Tables 5.12 - 5.23, the first set of variables is unchanged for all regressions. Two things are worth
noting. First, there is a pronounced age and income pattern. This is in line with the theoretical
literature;103 second, past unemployment, as a further risk proxy variable, is negative significant in all
specifications. Third, the control variable whether the household aims achieving a savings target also
has explanatory power in all regressions. Fourth, as proxy variable for risk preference or tolerance,
whether or not the household has a private occupational disability insurance, is significantly positive
in most of the regressions. Fifth, occupation variables are only partly significant for self-employed.




Tables 5.12 - 5.23 show that the macro level expectations (Germany’s economic development) provide
insignificant results for all dependent variables regressions but for saving rates where pessimistic beliefs
lead to smaller saving rates. In contrast, the own development beliefs are linked to financial behavior.
Optimistic respondents show higher saving rates and higher financial wealth accumulation, while the
opposite is true for pessimistic respondents. This is clearly in contrast to the classical vision of
any precautionary savings argument from Section 5.2 as long as the causality is correctly captured
102 Cf. Section 5.2.2.
103 Keeping in mind, however, that the findings are based on cross-sectional data thereby ignoring cohort effects.
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here. If, in contrast, respondents belief that the own economic situation will be better in the future
since their financial background due to wealth accumulation is better, then estimates are biased. In
some specifications, the same is true for respondents’ and partners’ health situation expectations.
If these questions are judged more optimistically, this gives raise to higher saving rates and higher
wealth accumulation. This finding would support the hypothesis by Bo¨rsch-Supan and Stahl (1991)
that households might be consumption restricted due to age-related health problems. If in contrast,
households do not feel that these health restrictions might take place (or not that badly as primarily
expected), wealth accumulation should be higher to provide funds for the unrestricted consumption.
On the other hand, a high wealth accumulation could open possibilities for better health care measures
leading causality in the opposite direction. Given the (still) generous German health care system, I
discard the latter hypothesis.
Income uncertainty
The effect of income variation and development variables and their effect on the set of dependent
variables are listed in Tables 5.15 - 5.17. These explanatory variables are partially only significant in
the saving rates regression. Again, results are counter-intuitive. If income development was positive
in the past five years, saving rates are higher, and also, if income was highly volatile and therefore
more risky, saving rates are lower. If a household would face significant changes to its economic
situation if, e.g., one or both members would finish schooling and start their working life, this would
be comprehensible. In nearly all other cases, these findings would contradict the above mentioned
theoretical findings.
The variance of net income, which proved to be significant in Lusardi (1998), is insignificant for all
three tested dependent variables. An explanation for the different findings might be that in Germany,
the shock on the permanent income might be lower in the Germany than in the U.S., since the
replacement rate, α, is higher in Germany. The so-called Hartz IV - reform can in this case been seen
as a natural experiment. This also points the way ahead to reconsider this variable with the then
available SAVE 2005 data.
Job risk
The proxy variable for job risk measure, the state unemployment rate, is significant in the Tobit regres-
sion for saving rates (see Table 5.18), but has only a very small effect. In contrast, it is insignificantly
negative for relative financial and total wealth (Tables 5.19 and 5.20).
Savings motives
Tables 5.21 - 5.23 show Tobit and OLS estimates for saving rates, relative financial and total wealth.
The precautionary savings motive is, in all three regressions, strongly negative significant if the motive
is rated low; when it is highly rated, respondents do not behave statistically different to the median
rated motive group. The old-age provision motive is insignificant in all regressions. Interestingly,
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the self-estimation of living longer than some self-estimated average does not alter financial behavior
significantly.104.
All variables
Table 5.24 includes all discussed sets of subjective variables. The identical block of other variables
used in previous regressions was also applied here, but is not shown in the table for obvious reasons.
The basic patterns prove to be stable when including the additional sets of variables. Still, the savings
motive for unforseen events is, when ranked high, now significant in the saving rates regression.
5.5 Conclusions
The capture of a short-run or long-run precautionary savings motive is empirically a hard task. I
approached this challenge by three different sets of variables.
1. Expectations for the future: A negative evaluation of the own or the economy’s economic fu-
ture situation or health situation might be the reason for households’ increased need to insure
themselves - by higher savings or capital formation - to mitigate a negative development. The
results contradict this hypothesis. Households with low expectations for their own economic
development have significantly lower saving rates, and relative financial and total wealth.
Expectations capturing the job risk (by building a variance variable which measures the house-
hold’s risk of unemployment) show no significant effects, while income development variables
support the findings for economic development expectations: a positive development increases
saving rates, while a higher volatility of past income reduces saving rates.
2. Environmental situation: Substituting the expectations variable for job risk by local unemploy-
ment rates (which probably are not disaggregated enough) shows a positively significant effect
for saving rates, controlling for East Germany. As for occupation variables, which are included
in any regression specification, self-employed have a higher saving rate. Attribution this to job
risk seems difficult for two reasons. First, the dummy for self-employed might only produce a
spline for the influence of income since typically self-employed have a monthly income above the
median. Second, a dummy for retired households is also positive - the income risk for retirees
rather lies in the development of the Social Security system. One could argue, though, that
retirees have higher saving rates for health risks, but as seen in the specifications including ex-
pectations for health development, the health expectations dummies are insignificant while the
dummy for retirees maintains positive significant.
3. Savings motives: The short-run precautionary savings motive for unforseen events shows the
expected negative coefficient if the motive is ranked unimportant, but is insignificant when ranked
104 The relative life expectancy is the following. 65.1% belief to live as long as the average, 22.4% belief to live longer
and 12.5% to live shorter than the average. These numbers only slightly compare to surveys about self-judgement for
driving capabilities or being a good professor (better than the average) where these numbers typically reach about
90%
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important105. The long-run precautionary motive, old-age provisions, is positive significant when
ranked important in the saving rates regression, but insignificant in the other two regressions
(relative financial and total wealth). Expectations concerning the relative life expectancy have
unexpected coefficients or are insignificant.
By using three different dependent variables, one can see that the evaluation of the precautionary
saving motive is not homogeneous. Within one set of independent variables, the coefficients change
when applying each set in the estimation of the three variables saving rate, relative financial and
relative total wealth.
105 relative to the median group
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Table 5.5: Ordered probit results for future unemployment probabilities
Prob. job loss respondent Prob. job loss partner
Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Respondent
Permanent income / 10000 -3.436 0.006 -3.551 0.052
Permanent income / 10000 sq. 2.475 0.142 3.266 0.146
Age / 10 -2.162 0.479 -6.273 0.141
Age / 10 sq. 0.780 0.456 2.134 0.132
(Age / 10) cub. -0.121 0.423 -0.308 0.123
(Age/10)4 0.006 0.412 0.016 0.122
# inc. sources -0.043 0.314 0.017 0.744
Secondary school (D) -0.095 0.362 -0.056 0.667
Graduation diploma (D) -0.208 0.166 -0.228 0.238
University degree (D) -0.076 0.608 0.004 0.984
Kids (D) 0.409 0.005 0.117 0.522
Kids living in same house (D) -0.211 0.102 -0.035 0.813
East Germany (D) 0.228 0.045 0.114 0.409
Job: blue collar (D) 0.081 0.496 0.068 0.688
Job: civil servant (D) -0.960 0.000 0.008 0.973
Job: freelancer (D) 0.254 0.408 0.550 0.190
Job: self-employed (D) -0.462 0.015 -0.050 0.822
Work parttime (D) -0.111 0.379 0.050 0.725
Work little (D) -0.479 0.010 -0.105 0.566
Female (D) 0.080 0.434 4.142 0.593
Past unemployment 1-6 months 0.287 0.009 0.171 0.189
Past unemp.> 6 months 0.047 0.705 -0.117 0.422
Partner
# inc. sources -0.140 0.090
Age / 10 -3.729 0.597
Age / 10 sq. 1.189 0.604
(Age / 10) cub. -0.153 0.627
(Age/10)4 0.007 0.654
Secondary school (D) 0.047 0.773
Graduation diploma (D) 0.010 0.972
University degree (D) 0.044 0.845
Job: blue collar (D) -0.142 0.364
Job: civil servant (D) -1.339 0.007
Job: freelancer (D) -0.685 0.295
Job: self-employed (D) -0.082 0.707
Work parttime (D) -0.192 0.776
Work little (D) -7.053 1.000
Past unemployment 1-6 months 0.412 0.003
Past unemp.> 6 months 0.335 0.028
Number of obs 887 666
LR chi2(23) 139.4 111.12
Prob > chi2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.0549 0.0585
Log Likelihood -1199.9729 -894.89974
Note: The probability questions were only asked for respondents and their partners if they were fully, partly or little
employed.
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Table 5.6: Regression results for saving rates and savings on age, income and job variables
Tobit estimates OLS estimates
Saving rates Savings Saving rates Savings
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net HH income/10’ -0.021 0.372 2756.702 0.001 -0.064 0.007 3337.686 0.000
Net HH income/10’ sq. 0.001 0.778 -290.777 0.004 0.005 0.081 -326.019 0.001
Age/10 0.039 0.108 1580.671 0.065 0.018 0.485 789.069 0.403
Age/10 squared -0.004 0.122 -145.323 0.079 -0.002 0.356 -81.014 0.368
Secondary school (D) 0.028 0.078 1573.795 0.006 -0.001 0.946 955.604 0.117
Graduation diploma (D) 0.086 0.000 2803.431 0.001 0.045 0.057 1418.290 0.106
University degree (D) 0.090 0.000 4659.829 0.000 0.053 0.007 3908.034 0.000
Partner (D) 0.064 0.000 2833.860 0.000 0.011 0.480 1521.987 0.009
Kids (D) 0.010 0.634 581.270 0.432 0.018 0.379 867.396 0.264
Kids living in same house (D) -0.044 0.015 -1335.333 0.040 -0.028 0.123 -702.688 0.304
East Germany (D) -0.018 0.259 -1180.589 0.043 0.003 0.845 -714.526 0.256
Female (D) -0.001 0.930 -166.434 0.744 -0.010 0.487 -418.612 0.437
Job: blue collar (D) 0.004 0.879 109.641 0.904 0.004 0.876 464.205 0.617
Job: civil servant (D) 0.051 0.136 2720.648 0.023 0.006 0.847 1128.355 0.314
Job: freelancer (D) 0.049 0.471 4336.068 0.069 0.080 0.214 6806.315 0.005
Job: self-employed (D) 0.142 0.000 6135.093 0.000 0.172 0.000 7371.621 0.000
Retired(D) 0.068 0.025 2415.502 0.025 0.022 0.490 1008.425 0.395
Work parttime (D) -0.030 0.295 -1059.731 0.290 0.031 0.273 1143.156 0.284
Work little (D) -0.071 0.021 -1677.571 0.121 0.019 0.558 1599.189 0.184
Work not (D) -0.074 0.004 -2564.480 0.004 0.010 0.709 -87.758 0.929
Unemployed (D) -0.067 0.022 -2168.852 0.037 0.008 0.809 138.344 0.912
Constant -0.123 0.038 -7419.495 0.000 0.092 0.142 -1492.492 0.523
Number of obs 1751 1751 1005 1005
left-censored 746 746
uncensored 1005 1005
LR chi2 159.740 258.730
Prob > F 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R sq. / R sq. 0.150 0.012 0.050 0.124
Log likelihood -451.995 -10940.126
F(21, 983) 2.480 6.600
Adj. R sq. 0.030 0.105
Root MSE 0.195 7326.500
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Table 5.7: Regression results for permanent income imputation
Net income ln(Net income)
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Respondent
Salary index partner 4.202 0.254 -0.001 0.748
Household size 179.115 0.000 0.102 0.000
Age / 10 -77.808 0.966 1.155 0.146
Age / 10 sq. 418.941 0.366 -0.266 0.187
(Age / 10) cub. -76.241 0.200 0.024 0.355
(Age/10)4 3.855 0.167 -0.001 0.528
# inc. sources 77.205 0.010 0.018 0.169
Secondary school (D) 339.235 0.000 0.185 0.000
Graduation diploma (D) 264.785 0.014 0.109 0.020
University degree (D) 829.677 0.000 0.368 0.000
Kids (D) 189.060 0.054 0.068 0.111
Kids living in same house (D) -517.452 0.000 -0.205 0.000
East Germany (D) -364.048 0.000 -0.210 0.000
Job: blue collar (D) -221.743 0.048 -0.084 0.087
Job: civil servant (D) 638.495 0.000 0.214 0.002
Job: freelancer (D) 212.344 0.472 0.013 0.922
Job: self-employed (D) 530.715 0.001 0.131 0.062
Retired(D) 130.125 0.382 0.150 0.021
Work parttime (D) -405.935 0.001 -0.229 0.000
Work little (D) -558.564 0.000 -0.373 0.000
Work not (D) -602.099 0.000 -0.395 0.000
Unemployed (D) -198.885 0.103 -0.145 0.007
Widowed (D) -461.373 0.000 -0.269 0.000
Separated or divorced (D) -465.760 0.000 -0.250 0.000
Partner
Partner (D) -6457.766 0.518 -3.648 0.402
Salary index partner 1.414 0.849 0.000 0.982
# inc. sources 144.317 0.029 0.039 0.172
Age / 10 5755.009 0.335 3.805 0.143
Age / 10 sq. -1978.272 0.262 -1.316 0.087
(Age / 10) cub. 292.717 0.221 0.189 0.070
(Age/10)4 -15.188 0.197 -0.009 0.065
Secondary school (D) 141.893 0.301 0.053 0.371
Graduation diploma (D) 169.040 0.474 0.093 0.367
University degree (D) 1027.127 0.000 0.263 0.001
Job: blue collar (D) -258.862 0.074 -0.091 0.147
Job: civil servant (D) 238.089 0.371 0.067 0.563
Job: freelancer (D) -926.080 0.059 -0.283 0.187
Job: self-employed (D) 671.694 0.001 0.085 0.327
Retired(D) 521.327 0.276 0.212 0.310
Work parttime (D) -379.482 0.650 -0.043 0.906
Work little (D) -493.868 0.378 -0.521 0.033
Work not (D) -1278.834 0.002 -0.554 0.002
Unemployed (D) 663.911 0.128 0.217 0.253
Constant -1606.059 0.699 5.867 0.001
Number of obs 1694 1694
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661) 22.450 31.390
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
R squared 0.3691 0.45
Adj. R sq. 0.3526 0.4356
Root MSE 1155.4 0.50335
Notes: Conditional regression that at least one household member is not yet retired. In 18 cases, monthly income was
most probably mixed up with yearly income by the respondent when respondent’s occupation was blue collar worker
with low schooling and was thus divided by 12.
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Table 5.8: Unemployment information for German Bundesla¨nder (states); average values for 2003
State # Unemployed Unemployement rate Open jobs Short-time workers
Baden-Wrttemberg 336,540 6.1 49,022 34,623
Bayern 447,349 6.9 56,863 26,991
Berlin 306,462 18.1 9,291 4,485
Brandenburg 253,028 18.8 9,125 5,675
Bremen 42,366 13.2 3,411 1,653
Hamburg 86,388 9.9 7,633 2,032
Hessen 242,059 7.9 25,989 17,651
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 181,710 20.1 7,484 2,939
Niedersachsen 379,811 9.6 34,444 13,936
Nordrhein-Westfalen 880,053 10.0 65,394 47,205
Rheinland-Pfalz 154,610 7.7 27,308 9,170
Saarland 47,718 9.5 4,953 2,495
Sachsen 403,529 17.9 17,063 10,641
Sachsen-Anhalt 268,293 20.5 9,795 4,613
Schleswig-Holstein 136,159 9.7 10,771 4,740
Thringen 210,693 16.7 10,115 6,524
Germany 4,376,767 10.5 354,762 195,371
Source: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit
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Table 5.9: Ordered probit regression results for saving motives: part 1
Buying a home Unforseen events Paying off debts
Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Perm. income / 10,000 3.380 0.001 2.648 0.002 1.687 0.079
(Perm. income / 10,000) sq. -4.835 0.001 -3.063 0.008 -2.206 0.100
Two income earners (D) 0.320 0.000 0.027 0.704 0.221 0.004
Age/10 -0.375 0.000 0.075 0.426 0.055 0.598
Age/10 squared 0.028 0.006 -0.007 0.454 -0.013 0.215
Secondary school (D) 0.103 0.122 0.164 0.007 0.050 0.446
Graduation diploma (D) 0.206 0.030 0.104 0.243 -0.098 0.305
University degree (D) 0.171 0.057 0.062 0.451 0.103 0.245
Kids (D) -0.091 0.309 0.027 0.745 0.063 0.480
Kids living in same house (D) 0.108 0.164 -0.070 0.323 0.078 0.300
East Germany (D) -0.457 0.000 -0.145 0.021 -0.191 0.005
Job: blue collar (D) 0.044 0.681 0.019 0.855 0.012 0.911
Job: civil servant (D) -0.113 0.457 -0.048 0.739 -0.270 0.075
Job: freelancer (D) 0.089 0.740 -0.076 0.762 -0.148 0.576
Job: self-employed (D) 0.055 0.725 0.007 0.965 -0.180 0.243
Work parttime (D) -0.208 0.069 -0.035 0.747 0.029 0.798
Work little (D) -0.067 0.582 -0.054 0.638 0.249 0.039
Work not (D) 0.197 0.063 0.034 0.732 0.074 0.486
Unemployed (D) -0.299 0.008 -0.127 0.224 0.107 0.327
Female (D) -0.043 0.480 0.067 0.222 -0.004 0.943
Partner 0.112 0.201 0.015 0.853 -0.050 0.567
Widowed (D) 0.039 0.718 -0.157 0.118 -0.234 0.029
Separated or divorced (D) -0.032 0.748 -0.296 0.001 -0.092 0.345
Retired(D) -0.386 0.002 -0.027 0.813 -0.352 0.004
Business owner (D) -0.072 0.565 0.041 0.731 0.175 0.159
Number of obs 1957 1966 1935
LR chi2(23) 357.94 98.41 222.1
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0496 0.0118 0.0299
Log Likelihood -3429.6856 -4121.3349 -3603.2229
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Table 5.10: Ordered probit regression results for saving motives: part 2
Old-age provisions Traveling Major purchases
Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Perm. income / 10,000 0.703 0.424 4.228 0.000 2.846 0.001
(Perm. income / 10,000) sq. -0.273 0.820 -5.310 0.000 -3.780 0.002
Two income earners (D) 0.059 0.415 0.142 0.047 -0.029 0.688
Age/10 0.295 0.002 -0.083 0.388 -0.193 0.043
Age/10 squared -0.029 0.002 -0.003 0.780 0.008 0.358
Secondary school (D) 0.185 0.003 0.185 0.002 0.186 0.002
Graduation diploma (D) 0.051 0.569 0.365 0.000 0.217 0.014
University degree (D) 0.142 0.092 0.317 0.000 0.121 0.139
Kids (D) 0.057 0.501 0.073 0.378 -0.022 0.786
Kids living in same house (D) -0.227 0.002 -0.216 0.002 -0.069 0.325
East Germany (D) -0.172 0.007 -0.153 0.016 -0.339 0.000
Job: blue collar (D) -0.071 0.488 0.195 0.051 0.060 0.547
Job: civil servant (D) -0.452 0.002 0.249 0.081 -0.052 0.710
Job: freelancer (D) -0.056 0.826 -0.079 0.751 0.058 0.812
Job: self-employed (D) 0.117 0.447 -0.121 0.416 -0.074 0.617
Work parttime (D) -0.008 0.945 0.135 0.204 0.023 0.827
Work little (D) -0.093 0.418 -0.144 0.202 0.007 0.948
Work not (D) -0.093 0.356 0.066 0.503 -0.131 0.184
Unemployed (D) -0.108 0.302 -0.354 0.001 -0.235 0.024
Female (D) -0.028 0.615 0.006 0.912 -0.029 0.599
Partner 0.076 0.342 -0.138 0.081 0.179 0.024
Widowed (D) -0.177 0.081 0.091 0.364 0.142 0.157
Separated or divorced (D) -0.243 0.008 -0.138 0.130 -0.042 0.648
Retired(D) -0.450 0.000 0.065 0.562 -0.024 0.828
Business owner (D) 0.070 0.567 -0.192 0.104 -0.041 0.726
Number of obs 1953 1967 1966
LR chi2(23) 202.4 246.36 273.58
Prob > chi2 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.0241 0.0278 0.0308
Log Likelihood -4094.5818 -4304.2849 -4303.7851
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Table 5.11: Ordered probit regression results for saving motives: part 3
Subsidizing offspring Leaving bequests To receive tax subsidies
Coef. P > z Coef. P > z Coef. P > z
Perm. income / 10,000 2.096 0.019 0.428 0.632 3.638 0.000
(Perm. income / 10,000) sq. -1.934 0.108 0.317 0.792 -4.939 0.000
Two income earners (D) 0.160 0.029 0.090 0.228 0.181 0.015
Age/10 -0.610 0.000 -0.570 0.000 -0.235 0.026
Age/10 squared 0.049 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.005 0.596
Secondary school (D) -0.053 0.398 -0.073 0.255 0.023 0.723
Graduation diploma (D) 0.164 0.076 -0.191 0.045 -0.015 0.871
University degree (D) 0.190 0.027 -0.149 0.089 0.017 0.846
Kids (D) 1.069 0.000 0.988 0.000 0.180 0.045
Kids living in same house (D) 0.220 0.002 -0.226 0.002 -0.068 0.368
East Germany (D) -0.129 0.047 -0.255 0.000 -0.297 0.000
Job: blue collar (D) -0.074 0.482 -0.076 0.482 0.123 0.236
Job: civil servant (D) -0.065 0.666 -0.102 0.511 -0.182 0.226
Job: freelancer (D) -0.049 0.855 -0.044 0.872 -0.402 0.143
Job: self-employed (D) -0.133 0.388 0.000 0.999 0.041 0.787
Work parttime (D) 0.225 0.041 0.006 0.959 -0.067 0.544
Work little (D) 0.083 0.482 0.002 0.986 -0.008 0.946
Work not (D) 0.161 0.117 0.091 0.386 0.006 0.955
Unemployed (D) -0.005 0.962 -0.084 0.448 -0.083 0.448
Female (D) -0.018 0.757 -0.034 0.562 -0.079 0.176
Partner -0.216 0.008 -0.106 0.198 -0.024 0.780
Widowed (D) -0.332 0.002 -0.304 0.006 -0.181 0.094
Separated or divorced (D) -0.310 0.001 -0.309 0.001 -0.025 0.800
Retired(D) -0.199 0.086 -0.253 0.031 -0.319 0.008
Business owner (D) 0.182 0.130 0.276 0.021 -0.037 0.760
Number of obs 1943 1943 1938 1938 1942
LR chi2(23) 496.77 286.4 361.09
Prob > chi2 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.0586 0.0365 0.0466
Log Likelihood -3988.6158 -3781.9001 -3690.9245
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Table 5.12: Regression results: development expectations and saving rates
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 0.306 0.166
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.242 0.408
Age / 10 0.050 0.071 -0.004 0.912
Age / 10 sq. -0.005 0.071 0.001 0.890
Secondary school (D) 0.004 0.814 0.023 0.237
Graduation diploma (D) 0.037 0.103 0.032 0.300
University degree (D) 0.032 0.142 0.051 0.057
Kids (D) 0.023 0.251
Kids living in same house (D) -0.056 0.002
Separated or divorced (D) -0.040 0.095
Widowed (D) -0.012 0.642
East Germany (D) -0.001 0.966
Female (D) -0.010 0.514
Job: blue collar (D) 0.025 0.294 0.015 0.575
Job: civil servant (D) 0.016 0.623 -0.034 0.489
Job: freelancer (D) 0.033 0.589 -0.017 0.833
Job: self-employed (D) 0.114 0.002 -0.102 0.012
Retired (D) 0.062 0.036 -0.016 0.580
Work parttime (D) 0.009 0.735 -0.017 0.581
Work little (D) -0.023 0.427 -0.039 0.304
Work not (D) -0.040 0.103 -0.018 0.514
Unemployed (D) 0.017 0.563 -0.013 0.729
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.001 0.948 -0.010 0.678
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.054 0.006 0.013 0.623
Village (D) -0.008 0.742
Partner (D) 0.026 0.790
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.055 0.021
Business owner (D) 0.013 0.688
Prob(inheritance) 0.025 0.456
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.061 0.000
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.009 0.640
Live longer than av. (D) 0.005 0.733
Expectations (D)
Low: Germany’s ec. situation -0.021 0.096
High: Germany’s ec. situation -0.007 0.822
Low: Own economic situation -0.113 0.000
High: Own economic situation 0.045 0.004
Low: Own health situation 0.028 0.280
High: Own health situation 0.021 0.160
Low: Partner’s health situation -0.021 0.555
High: Partner’s health situation -0.020 0.261
Constant -0.163 0.038
Number of obs 1573
uncensored obs 909
LR chi2(68) 317.46




Table 5.13: Regression results: development expectations and financial wealth/permanent income
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 11.826 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -11.645 0.000
Age / 10 0.560 0.039 0.590 0.127
Age / 10 sq. -0.035 0.164 -0.051 0.185
Secondary school (D) 0.326 0.049 -0.352 0.096
Graduation diploma (D) 0.255 0.290 -0.112 0.738
University degree (D) 0.151 0.501 -0.048 0.871
Kids (D) 0.140 0.494
Kids living in same house (D) -0.602 0.001
Separated or divorced (D) -0.340 0.144
Widowed (D) -0.245 0.358
East Germany (D) -0.319 0.047
Female (D) -0.233 0.114
Job: blue collar (D) 0.020 0.937 -0.168 0.572
Job: civil servant (D) -0.425 0.246 -0.156 0.758
Job: freelancer (D) -0.562 0.383 -0.760 0.360
Job: self-employed (D) -0.589 0.133 -0.605 0.144
Retired (D) 0.163 0.565 -0.016 0.955
Work parttime (D) -0.326 0.300 0.021 0.951
Work little (D) -0.393 0.193 0.099 0.804
Work not (D) -0.444 0.083 -0.041 0.887
Unemployed (D) -0.195 0.498 0.284 0.444
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.188 0.311 -0.058 0.828
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.581 0.005 -0.082 0.780
Village (D) 0.044 0.865
Partner (D) -1.637 0.096
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.611 0.016
Business owner (D) 0.862 0.008
Prob(inheritance) 0.705 0.053
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.376 0.043
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.054 0.778
Live longer than av. (D) -0.037 0.806
Expectations (D)
Low: Germany’s ec. situation 0.112 0.389
High: Germany’s ec. situation -0.217 0.583
Low: Own economic situation -0.839 0.000
High: Own economic situation 0.238 0.142
Low: Own health situation -0.528 0.034
High: Own health situation -0.194 0.212
Low: Partner’s health situation -0.172 0.609
High: Partner’s health situation 0.173 0.362
Constant -1.721 0.029
Number of obs 1140
uncensored obs 431
LR chi2(68) 402.4
Prob > chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.1034
Log likelihood -1744.6798
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Table 5.14: Regression results: development expectations and total wealth/permanent income
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 12.520 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -12.950 0.000
Age / 10 0.872 0.003 1.025 0.015
Age / 10 sq. -0.050 0.065 -0.068 0.108
Secondary school (D) 0.573 0.002 -0.129 0.592
Graduation diploma (D) 0.472 0.071 -0.472 0.215
University degree (D) 0.571 0.029 -0.075 0.826
Kids (D) -0.574 0.010
Kids living in same house (D) 0.053 0.791
Separated or divorced (D) -0.424 0.100
Widowed (D) -0.313 0.275
East Germany (D) -0.428 0.015
Female (D) -0.340 0.037
Job: blue collar (D) 0.313 0.269 -0.449 0.179
Job: civil servant (D) 0.026 0.952 0.316 0.596
Job: freelancer (D) -0.993 0.156 -0.353 0.712
Job: self-employed (D) -0.185 0.707 0.391 0.451
Retired (D) -0.345 0.270 -0.382 0.252
Work parttime (D) 0.297 0.394 0.302 0.448
Work little (D) 0.679 0.041 -0.245 0.589
Work not (D) 0.555 0.048 0.512 0.122
Unemployed (D) -0.813 0.006 -0.123 0.763
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.048 0.817 -0.324 0.290
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.386 0.089 0.350 0.287
Village (D) 1.157 0.000
Partner (D) -3.496 0.001
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.713 0.011
Business owner (D) 1.959 0.000
Prob(inheritance) 0.472 0.256
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.179 0.399
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.215 0.307
Live longer than av. (D) -0.367 0.028
Expectations (D)
Low: Germany’s ec. situation 0.216 0.134
High: Germany’s ec. situation -0.693 0.112
Low: Own economic situation -0.611 0.002
High: Own economic situation 0.427 0.019
Low: Own health situation -0.422 0.109
High: Own health situation 0.128 0.458
Low: Partner’s health situation -0.488 0.183
High: Partner’s health situation 0.100 0.644
Constant -1.754 0.037
Number of obs 1016
F( 56, 959) 10.36





Table 5.15: Regression results: probability of job loss expectations and saving rates
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 0.476 0.033
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.402 0.174
Age / 10 0.043 0.128 0.000 0.993
Age / 10 sq. -0.004 0.120 0.000 0.974
Secondary school (D) 0.012 0.448 0.022 0.252
Graduation diploma (D) 0.048 0.034 0.029 0.356
University degree (D) 0.042 0.049 0.052 0.052
Kids (D) 0.021 0.305
Kids living in same house (D) -0.055 0.002
Separated or divorced (D) -0.045 0.057
Widowed (D) -0.015 0.578
East Germany (D) -0.013 0.422
Female (D) -0.011 0.454
Job: blue collar (D) 0.040 0.096 0.014 0.589
Job: civil servant (D) 0.003 0.936 -0.043 0.389
Job: freelancer (D) 0.049 0.425 -0.063 0.463
Job: self-employed (D) 0.125 0.001 -0.107 0.010
Retired (D) 0.069 0.018 -0.024 0.408
Work parttime (D) 0.000 0.994 -0.022 0.478
Work little (D) -0.011 0.712 -0.039 0.308
Work not (D) -0.028 0.253 -0.009 0.746
Unemployed (D) 0.003 0.915 -0.034 0.358
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.002 0.895 -0.004 0.851
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.054 0.006 0.014 0.605
Village (D) -0.002 0.938
Partner (D) 0.002 0.987
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.055 0.024
Business owner (D) 0.018 0.575
Prob(inheritance) 0.035 0.296
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.063 0.000
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.009 0.605
Live longer than av. (D) 0.008 0.586
Income variation
Income development: pos. (D) 0.039 0.006
Inc. dev.: highly volatile (D) -0.039 0.025
Inc. dev.: slightly volatile (D) -0.009 0.529
Variance of net income 0.000 0.271
Constant -0.179 0.023
Number of obs 1566
uncensored obs 906
LR chi2(68) 267.7
Prob > chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.3462
Log likelihood -252.73504
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Table 5.16: Regression results: probability of job loss expectations and financial wealth/permanent in-
come
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 12.975 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -12.601 0.000
Age / 10 0.613 0.025 0.632 0.101
Age / 10 sq. -0.041 0.107 -0.058 0.125
Secondary school (D) 0.406 0.015 -0.318 0.136
Graduation diploma (D) 0.272 0.265 -0.225 0.514
University degree (D) 0.148 0.517 0.042 0.886
Kids (D) 0.159 0.440
Kids living in same house (D) -0.707 0.000
Separated or divorced (D) -0.274 0.243
Widowed (D) -0.243 0.369
East Germany (D) -0.352 0.030
Female (D) -0.284 0.058
Job: blue collar (D) 0.072 0.779 -0.183 0.545
Job: civil servant (D) -0.430 0.245 -0.253 0.622
Job: freelancer (D) -0.485 0.458 -0.880 0.293
Job: self-employed (D) -0.551 0.168 -0.649 0.129
Retired (D) 0.214 0.453 -0.113 0.696
Work parttime (D) -0.293 0.355 0.041 0.906
Work little (D) -0.317 0.299 -0.040 0.921
Work not (D) -0.355 0.175 -0.007 0.981
Unemployed (D) -0.337 0.250 0.132 0.725
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.153 0.416 -0.102 0.707
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.584 0.005 -0.054 0.855
Village (D) 0.072 0.784
Partner (D) -1.544 0.110
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.581 0.025
Business owner (D) 0.899 0.007
Prob(inheritance) 0.756 0.040
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.375 0.047
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.121 0.524
Live longer than av. (D) -0.054 0.722
Income variation
Income development: pos. (D) 0.151 0.329
Inc. dev.: highly volatile (D) -0.194 0.276
Inc. dev.: slightly volatile (D) -0.014 0.923
Variance of net income -0.001 0.311
Constant -2.158 0.007
Number of obs 1130
uncensored obs 706
LR chi2(68) 360.65




Table 5.17: Regression results: probability of job loss expectations and total wealth/permanent income
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 15.123 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -15.517 0.000
Age / 10 0.877 0.003 1.169 0.005
Age / 10 sq. -0.053 0.053 -0.084 0.044
Secondary school (D) 0.657 0.000 -0.146 0.544
Graduation diploma (D) 0.641 0.014 -0.847 0.030
University degree (D) 0.645 0.014 -0.120 0.726
Kids (D) -0.566 0.011
Kids living in same house (D) -0.046 0.819
Separated or divorced (D) -0.513 0.047
Widowed (D) -0.430 0.139
East Germany (D) -0.444 0.012
Female (D) -0.451 0.006
Job: blue collar (D) 0.311 0.279 -0.541 0.109
Job: civil servant (D) -0.033 0.938 0.331 0.581
Job: freelancer (D) -1.033 0.142 -0.404 0.674
Job: self-employed (D) -0.340 0.493 0.637 0.232
Retired (D) -0.458 0.144 -0.425 0.203
Work parttime (D) 0.352 0.315 0.249 0.529
Work little (D) 0.772 0.022 -0.438 0.347
Work not (D) 0.649 0.022 0.550 0.098
Unemployed (D) -1.117 0.000 -0.233 0.571
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.049 0.818 -0.500 0.109
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.376 0.100 0.516 0.120
Village (D) 0.975 0.001
Partner (D) -3.853 0.000
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.716 0.012
Business owner (D) 1.972 0.000
Prob(inheritance) 0.616 0.137
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.177 0.406
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.389 0.063
Live longer than av. (D) -0.401 0.017
Income variation
Income development: pos. (D) -0.059 0.730
Inc. dev.: highly volatile (D) -0.068 0.721
Inc. dev.: slightly volatile (D) -0.144 0.359
Variance of net income -0.001 0.241
Constant -1.686 0.045
Number of obs 1010
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661) 10.53
Prob > F 0
R squared 0.364
Adj. R sq. 0.3294
Root MSE 2.0449
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Table 5.18: Regression results: local unemployment probability and saving rates
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 0.560 0.011
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.483 0.099
Age / 10 0.041 0.141 -0.006 0.868
Age / 10 sq. -0.004 0.131 0.001 0.860
Secondary school (D) 0.012 0.444 0.017 0.374
Graduation diploma (D) 0.051 0.022 0.029 0.353
University degree (D) 0.042 0.052 0.059 0.028
Kids (D) 0.019 0.342
Kids living in same house (D) -0.055 0.002
Separated or divorced (D) -0.048 0.041
Widowed (D) -0.017 0.513
East Germany (D) -0.006 0.690
Female (D) -0.012 0.423
Job: blue collar (D) 0.029 0.220 0.014 0.601
Job: civil servant (D) 0.011 0.720 -0.031 0.531
Job: freelancer (D) 0.030 0.621 -0.023 0.769
Job: self-employed (D) 0.109 0.003 -0.117 0.004
Retired (D) 0.064 0.029 -0.020 0.497
Work parttime (D) 0.002 0.927 -0.014 0.635
Work little (D) -0.021 0.473 -0.033 0.379
Work not (D) -0.036 0.147 -0.006 0.832
Unemployed (D) -0.010 0.736 -0.045 0.221
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.006 0.732 -0.003 0.882
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.056 0.005 0.010 0.712
Village (D) -0.006 0.806
Partner (D) 0.011 0.904
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.056 0.020
Business owner (D) 0.018 0.566
Prob(inheritance) 0.046 0.166
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.062 0.000
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.014 0.448
Live longer than av. (D) 0.013 0.355
Income risk (local unemp.rate) 0.000 0.024
Constant -0.172 0.026
Number of obs 1589
uncensored obs 918
LR chi2(68) 263.550




Table 5.19: Regression results: local unemployment probability and financial wealth/permanent income
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 13.671 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -13.397 0.000
Age / 10 0.516 0.059 0.726 0.060
Age / 10 sq. -0.032 0.204 -0.065 0.086
Secondary school (D) 0.399 0.017 -0.303 0.156
Graduation diploma (D) 0.297 0.224 -0.078 0.820
University degree (D) 0.191 0.403 0.094 0.753
Kids (D) 0.156 0.448
Kids living in same house (D) -0.735 0.000
Separated or divorced (D) -0.332 0.155
Widowed (D) -0.250 0.357
East Germany (D) -0.325 0.044
Female (D) -0.275 0.067
Job: blue collar (D) 0.087 0.735 -0.175 0.563
Job: civil servant (D) -0.379 0.306 -0.311 0.559
Job: freelancer (D) -0.463 0.494 -0.884 0.293
Job: self-employed (D) -0.633 0.116 -0.735 0.081
Retired (D) 0.154 0.592 -0.170 0.558
Work parttime (D) -0.286 0.369 0.013 0.969
Work little (D) -0.346 0.259 0.137 0.733
Work not (D) -0.331 0.205 0.045 0.878
Unemployed (D) -0.442 0.127 -0.044 0.905
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.154 0.414 -0.075 0.781
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.588 0.005 -0.013 0.964
Village (D) 0.106 0.687
Partner (D) -1.898 0.050
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.614 0.017
Business owner (D) 0.933 0.005
Prob(inheritance) 0.779 0.034
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.353 0.062
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.147 0.440
Live longer than av. (D) -0.047 0.754
Income risk (local unemp.rate) -0.002 0.141
Constant -1.976 0.012
Number of obs 1140
uncensored obs 713
LR chi2(68) 361.06
Prob > chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.0925
Log likelihood -1771.2515
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Table 5.20: Regression results: local unemployment probability and total wealth/permanent income
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 14.821 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -15.231 0.000
Age / 10 0.872 0.003 1.217 0.004
Age / 10 sq. -0.053 0.055 -0.087 0.036
Secondary school (D) 0.640 0.000 -0.119 0.620
Graduation diploma (D) 0.605 0.020 -0.661 0.087
University degree (D) 0.656 0.012 -0.050 0.884
Kids (D) -0.566 0.011
Kids living in same house (D) -0.065 0.749
Separated or divorced (D) -0.520 0.043
Widowed (D) -0.450 0.121
East Germany (D) -0.453 0.010
Female (D) -0.466 0.005
Job: blue collar (D) 0.314 0.274 -0.531 0.115
Job: civil servant (D) -0.064 0.880 0.204 0.741
Job: freelancer (D) -1.055 0.153 -0.476 0.620
Job: self-employed (D) -0.398 0.427 0.442 0.395
Retired (D) -0.453 0.150 -0.470 0.157
Work parttime (D) 0.343 0.327 0.234 0.554
Work little (D) 0.750 0.025 -0.287 0.533
Work not (D) 0.660 0.019 0.566 0.088
Unemployed (D) -1.114 0.000 -0.296 0.467
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.049 0.817 -0.463 0.134
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.381 0.094 0.505 0.125
Village (D) 1.008 0.001
Partner (D) -4.025 0.000
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.735 0.009
Business owner (D) 2.027 0.000
Prob(inheritance) 0.617 0.135
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.152 0.475
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.390 0.061
Live longer than av. (D) -0.377 0.024
Income risk (local unemp.rate) -0.002 0.144
Constant -1.700 0.039
Number of obs 1016
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661) 11.22
Prob > F 0
R squared 0.3626
Adj. R sq. 0.3303
Root MSE 2.0467
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Table 5.21: Regression results: Savings motives and saving rates
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 0.490 0.028
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -0.436 0.137
Age / 10 0.048 0.103 -0.017 0.665
Age / 10 sq. -0.004 0.128 0.002 0.691
Secondary school (D) 0.009 0.564 0.008 0.659
Graduation diploma (D) 0.048 0.036 0.023 0.479
University degree (D) 0.044 0.042 0.060 0.027
Kids (D) 0.003 0.907
Kids living in same house (D) -0.046 0.012
Separated or divorced (D) -0.031 0.197
Widowed (D) -0.006 0.828
East Germany (D) 0.000 0.984
Female (D) -0.006 0.697
Job: blue collar (D) 0.036 0.130 0.032 0.224
Job: civil servant (D) 0.020 0.528 -0.013 0.784
Job: freelancer (D) 0.025 0.689 0.001 0.989
Job: self-employed (D) 0.112 0.002 -0.081 0.046
Retired (D) 0.074 0.013 -0.017 0.559
Work parttime (D) 0.016 0.559 -0.005 0.868
Work little (D) -0.003 0.907 -0.009 0.809
Work not (D) -0.038 0.129 -0.005 0.849
Unemployed (D) -0.003 0.921 -0.036 0.326
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.005 0.755 0.000 0.983
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.054 0.006 0.016 0.534
Village (D) -0.016 0.515
Partner (D) 0.037 0.702
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.071 0.004
Business owner (D) 0.010 0.758
Prob(inheritance) 0.054 0.104
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.058 0.000
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.012 0.527
Live longer than av. (D) 0.008 0.600
Low financial risk -0.018 0.209
High financial risk -0.019 0.581
Saving goals (D)
Low: buying a home 0.022 0.226
High: buying a home 0.051 0.007
Low: unforseen events -0.103 0.000
High: unforseen events 0.020 0.146
Low: repaying debts 0.074 0.000
High: repaying debts -0.027 0.135
Low: old-age provision -0.015 0.437
High: old-age provision 0.040 0.006
Low: holidays 0.023 0.114
High: holidays -0.012 0.493
Low: major purchases -0.011 0.498
High: major purchases 0.008 0.618
Low: subsidizing offspring -0.005 0.775
High: subsidizing offspring 0.001 0.954
Low: leaving bequests -0.030 0.053
High: leaving bequests -0.007 0.735
Low: getting tax subs. -0.029 0.066
High: getting tax subs. -0.009 0.635
Constant -0.225 0.006
Number of obs 1515
LR chi2(68) 357.34
Prob > chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.4834
Log likelihood -190.9217
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Table 5.22: Regression results: Savings motives and financial wealth/permanent income
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 11.199 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -11.166 0.000
Age / 10 0.724 0.011 0.616 0.109
Age / 10 sq. -0.046 0.088 -0.053 0.166
Secondary school (D) 0.358 0.031 -0.325 0.118
Graduation diploma (D) 0.229 0.345 -0.148 0.668
University degree (D) 0.069 0.759 0.240 0.414
Kids (D) 0.100 0.643
Kids living in same house (D) -0.707 0.000
Separated or divorced (D) -0.126 0.589
Widowed (D) -0.105 0.700
East Germany (D) -0.365 0.025
Female (D) -0.265 0.076
Job: blue collar (D) -0.056 0.821 -0.015 0.959
Job: civil servant (D) -0.266 0.465 -0.254 0.610
Job: freelancer (D) -1.140 0.098 -0.713 0.385
Job: self-employed (D) -0.482 0.212 -0.432 0.294
Retired (D) 0.251 0.381 -0.236 0.408
Work parttime (D) -0.262 0.402 0.044 0.895
Work little (D) -0.145 0.634 0.251 0.528
Work not (D) -0.458 0.075 -0.040 0.890
Unemployed (D) -0.332 0.247 0.170 0.642
Unemp.> 1 month (D) 0.111 0.546 0.079 0.769
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.555 0.007 -0.091 0.755
Village (D) -0.033 0.900
Partner (D) -1.594 0.097
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.593 0.022
Business owner (D) 0.905 0.005
Prob(inheritance) 0.811 0.024
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.236 0.207
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.115 0.550
Live longer than av. (D) -0.096 0.523
Low financial risk -0.492 0.001
High financial risk -0.318 0.408
Saving goals (D)
Low: buying a home 0.272 0.155
High: buying a home 0.332 0.101
Low: unforseen events -0.676 0.002
High: unforseen events 0.177 0.221
Low: repaying debts 0.457 0.010
High: repaying debts -0.389 0.039
Low: old-age provision -0.039 0.832
High: old-age provision 0.183 0.227
Low: holidays -0.073 0.620
High: holidays -0.196 0.272
Low: major purchases -0.033 0.835
High: major purchases 0.238 0.170
Low: subsidizing offspring -0.298 0.086
High: subsidizing offspring -0.059 0.746
Low: leaving bequests -0.111 0.498
High: leaving bequests -0.331 0.120
Low: getting tax subs. -0.361 0.026
High: getting tax subs. -0.004 0.984
Constant -1.886 0.019
Number of obs 1083
LR chi2(68) 441.04




Table 5.23: Regression results: Savings motives and total wealth/permanent income
Respondent Partner
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 12.861 0.000
(Perm. Inc./ 10,000) sq. -13.360 0.000
Age / 10 0.905 0.003 0.975 0.023
Age / 10 sq. -0.054 0.070 -0.065 0.132
Secondary school (D) 0.541 0.004 -0.060 0.801
Graduation diploma (D) 0.604 0.024 -0.238 0.554
University degree (D) 0.656 0.014 0.299 0.396
Kids (D) -0.498 0.037
Kids living in same house (D) -0.067 0.748
Separated or divorced (D) -0.286 0.279
Widowed (D) -0.388 0.194
East Germany (D) -0.368 0.041
Female (D) -0.424 0.012
Job: blue collar (D) 0.404 0.157 -0.187 0.582
Job: civil servant (D) -0.063 0.885 0.433 0.469
Job: freelancer (D) -1.235 0.111 0.229 0.812
Job: self-employed (D) -0.214 0.663 0.517 0.321
Retired (D) -0.207 0.518 -0.403 0.233
Work parttime (D) 0.431 0.223 0.439 0.271
Work little (D) 0.660 0.056 -0.189 0.684
Work not (D) 0.538 0.060 0.507 0.133
Unemployed (D) -0.819 0.006 -0.325 0.427
Unemp.> 1 month (D) -0.076 0.718 -0.276 0.381
Unemp.> 6 months (D) -0.321 0.163 0.390 0.243
Village (D) 0.868 0.005
Partner (D) -3.514 0.001
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.681 0.019
Business owner (D) 1.964 0.000
Prob(inheritance) 0.643 0.120
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.032 0.883
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.438 0.041
Live longer than av. (D) -0.387 0.024
Low financial risk -0.414 0.015
High financial risk -0.531 0.228
Saving goals (D)
Low: buying a home 0.384 0.072
High: buying a home 0.917 0.000
Low: unforseen events -0.652 0.005
High: unforseen events 0.066 0.682
Low: repaying debts 0.204 0.305
High: repaying debts 0.097 0.648
Low: old-age provision -0.202 0.321
High: old-age provision 0.144 0.398
Low: holidays 0.382 0.022
High: holidays -0.002 0.992
Low: major purchases -0.182 0.304
High: major purchases 0.341 0.090
Low: subsidizing offspring 0.225 0.252
High: subsidizing offspring -0.436 0.040
Low: leaving bequests -0.052 0.782
High: leaving bequests 0.547 0.024
Low: getting tax subs. -0.229 0.213
High: getting tax subs. -0.377 0.094
Constant -1.991 0.021
Number of obs 969
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661) 8.94
Prob > F 0
R squared 0.4032
Adj. R sq. 0.3581
Root MSE 2.0095
134 5 Precautionary savings
Table 5.24: Regression results: All subjective variables for saving rates, relative financial wealth, relative total
wealth
Saving rates Relative financial wealth Relative total wealth
Coef. P > t Coef. P > t Coef. P > t
Savings goal ahead (D) 0.067 0.006 0.498 0.046 0.649 0.022
Business owner (D) 0.009 0.770 0.814 0.010 1.841 0.000
Prob(inheritance) 0.031 0.366 0.764 0.028 0.679 0.097
Occ. disab. insur. (D) 0.054 0.001 0.234 0.201 -0.017 0.938
Live shorter than av. (D) -0.009 0.627 -0.070 0.712 -0.328 0.127
Live longer than av. (D) -0.004 0.797 -0.070 0.635 -0.446 0.009
Low financial risk (D) -0.021 0.142 -0.468 0.001 -0.318 0.059
High financial risk (D) -0.031 0.386 -0.452 0.224 -0.571 0.186
Saving goals (D)
Low: buying a home 0.018 0.323 0.227 0.226 0.345 0.105
High: buying a home 0.053 0.007 0.359 0.068 0.967 0.000
Low: unforseen events -0.094 0.000 -0.641 0.002 -0.696 0.002
High: unforseen events 0.025 0.067 0.208 0.140 0.052 0.742
Low: repaying debts 0.066 0.000 0.438 0.012 0.192 0.331
High: repaying debts -0.027 0.133 -0.304 0.096 0.101 0.628
Low: old-age provision -0.018 0.382 -0.039 0.827 -0.228 0.257
High: old-age provision 0.034 0.019 0.112 0.448 0.073 0.664
Low: holidays 0.026 0.078 -0.080 0.575 0.360 0.028
High: holidays -0.008 0.670 -0.181 0.296 -0.005 0.981
Low: major purchases -0.001 0.968 0.094 0.541 -0.093 0.595
High: major purchases -0.001 0.967 0.223 0.189 0.306 0.123
Low: subsidizing offspring -0.002 0.927 -0.301 0.077 0.228 0.241
High: subsidizing offspring 0.003 0.875 -0.051 0.773 -0.467 0.025
Low: leaving bequests -0.022 0.160 -0.019 0.907 0.010 0.958
High: leaving bequests -0.005 0.788 -0.330 0.111 0.542 0.023
Low: getting tax subs. -0.028 0.079 -0.307 0.052 -0.271 0.136
High: getting tax subs. -0.013 0.483 0.007 0.970 -0.412 0.063
Income variation
Income development: pos. (D) 0.026 0.071 0.128 0.397 -0.083 0.633
Inc. dev.: highly volatile (D) -0.032 0.074 -0.151 0.377 -0.066 0.728
Inc. dev.: slightly volatile (D) -0.005 0.732 0.032 0.818 0.008 0.962
Variance of net income 0.000 0.351 0.000 0.904 0.000 0.661
Income risk (local unemp.rate) 0.000 0.024 -0.002 0.249 -0.001 0.649
Low: Germany’s ec. situation -0.020 0.140 0.181 0.155 0.133 0.365
High: Germany’s ec. situation 0.028 0.414 -0.001 0.999 -0.640 0.134
Low: Own economic situation -0.093 0.000 -0.696 0.000 -0.493 0.013
High: Own economic situation 0.024 0.138 0.162 0.309 0.384 0.037
Low: Own health situation 0.023 0.381 -0.511 0.036 -0.405 0.125
High: Own health situation 0.015 0.344 -0.284 0.065 -0.011 0.952
Low: Partner’s health situation -0.004 0.906 0.087 0.792 -0.119 0.749
High: Partner’s health situation -0.009 0.620 0.344 0.065 0.281 0.197
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
To get tax subsidies
Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Answers are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
means ‘totally unimportant’ and 10 ‘very important’.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Partner’s health situaion
Notes: Weighted values by subsample, hh income, and age. Answers are measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
means ‘very negative’ and 10 ‘very positive’.
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Chapter 6
Imputing total expenditures from a non-exhaustive list of sub-items:
An empirical assessment using the SAVE data set
6.1 Introduction
Income and expenditure surveys are available in many countries.106 They provide a great deal of
detailed and supposedly reliable consumption data, but these data only strive or totally lack other
data necessary for many research questions. While general-purpose surveys like the German Socio-
Economic Panel GSOEP or SAVE typically are a good source of socio-economic characteristics or
other information relevant for savings analysis, they face the immanent problem of lacking detailed
information on some other information like consumption. These problems are immanent since these
surveys are typically not diary based; this would be way too costly and can usually only be justified
by the need for central statistical offices to calculate weights for consumer price indices. The time
restrictions for personal household interviews thus make it necessary to look for alternative ways to
retrieve useful information.
Browning et al . (2003) therefore developed a method for getting a measure for total non-durable
expenditures107 of households without asking an exhaustive list of consumption items and sub-items.
This saves time and makes asking consumption questions in general purpose surveys feasible. Further-
more, they also do not rely on a direct question for total consumption expenditures which has been
shown to be measured with a large error, see Browning et al . (2003) or Battistin et al . (2003).
The idea of Browning et al . (2003) is to use the exhaustive information from an external survey
with with exhaustive expenditure items to impute total expenditures in the non-exhaustive survey
based on the sub-item. The external data will be a national income and expenditure survey, e.g. with
expenditure information from a household diary. I apply this idea to the SAVE data set where only
a few expenditure items are asked. The external data will be the German Income and Expenditure
Survey (EVS ). The aim of this chapter is to compare the direct measure of total expenditures in SAVE
with the imputed values. Furthermore, I will test whether some expenditure sub-items can proxy total
non-durable expenditures as well for German data, i.e. the EVS, as for other national surveys like
106 E.g., the Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) in Germany, the survey of Family Expenditures FAMEX in Canada,
the Consumer Expenditure Survey CEX in the U.S., or the Survey of Family Budgets SFB in Italy.
107 Browning and Crossley (2004) suggest that non-durable expenditures such as food may be differentially smoothed in
response to shocks, and show that much more action appears in small durables.
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those used in Browning et al . (2003). Finally, I use the imputed expenditure measure to compute
household savings as a residual measure (difference of income and total non-durable expenditures).
Winter (2004) presents experimental evidence on how the choice of expenditure categories influences
measures of household consumption. He interprets the findings that responses to one-shot questions on
total monthly nondurable expenditures differ from the sum of disaggregated categories. Furthermore,
he finds underreporting in the one-shot question even when considering that the answers to a detailed
list of 35 categories might still also be subject to underreporting.
The structure of this chapter will be as follows: In Section 6.2, I will quickly mention three alter-
native methods of retrieving information on total expenditures in surveys, which are pointed out by
Browning et al . (2003). In Section 6.3, descriptive summaries from the expenditure questions SAVE
are displayed and compared to the expenditure values from the German EVS. It also shows the results
from the imputation procedure based on the EVS for total expenditures in SAVE and compares the
imputed to the recall values.
6.2 Asking expenditure questions in surveys
As pointed out in Section 8.1, running diary based surveys which might recover reliable detailed
consumption values, is burdensome, time consuming and very costly. It would therefore practically
be impossible to receive information on consumption and savings related topics from the observed
household if we had to use diaries to get a good measure of expenditure data.
Browning et al . (2003) discuss three methods to gain information on total expenditure which will
summarized below. In brief, the first one is to ask a single general total expenditure question, the
second one asks for a detailed and exhaustive list of sub-items composing total expenditures while the
third one is a nonexhaustive selected subset of the list of total sub-items. General-purpose surveys
include retrospective or recall questions on consumption and expenditures. In contrast to the German
EVS which delivers diary-based data on expenditures, other national expenditure surveys like the
U.S. CEX or the Canadian FAMEX are partially based on interview recall questions. Beginning with
the SAVE 2003 wave, the latter method, along with the first one, was applied.
General-purpose surveys include retrospective or recall questions on consumption and expenditures.
In contrast to the German EVS which delivers diary-based data on expenditures, other national
expenditure surveys like the U.S. CEX or the Canadian FAMEX are partially based on interview
recall questions.
One-shot question for total non-durable expenditures At a first glance, it seems attractive to
simply ask one total expenditure question in surveys: it is time saving, and the question can easily be
understood. Thinking twice, this option appears far less appealing, since the question is very complex,
and respondents tend to give a rough estimate which then is heavily loaded with noise.108
Battistin et al . (2003) compare the expenditure questions from the Bank of Italy Survey on House-
hold Income and Wealth (SHIW ) with the corresponding diary based survey (SFB). They develop a
108 which might become quite clear if one tries to guess the own average consumption
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model for the recall error process to correct for heaping and rounding in the recall values; still, the
distribution of true109 expenditures is different for total non-durable expenditure. They conclude that
the SHIW reported non-durable expenditure measure diverge from values of the SFB and conclude
that the recall error is more severe concerning total non-durable consumption than for subcategories
like expenditures for ‘food at home’.
This is also found by Browning et al . (2003) who compared the Canadian Out of Employment Panel
(COEP) with the Canadian Family Expenditure Survey (FAMEX) and SHIW to SFB. For Italy, they
find underreporting of total non-durable expenditures of 24%/30%, and for Canada 37%/32% (total
expenditures) when comparing medians/means.
While, in addition to the measurement problem, one might wonder about nonresponse rates to
total expenditures, this seems to be less of a problem. Browning et al . (2003) report a nonresponse
rate of 6.0% for total expenditures, while Winter (2004) finds item nonresponse (‘don’t know’ option)
of about one third which in turn compares to the rate of 35.8% reported by Hurd et al . (1998). Nonre-
sponse rates of that amount require analyses for response dependence on household and demographic
characteristics. While there is evidence of significant demographic and other effects in Hurd et al.,
which raises the issue on sample selectivity, Winter finds evidence justifying the assumption of random
non-response.
Exhaustive list of items The summaries of Browning et al . (2003) and Winter (2004) concerning
the use of an exhaustive list of expenditure items give the advice that their inclusion in surveys is
quite costly in interview time, which is costly in monetary terms as well as in terms of trade-off costs
for other questions since there normally is a natural limit of interview time110. Apart from the time
constraint, many of the items might be reported with noise as well.
Non-exhaustive list of items This paragraph splits into two sections. The first one investigates
which sub-items are measured reliably and which ones proxy total expenditures reasonably well. The
second one explains how the incomplete measures are used to get a reliable measures for total non-
durable expenditure.
Browning et al . (2003) have shown that questions on expenditure on ‘food at home’ are not exposed
to the same amount of noise as the total non-durable expenditure questions. Means and medians for
the just mentioned comparison of survey to diary data are about the same, which is also true for the
dispersion of the data. These encouraging results state that respondents are astonishingly well capable
to give reliable responses to that question.
Since ‘food at home’ also represents a large budget item, it is useful for imputing total consumption.
Browning et al . (2003) explain that even though they can not present evidence on its accuracy, a ‘food
outside home’ question should be included, since it represents a substitute to food at home; it might
also capture heterogeneity of the two budget shares for households having the same level of total
expenditure. In addition to the food questions, Browning et al. advise us to also collect information
109 assuming that the diary-based information reflect the truth
110 after which interview abortion rates will rise dramatically
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on utilities (or energy costs like water, fuel, electricity) and communication expenditures based on
their analysis of the explanatory power of these variables for total expenditure.
The basic idea in the process of using only a sub-group of items to estimate total expenditure is
the following. Using expenditure survey data with a precise measure of total expenditure xtotal; based
on a sum of all sub-item expenditures, one chooses a subset of goods xi, i = 1, 2...l and estimates the
following
xtotal = α + β1x1 + β2x2 + ... + βlxl +  (6.1)
By interpreting the estimated coefficients βi as weights, it is possible to use the βˆi for predictions of
xˆtotal on the basis of the same goods xi, i = 1, 2...l using data from the general-purpose survey, e.g.
SAVE :
xˆtotal = αˆ + βˆ1x1 + βˆ2x2 + ... + βˆlxl (6.2)
Browning et al. suggest not to include income as an predictor for two reasons. The first one is
that they suspect that income is an ill-measured variable, based on the results by Lusardi (1996).
The second is that income introduces spurious relationships between income and the result of the
imputation which then invalidates some uses of the imputed total expenditure measure.111
6.3 Descriptive findings in SAVE and in the EVS
The expenditure questions in the German SAVE data set were designed in the way suggested by
Browning et al . (2003). In 2003, five questions were included to ask for four expenditure items112, and
total non-durable expenditures. The four items were ‘food at home’, ‘food outside home’, ‘telecom-
munication services’ and ‘utilities’ (heating and energy costs). The exact wording and survey imple-
mentation is shown in the Appendix, part 6.C. The inclusion of the consumption questions in that
period was especially appealing since in the same year, a wave of the EVS survey was conducted.113
Unfortunately, the 2003 scientific use file containing detailed information on expenditure components
is not yet available. This is why for following analyses, the 1998 EVS wave is used.
6.3.1 Expenditure items in SAVE
This section describes empirical findings for the SAVE consumption expenditure data. As further
explained in the Appendix, part 6.C, energy costs are asked in two questions where the first one
collects information on the billing period, while the second one asks for the average costs per bill. The
product of these two questions is then recalculated to obtain monthly heating expenditures. Table 6.1
lists methodological issues of the expenditure items.
111 E.g., testing for excess sensitivity.
112 One question controlling for the billing period of energy costs.
113 The German Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) started in 1978 and was repeated on a regular five year interval.
It described as a series of cross section, although it contains a considerable true panel component of individuals willing
to participate several times. Still, this panel information is not available due to the original data law agreements
which makes it impossible to track households over time.
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Table 6.1: Values for different expenditure items
Food at Food outside Telecom. Water, fuel, Total non-
home home services electricity durable exp.
N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent
Nonresponse 21 0.67 115 3.65 47 1.49 782b 24.79b 18 0.57
Outliersa 11 0.35 1 0.03 5 0.16 9 0.38 133 4.24
Zeros 183 5.84 622 20.47 75 2.41 158 6.66 225 7.17
Obs. 2939 93.18 2416 76.60 3027 95.97 2205 69.91 2778 88.08
a Outliers defined as values being larger than net household income if income is observed.
b Monthly energy costs are calculated from two questions, the billing period and costs per bill. From the 782 missings,
402 were due to the option ‘included in monthly rent’, 87 to ‘heating billing period other than listed’, 113 / 180 to
nonresponse to the billing period / heating costs questions.
Source: All SAVE 2003 and 2004 subsamples
The items appear in the order they were asked in the survey, i.e. total non-durable expenditures
were asked after all sub-items. At first glance, non-response rates seem to be rather low, especially for
total non-durable expenditures. Respondents were obviously willing to give an answer despite having
refused to answer to the previous questions. Still, the high number of zeros is disturbing: these might
be hidden non-responses. I analyze the potential causes of the zero expenditures in probit estimations
for any of the these expenditure items where the dependent variable was zeros vs. “positive values”
on income, age and a set of demographic characteristics. However, one would suspect for example
that ‘food outside home’-expenditures strongly depend on income, schooling and employment status.
This would indicate that at least some of the zero values are not hidden non-responses but might well
be due to a lower living standard. Since this question also contains expenditures for food at canteens,
the responses might be influenced by the work environment. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 shows the results of
the Probit estimates. For ‘food outside home’ and ‘telecom. services’, the income polynomial is highly
significant; the higher the income, the lower the probability for zero responses. The minimum effect is
at about 5300/4700 e, respectively. This seems to support the hypothesis that not all zero values are
due to respondents’ uncertainty about the true value, as Winter (2004) proposes for the occurrence
of zeros for total non-durable expenditures. Still, dummy variables for the SAVE subsamples are
significant. While the TPI sample, which surveys skilled interviewees, contains no zero values for
three of the items, the random subsample RR 2003 contains significantly more zero value respondents
for three items including total non-durable expenditures.
It is not plausible that a household has zero ‘food at home’-expenditures, so at least some of the
zero expenditures can be attributed to non-response. Moreover, zero values are correlated: giving no
answer in e.g. the ‘food at home’ or the ‘total expenditure’ question can explain almost half of the
zero values of each other and the other two questions.
Given the results, it is not justifiable to drop zero value observations. For the high values, or
outliers, shown in Table 6.1, a similar set of regression was done. The structure was much less stable;
many variables predicted the output perfectly which is obvious given the low number of cases. For
total non-durable expenditures, there is a clear income and schooling dependence: the higher income
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and schooling, the lower the probability of outliers. This supports the often expressed reservation
against asking total non-durable consumption recall questions. For the following analyses, I will drop
outliers for each expenditure item, cf. Table 6.1.
Figures 6.1 shows histograms for the expenditure items, which are also depicted in Figure 6.2,
excluding zero values. Both Figures exclude values which are higher than monthly net household
income. The figures also show typical effects of recall questions: focal values are relatively frequent.
This effect is also shown in Winter (2004) and Battistin et al . (2003); the latter also developed methods
to account for this heaping and rounding. For total expenditures, 91.16% of the answers were multiples
of 50 e, 76.0% multiples of 100, 32.0% of 500 and 20.2% at 1,000 e, not excluding zero values. These
rounding effects are less frequent for ‘food at home’ (43% for multiples of 100 e), but the scale is of
course finer.
As an executive summary for the SAVE expenditure data, two things are worth noting. First,
nonresponse is by no means comparable to the findings by Winter (2004) or Battistin et al . (2003);
in fact, nonresponse is completely ignorable concerning almost all expenditure items, including total
non-durable consumption. Still, zero values are relatively frequent, and it is hard to tell whether these
are hidden nonresponses or true zero expenditures. Compared to other data sources, the experiment
including these expenditure questions seems very promising, and the next section will confront these
values to the German diary based EVS.
6.3.2 Expenditures in the EVS
This study has been done whilst detailed data on different income and expenditure items were not yet
available for the 2003 wave. Hence, I use the EVS 1998 and multiply all different consumption items
being explained in the following by separate price indices114 for every subgroup.115
Total non-durable consumption in the EVS was computed as the sum of the following sub-items.
Included are all items of the group ‘food, drinks, tobacco’; all items of the group ‘clothing and shoes’;
‘total costs of health care’ (out of pocket health); ‘total energy expenditures’; ‘total education expendi-
tures’; ‘total expenditures for food outside home, drinks and lodging’; ‘goods and services for housing’;
‘traffic’; ‘communications’; ‘other goods and services116; ‘expenditures for leisure, entertainment and
cultural events’; ‘other goods and services’. These categories have to be corrected, i.e. reduced, by
expenditures for durable consumption goods: cars, bikes and motorcycles; phones and fax machines;
TVs, VCRs, camera and camera equipment, and other durables like music instruments; bijou, watches.
When trying to impute the coefficients estimated for the four subcategories food at home, food
outside home, telecommunications and energy, one must take account of the fact that in the 1998
EVS, food at home as well as food outside home, drinks are included as well. In order to replicate the
measures used by Browning et al . (2003) as closely as possible, I use the 1993 EVS to calculate the
114 Source: Federal Statistical Bureau of Germany
115 and also, if measures were composite, for every subgroup within that group.
116 For the latter category (other goods and services), it is recommended that all goods and services are included separately
instead of using the whole group for allowing different price indices and has been done accordingly.
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shares of food alone without drinks in these two subgroups, which is then used to approximate the
corresponding 1998 expenditures.117
Table 6.2: Expenditure shares from income and expenditure surveys
EVS (1998a/1993), N=49720 Canada Italy Spain
Mean Median Std. Error FAMEX (1996) (SFB) (ECPF)
Food at home 16.9% 16.3% 0.03% 22.1% 32.1% 57.4%
Food outside home 3.5% 2.8% 0.02% 6.3% 5.0% 0.3%
Telecommunications 2.5% 2.1% 0.01% 3.9% 3.3% n.a.
Energy 8.3% 7.3% 0.02% 8.2% 8.0% 7.8%
Overall total 31.2% 31.1% 0.04% 40.5% 48.5% 49.3%
a In prices of 2003
Source: EVS : Own calculations; FAMEX, SFB, ECPF : Browning et al . (2003)
Table 6.2 compares the expenditure shares from the EVS with the corresponding expenditures in
Canada, Italy, and Spain. The differences in the single four shares as well as in the overall totals
suggest that total non-durable expenditures calculated from the other three samples is measured more
restrictively as in the author’s calculations.118
Comparison between EVS and SAVE expenditure data Table 6.3 compares the total non-
durable expenditures from SAVE to the values of the EVS. The ratio of the mean/median expendi-
tures, respectively, in both data sets are even lower than what is reported by Browning et al . (2003),
which again might well be due to the fact that total non-durable consumption is calculated less restric-
tive here. This supports the general finding that recall-based total expenditures suffer significantly
from underreporting.
Table 6.4 analogously compares the sub-item expenditures from SAVE to the values of the EVS.
And again the results by Browning et al . (2003) can be mimicked: the ratio between the means and
medians of both data sets are about 1, which supports the findings that measures for sub-items,
especially ‘food at home’, work very well for recall-based surveys.
These findings allow to use the method discussed in Section 6.2 to impute total non-durable con-
sumption for the SAVE data using as an external source the EVS data set.
6.3.3 Estimation of weights and imputation of total non-durable consumption
This section presents the estimation results from the method mentioned in Section 6.2. Different
specifications were used to assign weights to different sub-items based on Equation 6.1. The estimated
117 This implicitly assumes constant expenditure shares for drinks/foods over the five year gap. The shares are 86% for
‘food at home’ to ‘food, drinks and tobacco at home’ and 67% for the food expenditures outside home, respectively.
118 Total nondurable expenditures in Browning et al . (2003) are defined as: food at home, food out, water, fuel, electric-
ity, household operations, clothing, transportation (excluding car purchases) medical care, personal care, recreation
(excluding purchases of recreational vehicles), reading material, educational expenses, alcohol and tobacco.
146 6 Imputation of expenditures
Table 6.3: Total expenditure measure
CAPI 2003 RR 2003 CAPI 2004a EVS 1998a
Mean 748.57 49.0% 830.20 54.3% 878.90 57.5% 1529.21
Median 650.00 47.1% 750.00 54.4% 750.00 54.4% 1379.93
Standard Error 28.44 13.97 60.40 3.34
N 483 2184 469 49720
only if expenditures > 0
Mean 815.04 53.3% 904.97 59.2% 878.90 57.5%
Median 700.00 50.7% 800.00 58.0% 750.00 54.4%
Standard Error 29.01 14.08 60.40
N 441 2001 469
a In prices of 2003
Notes: All values weighted. Absolute numbers and relative values to EVS numbers shown.
Table 6.4: Sub-items of household expenditures
EVS 98a CAPI 2003 RR 2003 CAPI 2004 SAVE 2003
and 2004b
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Food at home 254.0 229.4 237.6 200 167.0 50 1165.5 400 232.8 175
Food outside h. 59.7 38.8 57.4 30 27.7 8 76.4 50 51.6 25
Telecom. services 35.3 29 48.1 30 29.1 10 165.2 63 40.8 25
Water,fuel,elec. 120.0 101 117.8 62.5 108.3 79.2 202.9 88 121.8 81
a In prices of 2003
b Conditional on each value being larger than zero and the income fraction being smaller than one
Note: All values weighted.
coefficients for the weights are then applied to the SAVE expenditure items to obtain the imputation
measure for total non-durable consumption.
Estimation of weights Table 6.5 reports the results of five experiments. For each I report coefficient
estimates and the R2 for the regression.
The first column of Table 6.5 reports the results of regressing total non-durable expenditure on two
items, only ‘food at home’ and ‘food outside home’. 56% of total non-durable expenditures can be
explained by these two predictors; this means that more than half of the variance of total non-durable
consumption can be explained by food expenditures only. Including ‘telecommunication services’ and
‘utilities’, the explanatory power raises to 62% (2). Browning et al . (2003) argue that the assumption
of linear Engel curves made in Equation 6.1 might be too hard a restriction. This is the reason to
include squares and cross products of the four expenditure items in (3). Again, Browning et al.’s
results are confirmed as the less restrictive functional form only adds minor additional explanatory
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Table 6.5: Regression results for Equation 6.1
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Food at home 2.695 2.189 2.089 1.908 1.596
Food outside home 4.057 3.717 3.871 3.665 3.777
Telecom. services 5.509 4.741 5.529 4.875
Water, fuel, electricity 1.560 1.538 1.358 1.173
Squares and cross products N N Y N Y
Demographics N N N Y Y
R squared 55.6% 62.4% 63.6% 63.3% 64.4%
a Demographics: Age and age sq., household size, home ownership (D)
Source: EVS 1998(1993)
Notes: Results from weighted regressions. t- and p-values not reported: all coefficients significant at the 0.1% level
power, which also is true for including demographic variables (4).119 Finally, in specification (5), I
combine all extensions of specification (1).
Table 6.6 compares the coefficient estimates and the R2 from the second column in Table 6.5 (no
squares and cross products, no demographics) with the results of the regressions from Browning et al.
conducted for other national surveys. In order to get comparable results, Table 6.6 shows unweighted
estimation results. While the R2 is fairly lower, especially the ‘food at home’ weight factor is similar
in all three data sets.
Table 6.6: Comparing the results from the EVS to FAMEX and SFB
FAMEX SFB EVS
Food at home 2.190 2.220 2.231
Food outside home 3.280 2.327 3.731
Telecom. services 3.030 4.347 5.978
Water, fuel, electricity 2.720 1.489 1.578
Squares and cross products N N N
Demographics N N N
R squared 74.3% 63.4% 58.7%
Source: EVS : own calculations, results from unweighted regression; FAMEX, SFB : Browning et al . (2003)
Note: t- and p-values not reported: all coefficients significant at the 1% level
Imputation of total expenditures The specification chosen for the imputation in the SAVE data
set was the one in the fourth column of Table 6.5, reestimated with the population weights from the
EVS 1998; the four demographic variables were included, but not cross-terms and square products.
The reason for not including them lies in the limited improvement over the specification without
these terms and in the trade-off argument that outliers within the sub-items120 could bear the risk
119 In fact, I tried many different sets of demographic variables. The explanatory differences were very small, and I decided
to use the one with the best trade-off of additional explanatory power and no data loss for missing observations in
one of the demographic variables in SAVE .
120 which were not controlled for if income was not smaller than each expenditure item
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of imputing implausible values. The results are shown graphically in Figure 6.3. The dispersion of
the imputed expenditure values in SAVE is not much larger than the one from the total non-durable
expenditure measure in the EVS, and even more, dropping zero value sub-items does not affect the
shape either.
The comparison between the imputed total non-durable expenditures, the sum of sub-items in
SAVE and the values from the one-shot question is shown in Figure 6.4. The distribution for the
one-shot question is shifted to the left compared to the imputed values’ density; the mean of the one-
shot question’s values consistently is about one half of the mean of the imputed values. Comparing
the simple sum of the sub-items to the one-shot question makes clear that indeed households do not
forget to include other expenditures in the one-shot question which were not asked for before.121 The
mean again is just about one-half of the mean of the one-shot total expenditure question.
A possible threat to the use of the imputed consumption data is that nothing prevents imputed
total monthly non-durable expenditures from being smaller than monthly household net income. In
the present scheme, 27.4% of the imputed expenditures exceed income, which is a rather high number.
Going back to Equation 6.1 and to Table 6.5, respectively, and including income (and, additionally,
income and income squared) in the weights regression, this does not eliminate the problem. As Table
6.7 shows, values are still below income in about 20% of all imputed expenditure cases. For the one-
shot question, this is applies only for about 5%. Additionally, including income in the imputation
procedure would entail an endogeneity problem when analyzing e.g. saving rates, constructed as the
residual of income and expenditures, in dependence of income. See also Section 6.2, Footnote 111.
Table 6.7: Expenditures below income
Imputed expenditures
One-shot question No income included Income Income and income squared
Below inome 133 590 446 422
All 2960 2155 2155 2155
Percent 4.5% 27.4% 20.7% 19.6%
Notes: Three different imputation specifications are compared: no income (only expenditure items plus demographic
variables), income, and a second order polynomial for net income; (both in the estimation step in the EVS and in
imputation step for SAVE).
6.4 Conclusions
Collecting diary-based detailed information on household expenditure is a costly and time consuming
procedure. The use of one-shot expenditure questions, in contrast, has its limits, which was shown by
many authors including the one from this chapter. Instead, a non-exhaustive list of sub-items which
includes ‘food at home’, ‘food outside home’, ‘utilities’ and ‘telecommunication services’ can be used to
impute total non-durable expenditure with expenditure allocation weights estimated by diary-based
121 Remember that questions’ order was first to ask for the sub-items and then for total expenditures.
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income and expenditure surveys.122 The EVS 1998 was used to compute the weights which were
included in the SAVE 2003 and 2004 subsamples to impute total expenditures. Comparing absolute
expenditures in the EVS and in SAVE for the used sub-items, this procedure seems justifiable, which
then translates into similar total expenditure distributions. The drawback of this procedure is that
nothing prevents expenditures from being larger than monthly revenues, since the estimation of weights
cannot account for all household heterogeneity.
122 It has been shown in the literature that these four items are good proxies of total non-durable expenditures.
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6.A Tables
Table 6.8: Probit regression for zero values in expenditure items, part 1
Food at home Food outside home Telecom.
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net income / 10,000 -0.343 0.703 -5.031 0.000 -3.352 0.009
Net income / 10,000) sq. 1.134 0.263 4.691 0.000 3.563 0.018
Age/10 -0.067 0.686 0.198 0.109 0.247 0.263
Age/10 squared 0.010 0.548 -0.002 0.860 -0.022 0.333
Secondary school (D) 0.080 0.441 -0.197 0.009 0.045 0.745
Graduation diploma (D) -0.030 0.842 -0.288 0.015 0.013 0.950
University degree (D) -0.157 0.300 -0.333 0.002 -0.298 0.223
Household size 0.177 0.001 0.210 0.000 0.089 0.223
Kids (D) -0.045 0.746 0.028 0.787 -0.221 0.215
Kids living in same house (D) -0.362 0.018 0.024 0.827 -0.083 0.684
Job: blue collar (D) 0.290 0.065 0.185 0.139 0.137 0.533
Job: civil servant (D) -0.105 0.670 -0.177 0.419 0.229 0.490
Job: freelancer (D) 0.423 0.194 -0.704 0.144 dropped
Job: self-employed (D) 0.205 0.351 -0.113 0.582 dropped
Retired(D) -0.038 0.851 -0.248 0.076 -0.142 0.589
Work parttime (D) 0.066 0.735 -0.014 0.927 -0.074 0.796
Work little (D) 0.117 0.549 0.253 0.081 -0.361 0.276
Work not (D) 0.020 0.906 0.371 0.003 0.249 0.254
Unemployed (D) 0.148 0.476 0.076 0.570 -0.022 0.927
Past unemployment 1-6 months -0.231 0.078 -0.121 0.205 0.021 0.905
Past unemp.> 6 months -0.029 0.853 0.062 0.559 0.144 0.454
Partner -0.426 0.003 -0.105 0.337 -0.389 0.030
Widowed (D) -0.169 0.306 0.203 0.075 -0.179 0.366
Separated or divorced (D) -0.111 0.581 0.132 0.348 -0.062 0.803
Widowd 0.008 0.938 0.095 0.192 0.115 0.397
East Germany (D) -0.202 0.089 0.275 0.000 -0.295 0.059
Sample: RR 2003 0.182 0.071 0.343 0.000 -0.137 0.351
Sample: TPI 2004 dropped -0.347 0.010 -0.881 0.017
Constant -1.643 0.000 -1.869 0.000 -1.905 0.001
Obs. 2866 2792 2848
LR chi2(24) 54.12 464.78 63.95
Prob > chi2 0.002 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0479 0.1657 0.1019
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Table 6.9: Probit regression for zero values in expenditure items, part 2
Energy Total non-durable exp.
Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z
Net income / 10,000 0.765 0.478 0.021 0.980
Net income / 10,000) sq. -0.594 0.670 0.821 0.401
Age/10 -0.470 0.009 -0.343 0.024
Age/10 squared 0.045 0.014 0.031 0.042
Secondary school (D) 0.143 0.198 -0.028 0.776
Graduation diploma (D) 0.078 0.610 -0.202 0.152
University degree (D) -0.080 0.596 -0.295 0.039
Household size 0.087 0.134 0.056 0.283
Kids (D) -0.258 0.080 -0.170 0.203
Kids living in same house (D) 0.053 0.741 0.063 0.661
Job: blue collar (D) -0.228 0.195 0.112 0.444
Job: civil servant (D) -0.158 0.467 0.168 0.393
Job: freelancer (D) 0.186 0.578 0.543 0.064
Job: self-employed (D) -0.209 0.391 -0.382 0.172
Retired(D) -0.208 0.340 -0.015 0.935
Work parttime (D) -0.078 0.673 -0.155 0.386
Work little (D) -0.161 0.443 0.089 0.607
Work not (D) -0.005 0.976 0.008 0.958
Unemployed (D) -0.168 0.445 -0.132 0.483
Past unemployment 1-6 months -0.074 0.562 -0.070 0.548
Past unemp.> 6 months -0.129 0.406 -0.010 0.942
Partner -0.449 0.002 -0.248 0.060
Widowed (D) 0.196 0.208 0.077 0.602
Separated or divorced (D) -0.074 0.734 -0.130 0.500
Widowd 0.078 0.452 0.118 0.209
East Germany (D) 0.143 0.213 -0.234 0.041
Sample: RR 2003 -0.007 0.943 0.253 0.009
Sample: TPI 2004 dropped dropped
Constant -0.229 0.613 -0.745 0.052
Obs. 2199 2870
LR chi2(24) 72.14 65.88
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0668 0.0498
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6.C Expenditure questions in SAVE
Consumption questions were, if not asked within the full P&P interview environment of the TPI
subset, part of the CAPI component of the SAVE questionnaire. This applies to the CAPI 2003 and
the RR 2003 subsamples. The block of consumption questions appeared after the savings questions.
In addition to the interviewers reading the questions, respondents were handed ‘showcards’ which
additionally defined the questions more precisely.
Heating costs were asked in a two-step process since first the period was asked for and then the
corresponding amount of the bill; this sum, therefore, has to be recalculated on a monthly basis.
The expenditure questions were asked in the way as depicted on the following page.
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• Think of the year 2002(2003). About how much did your household spent on an
average month for food you consumed at home?
Showcard:
Count: food and alcohol-free beverages purchased in grocery stores, supermarkets
and similar stores
Don’t count: Expenditures for alcoholic beverages like beer, wine and liquors
• Think of the year 2002(2003): About how much did your household spent on an av-
erage month for food outside home, e.g. in restaurants?
Showcard:
Count: meals taken in restaurants, canteens, bars etc.
Don’t count: Expenditures for dropping by bars when nothing was eaten, and expen-
ditures for celebrations like weddings, birthdays etc.
• Think of the year 2002(2003): About how much did your household spent on an
average month for telecommunications, cell phones and internet connections?
Showcard:
Count: Basic and variable fees for fixed networks and cell phones, including text
messages; royalties for private internet connections (AOL, MSN)
Don’t count: Purchases of phones and cell phones
• What is the time period for your heating cost settlement?
Weekly; Monthly; every two/three/six months; once a year?
• What was your last heating bill?
Showcard:
Don’t count: Costs for electricity not used for heating (illumination, cooking etc.)?
• Think again of the year 2002(2003): About how much did your household spent in an
average month all in all for all goods and services including purchases in supermarkets,
meals in restaurants, telecommunications, heating etc.?
Showcard:
This is the sum of all household’s expenses for daily use.
Count: First four items plus expenses for clothing and health care; royalties for private
internet connections (AOL, MSN)
Don’t count: Rent and large irregularly purchases like homes, cars, furniture and
large electronic tools like stoves or refrigerators lasting many years.
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Chapter 7
Measures for savings and saving rates in the German SAVE data set
7.1 Introduction
Savings and saving rates are a key element for the analysis of household behavior. They present the
foundation for many different research areas, as e.g., how well households are prepared for old-age (the
old-age provision motive), what measures they take to insure against unknown shocks (the precau-
tionary motive), how important consumption smoothing is (the intertemporal substitution motive),
among many others, which already have been almost completely by Keynes (1936), to which Browning
and Lusardi (1996) added the downpayment motive to complete the list.
For an empirical analysis, micro data on households (or individuals) are needed to get an insight
into peoples’ actual behavior. The crucial variable is a precise assessment of households’ savings. This
sounds a lot easier than it can actually be implemented in a survey not only collecting savings and
income, but also many additional variables inevitable for a broad behavioristic analysis.123
This paper goes to the very roots of respondents’ understanding of savings. Do they realize savings
just as the residual left-overs on their accounts after subtracting all monthly expenditures from all
monthly net income flows? If so, then savings will heavily be underestimated. E.g., credit repayments
in that sense would be expenditures but clearly are a savings component124. The same applies for
monthly contributions to private savings and pension plans, whole life insurances or building society
contracts, which might be perceived as an additional income tax even though these are discretionary
contributions to build up private wealth. Even more complicated to assess are employers’ contributions
to occupational pension schemes since these contracts normally only tell the employee the future
benefits of this kind of pension scheme.
Four kinds of measures for household savings are typically calculated. The first one is the first
difference in net wealth since all savings have to be allocated to any form of financial or real investment.
Not looking at the stock of wealth but at the contributions and withdrawals gives the second measure
for savings (flow measure). The third one is the residual, or epsilon measure of savings which subtracts
123 To visualize the complexity of a simple savings question, just ask yourself: “How much, on average, do I save per
month?’
124 Even though, loan and mortgage repayments have been incorrectly included in the one-shot question on total non-
durable expenditures in the Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP), see Browning and Crossley (2002).
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all expenditures125 from all compositions of net income126. Concerning these measures, one has to
be aware of the symmetry of positive and negative values, and to adjust flow and stock measures.
This is the subject of Bo¨rsch-Supan et al . (1999)’s work. See also Brugiavini and Weber (2003) for
a discussion on these saving concepts. The fourth one is to directly include a question on household
savings in the questionnaire, leaving it to the respondents to deliver a reasonable assessment of private
savings.
Much research has been done for almost all of the above mentioned savings motives, but they are
far from being consistent even within a research area restricted to only one of the topics. Apart from
differences in the econometric assessment of the topics and variations in their specifications, the data
base used is frequently different. But not only the the data base itself, also the dependent variable used
differs. From which of the four measures are savings calculated from? In a very recent study, Alessie
et al . (2004) compare savings and saving rates for the Italian Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW) and the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) using different saving concepts. For the flow
measure, they compute the saving rate as Y−CC where Y is the sum of personal incomes of parents and
child, and C is non-durable consumption. The procedure to the saving rate relative to consumption
instead of income was proposed by Attanasio (1998) to avoid the problems of outliers and zero income
observations. Alessie et al . (2004) also implicitly equal consumption and expenditures. This might
sound tautological, but as Aguiar and Hurst (2004) very recently pointed out, the dramatic decline in
expenditures at the time of retirement is matched by an equally dramatic rise in time spent on home
production. This argument goes back to Becker (1986), who states that consumption is the output
of a “home production” function that uses both expenditure and time as inputs. The innovation of
that paper is that the authors empirically disentangle changes in actual consumption from changes in
expenditures. Taken together, the results highlight how direct measures of consumption distinguish
between anticipated and unanticipated shocks to income, while using expenditure alone obscures this
difference and leads to false rejections of the PIH.
This paper presents concisely the main findings for savings and saving rates estimated with the
SAVE survey. Section 7.2 quickly summarizes the definition of savings and shows which of the four
saving measures can be computed with SAVE, while Section 7.3 concentrates on the assessment and
measurement of the one-shot savings question in SAVE. Section 7.4 discusses the results from different
correction measures for the one-shot savings question, and Section 7.5 summarizes this chapter’s issues.
7.2 Saving measures in SAVE
The SAVE survey bears the possibility to calculate savings in three of the four ways described in
Section 7.1. The first one is the first difference in financial wealth components, while the second one
would be the epsilon measure of savings as the difference between all components of household income
125 Expenditures then are typically defined as total non-durable expenditures, excluding contributions to any saving
accounts.
126 Income is the sum of all different income components, like wage and capital income, transfer income, and social
security benefits.
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and total non-durable expenditures, which are asked in SAVE. The third one is a one-shot saving
question asking for total savings a household achieved in the last year, without explicitly guiding the
respondent by using a comprehensive list of components which typically should be accounted for.
This section quickly depicts and explains potential problems for each these three savings measures.
7.2.1 First difference in wealth
Financial wealth is asked for the beginning and the end of the calender year previous to the survey
field time. A savings measure often found in the empirical literature on savings and savings behavior
is to calculate savings as the difference between financial wealth at the end and the beginning of the
preceding year. Ignoring changes in the credit situation or real wealth allocation, including homes,
this shows even conceptually a massive flaw. Any reallocations from real to financial wealth or the
other way around would be registered as savings/dissavings, even though this is clearly without effect
on the total wealth situation. The same is true for short selling, or credit financed investments. Other
problems are of empirical nature. Values for the total amount in certain wealth categories like saving
accounts, stock, or mutual funds, certainly are as much due to recall error as the one-shot savings
or expenditure questions. Additionally, it is impossible to distinguish between ‘active’ and ‘passive’
savings (putting money into that financial wealth category, or does market appreciation/depreciation
account for higher/lower values at the end of the year?).
7.2.2 Residual measure
A third savings measure would be to compute savings as the residual measure (difference between
savings and expenditures). This savings measure requires two variables to be reliable. The first one
is income; see Chapter 2 for a discussion on income values in SAVE .
The other variable, expenditures, has been proven to be a rather imprecise measure for households’
expenditures, cf. Browning et al . (2003) or Winter (2004). Knowing these results before including
the expenditure questions, there were also four sub-items included from which is known that they are
typically remembered very well; based on these sub-items, Browning et al . (2003) proposed a method
to impute total non-durable expenditures in a way to fitting factual values much better than the
one-shot question’s values. This is done in Chapter 6 for the SAVE data using the EVS 1998 as an
external data source.
Even if expenditures were assessed correctly by this procedure, there is still a conceptual problem.
Durable consumption goods are difficult to assess. First of all, there are no data on durables in SAVE.
Second, durables affect savings not by the time they are purchased, since they represent at that time
wealth in equal size, neglecting transaction costs. More relevant is the useful economic life to calculate
the depreciation rate, which about represents the periodical consumption value. But these data are
extremely difficult to assess, for which not even diary-based consumption and expenditure data are a
reliable data source.
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7.2.3 One-shot saving questions
The SAVE questionnaire also contains a direct one-shot question to yearly savings. This might well
be subject to the same problems being discussed in the context of the one-shot expenditure question.
The following section will explain more deeply the possible problems and correction methods for
this one-shot savings questions.
7.3 Reliability of one-shot savings measure
This section argues that filtering might cause an underestimation of savings, and discusses the treat-
ment of credit repayments, contributions for life insurances and different pension plans. I will also
compare the values to the official numbers from the German Federal Reserve bank.
7.3.1 Problems due to filtering
The direct question for total last year’s savings in SAVE follows a set of preliminary questions. These
include who in the household actually makes the financial decisions, whether respondents talk with
other persons inside/outside the household about financial concerns, and who files for the income tax
declaration. Next, respondents were asked about the reception of one-off payments like inheritances,
tax refunds etc. as well as about the allocation of these one-off incomes. Questions checking whether
the household pursuits a certain savings goal and by what time that goal shall be reached follow. In
addition, a ‘meet-ends’ question is included as well as a filter question for a self-assessment of actual
savings behavior127. The one-shot question was asked as: ‘And finally: Could you tell us how much
money you and your partner together have saved in the year 2000?’, only for respondents who did
not choose the fourth or fifth item of the filter question128 and did not refuse to answer to the filter
question.
Table 7.1 shows the different stages which lead to zero values of savings (be these zeros correct or
incorrect). Due to filtering, 19.5% of all respondents were not asked for their savings.
To see what the filtering implies for the resulting data, I apply the statistical error types I (rejecting
a true hypothesis) and II (not rejecting a false hypothesis) to the filtering process. Filtering bears the
chances of a type-II error (household does not save, but should do so according to the filter process;
this is depicted in Table 7.2) as well as of a type-I error (household saves but was cancelled out in the
filtering process). The type-I error will lead to an underestimation of savings and saving rates since
for these households zero savings are assumed.
127 ‘I/we save a fixed amount regularly,’, ‘I/we put something aside each month but I/we decide on the amount according
to the financial circumstances’, ‘I/we put something aside when we have something left over to save’, ‘I/we do not
save because we do not have enough scope financially to do so’, ‘/we do not save because we would prefer to enjoy
life now’
128 “can’t save / don’t want to save”
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Table 7.1: Origin of nonpositive numbers for one-shot savings question
TPI 2001 CAPI 2001 CAPI 2003 RR 2003 TPI 2004
N 660 1169 486 2184 483
obs. lost due to filterin 11.2% 17.0% 18.4% 24.2% 17.0%
ref. in filter 1.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 1.0%
# HH for one-shot savings question 586 970 396 1655 401
does not apply / did save nothing 20.3% 21.2% 20.3% 19.5% 22.0%
refusals 4.3% 17.2% 18.5% 15.5% 3.2%
positive values for savings 442 597 241 1076 301
imputed zero saving values
in % of all obs. for savings 29.4% 40.0% 40.8% 43.6% 34.5%
Source: All SAVE subsamples
Table 7.2: Display of the type-II error
TPI 2001 CAPI 2001 CAPI 2003 RR 2003 TPI 2004
regular savings
N 391 417 186 769 249
% of zeros in savings question 14.3% 10.1% 9.1% 10.9% 16.1%
% refusals 4.1% 18.7% 21.5% 14.3% 3.6%
flexible saings
N 57 277 110 437 52
% of zeros in savings question 14.0% 14.1% 16.4% 14.7% 19.2%
% refusals 3.5% 19.9% 20.9% 19.2% 3.9%
saves occasionally
N 89 276 98 449 84
% of zeros in savings question 53.9% 45.3% 45.9% 38.8% 39.3%
% refusals 5.6% 12.3% 10.2% 14.0% 2.4%
Source: All SAVE subsamples
Notes: The share of zero values should be rather low for the first two categories. The difference of the shares is very
small for the filter-categories “saves regularly a fixed amount” and “ saves flexibly”. For the third filter category “saves
occasionally”, the share of zeros is very high (43.5%).
Households claiming not being able (or willing) to save show the following pattern which is depicted
in Figure 7.2. The dependent variable refers to the filter question and takes on the value 1 if the
respondent answered not being able / willing to save and 0 otherwise.
Significant variables which raise the probability for not being able/willing to save are dummies
for: retirement; unemployment and partial unemployment; whether the respondent is partially, little
(‘geringfu¨gig’), or not employed; separated/divorced; and a dummy for credit repayments. Negative
significant dummy variables are: self-employed; females; households living in Eastern Germany; and
dummy variables for the ownership of financial wealth categories all financial wealth categories except
bonds. Second-order polynomials for income and age are also negative significant, but not depicted
in Figure 7.2.
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Insignificant variables, which are not depicted in Figure 7.2 are: dummies for schooling; dummies
for the job type except self-employed; dummy variables for kids and kids living in the same house; a
partner dummy; and dummies for the different SAVE subsamples.
An important insight from the analysis of the savings ability is that households might not consider
credit repayments being savings. This is shown by the positively significant coefficient of credit
repayments (since the dependent variable takes on the value one if not being able /willing to save).
Not adding credit repayments to savings therefore would lead to an underestimation of savings.
When looking at the values given for the one-shot savings question, one can see that about one
fifth of respondents answered to having zero savings or below129, further 13% refused to give values.
In the following analyses for zero values and refusals will be separated.
Figure 7.3 shows marginal effects of different significant regressors for the probability to give zero
values. Next to the results in Figure 7.2, one can see that values for savings ability are consistent with
the probability to give zero values: households saving regularly a fixed amount answered significantly
less frequently with zero values than households who save only occasionally. While credit uptakes
influence saving measures consistently, credit repayments are not understood as savings (as shown
before); again, the coefficient is positive significant.
The corresponding analysis of refusals for saving values will only be mentioned here. Only four
variables from the set of 39 explanatory variables were significant: unemployed, occasional savers,
households from the two TPI subsamples and households with credit repayments have a lower proba-
bility to refuse the answer. For occasional savers and credit repayers this can be explained by the fact
that these types have a higher probability of answering with zero values.130 Income, age, schooling,
and job variables have no influence on refusals.
Looking at the values from the one-shot saving question, one can observe in 27 cases saving rates
which exceed net monthly income when savings is recalculated for a mensual measure.131 For three
of these 27 cases high savings can be explained by high one-off income sources.132 For the remaining
24 cases, saving rates are up to 1100% what in turn can heavily affect means. Four reasons for these
values can be thought of. (1) Respondents gave wrong numbers which were recorded “correctly” (in
CAPI interviews). (2) Respondents gave correct numbers which were recorded incorrectly (in CAPI
interviews). (3) Respondents thought of the correct values but gave wrong numbers concerning one
or two decimal places; these values were then recorded “correctly” (in CAPI interviews). (4) Respon-
dents thought of and registered correct values which were then incorrectly scanned and transferred
to computer data by the survey agency (in P&P interviews). There is a fifth possibility which also
occurred with the data at hand, but was recognized by the author and corrected accordingly by the
129 Cf. Table 7.1. Negative savings are censored to zero due to the question (“did not save / have dipped into savings”)
130 Running a multinomial logit regression with the three choices “Positive values”, “zero/negative savings”, “refusal”,
the results are in line with the findings from the binary model.
131 For the procedure for checking income values, see Chapter 2.
132 SAVE asks for one-off payments like inheritances, lottery gains, or tax refunds. 78% of all surveyed households
declared not having received any one-off income sources; the most common income source of the group which received
any or several one-off payments tax refunds was the most common case.
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survey agency: variables can be coded incorrectly, which gives implausible values for any observation
or no variation between observations. This is the most unproblematic case.
The 24 implausible cases distribute to the modes P&P with 10 cases (1.4%) and CAPI with 14
cases (0.8%). There are two ways of dealing with these 24 cases. First, all of these cases can be coded
as missings. Second, if it is believed that errors in the transmission process are responsible for the
high savings / saving rates and if the error lies in the imprecision of one decimal place, savings can be
divided by 10. The latter way was applied here.
7.3.2 Perception of savings
Figure 7.1 might be helpful to illustrate the challenge of precisely measuring savings. A household
is planning the acquisition of a consumption good which, since depicted as a durable good, he will
consume for a certain time period. This acquisition can be financed in two ways. First, he can take
up a credit (Figure 7.1, left hand side), or he can save the financial means needed (Figure 7.1, right
hand side). When only looking at the latter case, one would neglect households with a higher time
preference who prefer to consume now rather than after the saving period. Credit repayments thus
are savings as well as the accumulation of assets.
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Notes: The depicted consumption good is a durable; its consumption period about equals the depreciation period. If
consumption is immediate (voyages, dinners etc.) the consumption period reduces to 0, such that the downward sloping
line of the consumption period would become a vertical line. The value of the credit is larger than the value of the
consumption good if interest rates are positive, as depicted.
Credit repayments
Credit repayments only compare to savings if they are not produced by wealth reallocations. Balance
sheets would be shortened if credits were repaid through the liquidation of wealth. This is why I only
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add credit repayments to savings if they do not exceed 50% of net income.133 If zero saving values
were given, savings just equal credit repayments. This procedure is costly in the sense of data loss
due to consistency reasons if observations are dropped if values for savings or credit repayments were
refused.
At the same time, credit uptakes as such would typically not affect savings, as in most cases the
uptaking of a credit would be related to the acquisition of a durable good of similar size (equal size +
interest rate markup + adminstration fees). This would result in a ‘longer balance’ since the liquidity
inflow faces an expenditure position (capital asset) of equal size (e.g. durable consumption goods like
furniture, cars, technical equipment etc.; housing). Credit uptakes therefore will not be subtracted
from savings; only repayments will be added.134 In total, 32% of respondents declared to repay credits,
and 5% to have new credits taken up. 64% of all home owners are indebted, and 38% of tenants.
Contributions to life insurance
Having controlled for credit repayments, it is still unclear what exactly households have in mind
when thinking about savings. Is it the sum which remains on the account at the end of the month
(the balance of labor, capital and transfer income and total expenditures)? This certainly would
underestimate savings, since it neglects credit repayments, as argued. Additionally, other expenditures
are not completely consumption expenditures. Regular contributions to certain capital investments
(whole life insurances, saving plans, building society contracts) could well be perceived as additional
taxes on income. Heckman selection regressions for gross saving rates135 on an income and age
polynomial and a set of household and individual characteristics and a set of dummy variables for
the ownership of each financial wealth category and for credit repayment show that five of the six
financial wealth dummies are positively significant except for whole life insurances. This might be an
evidence that contributions to whole life insurances are possible not included in respondents’ saving
values. This section will explain how this can be remedied.
Whole life insurance represents the Germans’ most important instrument of private old-age provi-
sion, cf. Walliser and Winter (1999). 52% of all male respondents answered to own a life insurance
contract as well as 34% of all respondents (weighted; unweighted: 38%). This share is below the
values observed in the EVS 2003 where the share for all respondents is at 46%. The ownership of life
insurance contracts strongly differs between the SAVE subsamples.
Table 7.3 shows the differences in ownership rates between the subsamples. It should be taken
into account that the first line only shows values for the whole subsample; thus the observation that
ownership rates dropped between 2001 and 2004 in the TPI subsamples by 23% is not valid. This is
shown in the panel comparison where, of course, only values are shown for households being observed
in both years. For these households, some differences occurred between 2001 and 2004: 33% claimed
133 This rather high share of net income can be reasonable since high debit interest rates might force households to quick
repayment.
134 There is no way in the data to tell whether the credit uptake is used to finance a durable or non-durable consumption
good, and thus I implicitly assume the usage for a durable good.
135 The original values given to the one-shot question
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Table 7.3: Life insurances: ownership changes
TPI 2001 TPI 2004 CAPI 2001 CAPI 2003 RR 2003 all
Ownership rates 50.60% 27.50% 39.20% 32.40% 26.40% 33.50%
Panel comparison ←→ ←→
only in 2001 / withdr. 33.10% 17.20%
neither in 2001 nor in 2003/2004 40.30% 52.40%
in both 2001 and 2003/2004 22.50% 24.50%
onlyin 2003/2004 / new contr. 4.10% 6.00%
Source: All SAVE subsamples.
Note: Weighted values.
to having owned life insurances only in the first year, only 4% in the year 2004 if they had none in
2001.
The decline in life insurance ownership has also been documented by Braun et al . (2002), Figure
22b, with values measured with the EVS, but the 2003 wave reports even lower values than predicted
by Braun et al . (2002) (52% predicted for 2003, 45% reported in the EVS 2003136). Similar results
are reported by the Gesamtverband der deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft (GDV) (2003). For the
past year, trends for life insurances are summarized as follows: (1) significant growth of contributions
for new contracts where one-off payments grew higher than the regular contributions; (2) significant
reduction of new contracts; (3) growth of new contributions, and (4) growing contract payments
(Leistungsausahlungen).
Contributions for life insurance contracts are normally paid on a regular monthly basis and therefore
have a similar character to contributions for the public pension system (GRV), which might lead
households to the thinking not to include the contributions into savings, but to view them as some
sort of tax.
When considering wealth data, one should keep in mind how they were asked in the surveys. SAVE
is, as most general-purpose surveys, not diary-based, but collects recall information. Values are thus
much more due to response error. When looking at the wealth information closely, one can see that in
8 cases, wealth at the beginning and the end of last year differ by the factor 10, 100, 1000 and 10,000
(ex.: wealth at the beginning of the year = 12,000 e, wealth at the end of last year: 12 e), so it must
presumed that households think of the same value in both cases but the observed value is wrong by
one of the four errors mentioned above. These eight values have been corrected accordingly.137
Contributions to life insurances approximately calculated by the difference in life insurance wealth
at the end and the beginning of the year. If numbers were correct, the difference includes the internal
rate of return as well as the reduction of the cash-in penalty. One has to take account of the possibility
that wealth was removed in that period (negative contributions), and further that this difference,
136 Own calculations
137 This procedure was done accordingly for all components of financial wealth. In SAVE , financial wealth consists of six
categories in 2001; in 2003, private old-age provisions was asked in a more detailed manner, which raises the number
of financial wealth categories to eight. If only one value was available for the beginning or the end of the last year
due to refusal, the missing value was replaced by the observed one thereby assuming no wealth difference.
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recalculated for a monthly basis, does not exceed a certain income share. If this would be the case,
then this wealth difference might only be realized by the reallocation of wealth and not by savings
from current disposable income. This share of income which is to be assumed with 13 , which is less
than the assumed share for credit repayments with 12 since the contributions would take place on a
regular basis. High debit interest rates might force higher repayment rates which is the reason to allow
for higher shares.
Old-age provision
Occupational pension schemes In 2001, the SAVE questionnaire included the financial wealth
category “Other contractually defined private old-age provision, e.g. special old-age provision assets
or private pension policies”. After 2001, this question was split up into three separate questions: (1)
occupational pension schemes138; (2) fiscally subsidized private old-age provisions (‘Riester-Rente’)139
and (3) other contractual private old-age provisions140. Along with the split, the design was slightly
changed. Individuals are not only asked for the pension wealth at the beginning and the end of each
year, but also for employer and employee (own) contributions separately for each pension scheme.
If the three sub-items for private pensions are aggregated in 2003 and 2001 and compared to the
year 2001, the following results can be seen.
Table 7.4: Private old-age provision: ownership changes
TPI 2001 TPI 2004 CAPI 2001 CAPI 2003 RR 2003 all
Ownership rates 19.40% 24.40% 11.70% 26.60% 20.20% 19.10%
Panel comparison ←→ ←→
only in 2001 / withdrawal 4.10% 11.90%
neither in 2001 nor in 2003/2004 65.60% 63.70%
in both 2001 and 2003 / 2004 13.40% 8.50%
only in 2003/2004 / new contr. 16.90% 15.90%
Source: All SAVE subsamples
Note: Weighted values.
The results from Table 7.4 can be divided into the three pension schemes, which is presented in
Table 7.5.
When we only look at fully dependently employed, the ownership rates of occupation pension
schemes rises to 20.4%. This is less than half the values Kortmann (2003) finds (44% for men and
39% for women) using data from private and public employers, pension fonds and ‘Pensionskassen’,
and all administrators of private pension schemes in the public service141
138 This comprises defined pension plans, pension fonds and ‘Direktzusagen’
139 E.g. ‘staatlich gefo¨rderte und zertifizierte Sparanlagen, die nicht vor Ruhestandseintritt auflo¨sbar sind.’
140 Which in Germany is: ‘Altersvorsorge-Sondervermo¨gen oder private Rentenversicherungsvertra¨ge, die nicht staatlich
gefo¨rdert werden bzw. abgeschlossen wurden, bevor es solche Fo¨rdermo¨glichkeiten gab’.
141 ‘Tra¨ger o¨ffentlicher Zusatzversorgungsleistungen.
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Table 7.5: Ownership rates of different old-age provisions
CAPI 2003 RR 2003 TPI 2004 all
Occupational pensions 13.30% 11.20% 14.10% 12.00%
Fiscally subsidized old-age provisions 5.80% 4.70% 5.90% 5.10%
Other old-age provisions 13.20% 7.60% 9.80% 8.90%
conditional on full employmenta
Occupational pensions 19.50% 17.50% 20.40% 18.40%
Fiscally subsidized old-age provisions 7.60% 7.90% 9.20% 8.10%
Other old-age provisions 19.00% 13.30% 14.70% 14.50%
a For couples: if male partner is fully employed.
Source: All SAVE 2003 and 2004 subsamples
Note: Weighted values.
Following the arguments from the last section, one should also consider to impute private old-age
pensions and add the contributions to savings. There are two problems associated with that proce-
dure. First, nonresponse is very high.142 This clearly is the consequence of the problems immanent
in the complexity of this topic. Employee and especially employer contributions for occupational pen-
sion schemes are certainly less well known than own contributions to other private pension schemes
or life insurances. Second, answers are frequently inconsistent: the difference of stocks equals the
contributions in many cases, but the question asked for monthly contributions. It can be assumed
that respondents gave a crude approximation for the pension stocks, and took the year’s differences as
contribution measures. These values have been divided by 12, accordingly. Still, the refusal level is an
issue; a correction of savings by these contributions is associated with a high loss of observations. An
alternative would be an imputation of contributions, measured as certain percentage of net income for
households, who own the the respective private pension category. The contributions to occupational
pensions relative to net income are measured as 3.1%/3.0% (mean/median; weighted values) for the
SAVE 2003 and 2004 data; N=372, after imputation.
Unfortunately, there is no possibility to check these numbers by an external data source; the
EVS represents in this respect no outside data source, and numbers for occupational pension scheme
contributions have never been estimated relative to net income. The best differentiated data source
for occupational pensions so far is Kortmann (2003).
Fiscally subsidized private pension schemes The contribution rates for ‘Riester’-pensions can
be imputed relatively easy: the so-called ‘Riester’-stairs gives an lower and upper bound for private
contributions. In 2002, 1% of last year’s gross income are the necessary investment to receive full fiscal
subsidies. It rises gradually rises to 4% in 2008. Own contributions and subsidies accrue the pension
plan. The full regulation is shown in Table 7.6.
For the current contracts, the following steps were made: (1) ‘Riester’-contributions refer to gross
income, but SAVE only collects net income. The ratio of gross to net income for the average income
142 Conditional nonresponse is at over 70% for stocks and 66% for contributions for occupational pensions. For the other
two private pension schemes, values are comparable.
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Table 7.6: Minimum and maximum contribution rates to ‘Riester’ saving plans
Investment year Minimum contribution rate Maximum contribution for
in % of gross income fiscal subsidies
2002 and 2003 1 % 525 e
2004 and 2005 2% 1,050 e reduced by basic
2006 and 2007 3% 1,575 e and child allowances
2008 and later 4% 2,100 e
Note: In principal, lower contributions than the minimum are possible, but subsidies will reduce accordingly and thereby
the incentives.
earner was 64%, which was taken as a proxy for all households. Contributions therefore have to be
multiplied by the inverse value of about 1.6. (2) Maximum contributions are given by the values shown
in Table 7.6. (3) For SAVE , the years relevant to impute current contributions are the years 2003
and 2004, only.
If one is interested in projecting values over the life cycle, minimum contribution rates have to
be calculated as weighted averages of the numbers in Table 7.6 with the weights being the years to
retirement: the younger and thereby the longer retirement age lies ahead, the higher is the weight for
the 4% value for calculating average contribution rate. Example: minimum contributions are 3.5%
for a today 40-year-old entering retirement at age 65, 3.2% for a 50 year old, 2.0% for a 55-year-old,
and 2% for a 60 year old.
Other private old-age provisions Like for the situation of occupational pension schemes, external
data sources are limited, which requires to take another look at the data in SAVE. 281 respondents
claimed to own private pensions in 2003 and 2004. In the data for stocks and contributions, we only
observe 21 cases containing full information. The procedure is comparable to dealing with occupational
pensions.
1. For all observations which include stocks as well as contributions: If contributions equal the
difference of year’s end and year’s beginning, they were in sum (employer and employee’s contri-
butions) or, if only one is available, separately divided by 12 since monthly contributions were
mixed up with annual contributions.
2. If either employer or employee’s contributions were refused, the other value was not imputed
since I assumed that other private contributions were made without employers’ contributions
(unlike for occupational pensions).
3. After that, contributions were compared to net income. If that share was higher than 20%143,
the contributions were calculated as the difference between the two stock values, divided by 12.
143 This is assumed a lower share than for life insurances and credit repayments since the regular contributions to old-age
provisions are typically not a high share of monthly net income
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4. In the next control stage, the mean of the corrected shares was calculated conditional for shares
being smaller than 30% of net income; this conditional mean was used to impute the missing
contributions relative to the net income.
5. Contributions being larger than 30% were replaced by the conditional mean share as well.
In total, the mean contribution share (of all original and imputed values) is at 5.2% of net income.
7.3.3 Imputed rent
If comparing the wealth situation at old age, it seems advisable to take the housing wealth into account
since this typically represents the household’s largest wealth asset. This can be done in two ways.
First, one could treat housing wealth as if it was payed out as an annuity over the rest of the life cycle.
The second alternative is to use the imputed rent of the owner-occupied housing. This construct
compares the housing wealth to comparable market rent payments a household had to pay if he would
sell the house and rent a similar object.
Estimates for the imputed rent relative to the worth of the concerning housing are about 3.9% p.a.
(median) and 4.7% (mean) based on weighted values in the EVS 1998. These values are slightly below
those of the Ring Deutscher Makler (RDM).144
Comparing values from the EVS and the RDM, I presume a value of 5% p.a., or 0.42% per month.
The difference of the imputed rent and the annuity method lies in the time horizon. While it is
infinite for the first one, the second one depends on the duration of the annuity payments which is in
the case at hand given by the year of death. A simple example would make this clear. Assume a house
worth 500,000 e. If it was sold and the sum annuitized for a monthly rent payment with the duration
given by the difference of life expectancy minus the retirement entry age, which is assumed to, say,
30 years, it would pay a rent of 2,071.21 e per month if real interest rate was 2.8% percent p.a. The
same housing wealth assumed as monthly imputed rent would then be 2083.33 e, nearly exactly the
same amount. Of course, this comparison is highly age-dependent: A shorter life expectancy clearly
would raise the annuity, while the imputed rent delivers the higher value for later years of death.145
There is another way to retrieve an additional income flow from home ownership: reverse annuity
mortgages. The reverse mortgage pays a regular income, and typically is available regardless of current
income. The amount one can borrow depends on age, the current interest rate, other loan fees, and
the appraised value of the home. Generally, the more valuable the home is, the older one is, the lower
the interest, the more one can borrow. No payments are needed, because the loan is not due as long
as the house is one’s principal residence. The loan is repaid when the occupation of the home ceases
(by death, or by selling the home).
144 Values are shown separated for houses/flats which were built before/after 1940. The RDM publishes these numbers
for 256 cities and regions. In Eastern Germany, these values are much higher than in Western Germany. This means
that in the Eastern part, purchase prices for houses are much lower. Munich, for example, shows very low imputed
rent values which can be translated in the belief that housing worth will not significantly deteriorate and can collect
rent payments for a long time horizon, or otherwise, the market is assumed to be less volatile.
145 Assuming that the annuity depends on individual subjective life expectancies and not on standardized life tables.
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7.4 Computing savings and saving rates
After the discussed steps of calculating different possibly unconsidered monthly savings, the question
arises: what kind of difference does it make? Does it only affect households who have rather high
monthly savings anyway, or does this also significantly change the picture of savings we get for poorer
households? I will also quickly mention the results for the other two savings measures in SAVE
(difference in financial wealth and residual meausue).
7.4.1 Corrected one-off savings measure
The effects of four different saving measures are shown in Figures 7.4 and 7.5. Differences between
net and gross savings 146 are 1.4%/0.2% (mean/median), N=2391. The means and median values are
summarized in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7: Saving rates with different savings components
Gross saving rates Net saving rates Net + LICa Net + LI + POACb
Mean 9.4% 10.8% 11.4% 12.3%
Median 3.5% 3.7% 4.2% 5.1%
Standard error 23.7% 30.7% 31.1% 31.5%
Share of HH with 0 savings 43.1% 42.6% 40.4% 35.6%
a LIC = Contributions to whole life insurances.
b POAC = Contributions to private old-age pension schemes
Source: SAVE 2003 and 2004.
Notes: Weighted values. N=2391→ only values if all measures were observed for each observation. The official statistics
of the German Federal Reserve bank show values of an average of 10.8% for saving rates in 2003.
The results of Table 7.7 make one point very clear. Adding different contributions, debt repayments
etc. to gross savings does not change much for households which do not save at all. The share of non-
savers goes down from a high rate of 43% to 35% after adding five flow measures (credit repayments,
contributions to life insurances, occupational, fiscally subsidized and other private old-age provisions).
This means that the inequality of the savings distributions will not decrease but rather increase
after correcting the one-shot savings question. The largest drop in non-saver rates is achieved when
accounting for all private old-age provision types which is an additional hint that respondents might
systematically ignore certain saving components which require contributions on a regular basis.
The results from Table 7.7, though, must be seen in the light that the one-shot savings question
probably suffers heavily from underreporting. A similar analysis for the one-shot total non-durable
expenditure question can be found in Chapter 6. But unlike response rates for the expenditure
question, direct and indirect refusals for the savings question are much more frequent. So in addition
to the probably underreported values itself, there is an information loss due to these refusals, as well
146 Gross savings are defined as the values retrieved from the one-shot savings question, while net savings are gross savings
plus credit repayments
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as through the type-I error in the filtering process. In addition, many of the zero values might well be
no true zeros, as shown in Section 7.3.
7.4.2 Other savings measures
Calculating saving rates from first differences in financial wealth shows values of 5.2%/0% (mean/median)
with 2123 observations for SAVE 2003 and 2004 with 8.2% observations being below zero, and 52%
being exactly zero, which supports the previous findings that respondents tend to repeat values (year’s
beginning values for year’s end).
The residual measure of savings, no matter whether the one-shot or the imputed non-durable
expenditure measure is used for the computation, proves to be extremely noisy. As is shown in
Chapter 6, about one fourth of the imputed non-durable values are higher than net income. The
mean/median saving rates are 22%/33% 147; using the one-shot expenditure values, saving rates rise
to 49%/60%. Values reach implausible values, e.g. the one-shot expenditure question takes on values
up to 17 times the corresponding monthly income. The question explicitly only asked for normal
non-durable expenditures, supported by show cards.
Computing savings by any of these two means seems little promising. Stocks of financial wealth are
very often the same for the beginning and the end of the year, or implausibly remote. Non-durable
expenditure values are also problematic. Even though the imputed values do a slightly better job,
they entail other problems, cf. Section 6.3.3.
7.5 Conclusions
This chapter shows potential flaws of and limited possibilities to correct a one-shot saving question.
Any measure to ‘correct’ the values given by the respondents is associated with rather untestable
hypotheses. Hints are shown that respondents indeed do not include contributions to whole life
insurances. For that reasons, the one-shot measures are corrected for credit repayments (=net savings),
contributions to whole life insurance, and to old-age pension schemes. Mean values rise from 9.4%
from the original one-shot question values to 11.4% when including credit repayments and imputed
contributions to life insurances, and to 12.3% when additionally including contributions to all three
types of private old-age provision. It is unclear, though, which of these items is already part of the
values and are therefore accounted for twice. The share of non-savers, in contrast, does not change
remarkably when including credit repayments and contributions to life insurances; the drop is larger
when adding contributions to private old-age provisions.
147 If income is not used in the estimation and imputation step, saving rates are 12.0%/28%; cf. Table 6.7.
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7.A Figures










































































































































Source: All SAVE subsamples.
Notes: Dependent variable takes on the value 1 if respondent answered not being able / willing to save and 0 otherwise
(one of the first three categories of filter question). Only significant coefficients displayed. Income and age not displayed:
negative influence up to 23.000 e/months and up to age 57 years. Columns show the marginal effect of a change from
0 to 1. Ex.: Owners of saving accounts have 21% lower probability not being able to save. The brighter the figure, the
higher the probability for savings capability.
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Source: All SAVE subsamples.
Notes: Conditional estimation for respondents who save according to the filter question. Dependent variable takes on
the value 1 if respondent answered having nothing saved in the previous calender year or even dipped into savings.
Only significant dummy variables displayed. Income is negative significant up to 19.500 e. Columns represent hight of
marginal effects from a change from zero to one of the independent variables. Ex: saving accounts owners have a 16%
lower chance of having zero or negative savings in the previous year. or even dipped into savings. The brighter the
figure, the higher the probability for positive saving values.
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<30 >=30−<40 >=40−<50 >=50−<60 >=60
Gross savings Net savings
Net sav. + LI Net sav.+LI+POA
Source: SAVE 2003 and 2004
Notes: Weighted values. Only observations shown if no variable is missing. LI = Contrib. to whole life insurances; POA
= Contrib. to priv. old-age pension schemes















<30 >=30−<40 >=40−<50 >=50−<60 >=60
Gross savings Net savings
Net sav. + LI Net sav.+LI+POA
Source: SAVE 2003 and 2004
Notes: Weighted values. Median values for households < 30 years are zero. Only observations shown if no variable is
missing. LI = Contrib. to whole life insurances; POA = Contrib. to priv. old-age pension schemes
Chapter 8
Personal assets and wealth ownership:
How well are the Germans prepared?∗
8.1 Introduction
The process of demographic change, and the fact that the benefits of a growing proportion of pensioners
must be financed by fewer and fewer contributors, poses major problems for the German pay-as-you-go
pension scheme. For this reason, the 2001 pension reform entailed a reduction in the level of statutory
pensions and strengthened the funded second and third pillars of old-age pension provision. Financial
incentives aimed at encouraging the accumulation of additional pension provision were introduced to
enable contributors and pensioners to maintain current levels of old-age pension provision. Private,
funded pension provision is less sensitive to demographic developments than pay-as-you-go state sys-
tems and, what is more, the accumulation process allows burdens to be spread more evenly across the
generations than in the PAYG system. This means that the baby-boom generation will be in a posi-
tion to prefinance part of their old-age pension provision. The calculations performed by the Ru¨rup
Commission on the basis of revised assumptions revealed that demographic developments will have a
far more serious impact on the financial standing of the pension system than originally supposed at
the time the Riester reform was introduced.148 As a result, an increasingly important role is set to be
played by supplementary private provision in the future.
The aim of partially replacing part of the first pillar of pension provision with voluntary private
supplementary provision is an entirely new approach to the pension issue in Germany. At this juncture,
so soon after the introduction of the Riester pension, there is little evidence available about how well
accepted or how effective this measure has been. In the first year after the Riester pension scheme was
introduced, around 5 million policies subject to state bonus were concluded, of which three million
were private and two million occupational pension policies. Only one in five of manual and white-collar
workers in the core 20 to 45 age group have so far taken out a policy and only a further 18 percent
plan to do so (Schnabel (2003)). These figures have so far failed to come up to expectations; see
also Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2. However, experience with similar pension products (such as Individual
Retirement Accounts in the USA) in other countries suggests that similar supplementary pension
products are not successful from one day to the next but require after a lengthy introductory period
∗ This chapter is joint work with Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan.
148 Commission on the long-term financial viability of the German social security system, referred to in brief in the
following as the Ru¨rup Commission.
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extending over several years. Nevertheless, there are a number of deficits in the current framework
of private pension provision which probably impede the rapid acceptance of such policies on a large
scale; discussion of reform proposals to address these problems is already underway.149
Two risks are inherent in the introduction of supplementary private pensions. On the one hand, the
voluntary nature of supplementary pension provision represents a risk. It is by no means certain that
households - and particularly low-income households - are willing and/or able to set aside additional
savings for old age on a consistent basis. Empirical findings confirm that lower-income groups are less
willing and able to make additional savings for their old-age pensions, and that this is exacerbated
by these groups being less well informed about financial matters (Bulmahn (2003)). However, it is
precisely the households in this group - a group which as a rule can expect to receive a relatively low
state pension, in many cases a very modest additional occupational pension, and which also has very
few significant assets at its disposal - which would be most in need of additional sources of income in
old age. The high rates of cancellation of building society contracts and whole life insurance policies
- despite the high losses which such cancellations imply owing to low surrender values and up-front
sales commission - suggest that there is also a very real risk that private old-age pension schemes may
also be terminated.150 While they are less damaging than cancellations, periods in which people find
themselves in straitened financial circumstances - owing to unemployment, loss of earnings, or if they
stay at home to bring up children - and consequently suspend payments to such schemes for a period
of time are also of great significance as well as being highly probable.
A further risk - the reverse side of the opportunities involved - is the rate of return on policy
contributions. While the rate of return on contributions to the pay-as-you-go system corresponds to
the growth rate for total wages and the population, the rate of return on payments to private pension
schemes is determined by interest rates on the capital market, whereby individual capital returns
depend on the success or otherwise of specific investment vehicles. The critics of funded private
pension provision emphasize the risk to which financial investments are subject, particularly in view
of the recent performance of the capital market. One cause of concern is the so-called “asset meltdown”
hypothesis according to which demographic developments will result in a significant decrease in demand
for financial assets and consequently in the capital returns on such assets. The pertinent calculations
do, however, demonstrate that the portents for a demographically-induced fall in rates of return are by
no means as gloomy as predicted in the popular press (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al . (2003)).151 Nonetheless,
the situation on capital markets since 2001 provides an unmistakable warning that lengthy periods of
below-average, or even negative, capital returns are certainly a danger to be reckoned with.
149 Refer, for example, to the discussion by Fehr et al . (2003) “Die Riester Rente - ein Flop?” in ifo-Schnelldienst 5/2003,
the Bertelsmann Stiftung Pension Report (2003), the proposals submitted by the Independent Expert Commission
on Tax Reform and the proposals of the Ru¨rup commission.
150 A survey in 2002 revealed, in Germany, that only 50 percent of policies are maintained through to the agreed term.
Policies are most frequently cancelled shortly before people - in the 55-64 age group - enter retirement. The most
frequently cited reasons are debts (26%), divorce (16%) and unemployment (13%) (Bertelsmann-Stiftung (2003)).
151 Owing to demographic factors, overall capital market returns will fall by around one percentage point, assuming
diversification within the EU region (Bo¨rsch-Supan et al . (2003)).
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Both of the risks referred to above have been investigated by Essig and Reil-Held (2003), who came
to the conclusion that consistent savings towards private pension provision will be essential in the
future in order to maintain living standards in retirement.
This paper examines whether households are in a position to close the gap in provision created by
the reduction in statutory retirement pensions without changing their current patterns of behavior,
i.e. by continuing to save as they are doing at present. In this context, expectations regarding life
span and retirement age play a decisive role; both these factors determine the requisite payout volume
that needs to be covered by accumulated savings. The age of retirement coincides with the end of the
savings phase available to households.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 8.2 examines anticipated life spans. This section
compares subjective life expectancy with the latest mortality tables published by the Federal Statistical
Office and checks the validity and consistency of the results. Section 8.3 examines household assets
according to their composition and volume as well as the level of assets available to such households at
the onset of retirement. Section 8.4 calculates the statutory pension entitlements of households before
and after the two reforms of 2001 and 2004. Section 8.5 presents the key results of our analysis: the
potential payout from private assets is compared with the benefits provided by the public retirement
insurance system. The degree to which the new pension gap can be closed over a pensioner’s entire
period of retirement is then assessed. Section 8.6 highlights the results of this study in summarized
form and presents recommendations for economic policy.
In the SAVE TPI 2004 subsample, the questionnaire design was slightly changed to enable the
measurement of precise subjective life expectancy. While the structure of the SAVE questionnaire is
discussed in length in Chapter 2, the changed design asking for subjective life expectancy is depicted in
Appendix 8.A. This paper draws on two of the SAVE sub-samples depicted in Figure 2.1 of Appendix
2.A in Chapter 2: TPI 2004152, which contains the date on subjective life expectancy, and Random
Route (RR) 2003153, which represents the largest SAVE subsample.
SAVE is a household survey. Values such as savings, assets and income are therefore assigned to
households as a whole rather than to individuals. This requires yet another assumption if individual
variables such as age, age of retirement or life expectancy are to be related to household size. The
assumption made is that, except in the case of households headed by a single woman, the head of
household is always a man. This means that calculations at the household level are based on the life
expectancy and anticipated age of retirement of the male head of household.
152 As a reminder: The abbreviation is derived from a subsidiary of NFO Infratest, the Wetzlar-based test panel institute
which maintains a permanent panel (“access”) from which this subsample was taken.
153 Again, Random Route refers to a method in which households are selected at random from a sampling frame with a
specific starting point and continuing along a specified route. A frequently used method for the selection of sampling
households.
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8.2 Life expectancy and anticipated age of retirement
A key component in the analysis of individual savings behavior is subjective life expectancy. Individual
subjective life expectancy is approximated statistically in a large number of microeconometric studies.
This imposes the restriction on the approximations that individuals adapt their behavior in line with
observable statistical variables, such as survival probability in a life cycle model of consumption. There
are two objections to this approximation. On the one hand, one might expect changes in life expectancy
which cannot be found in the mortality tables as the latter, owing to their design, respond only slowly
to environmental changes. On the other hand, the assumption of constant life expectancies for each
cohort and sex ignores differences between individuals which certainly can be reflected in subjective
life expectancy and which can lead to a corresponding change in behavior. This means that it is easier
to explain individual behavior if these subjective differences can be integrated in the estimates; cf.
Hurd and McGarry (1997). In order to take this into account, SAVE ascertains the individual life
expectancy of the respondent and their partner by deploying a three-step question (cf. Appendix 8.A).
The following analysis looks at the extent to which these subjective results are comparable with the
mortality tables of the Federal Statistical Office and how the results of various questions asked in 2001
and 2003 compare with those for the year 2004. The factors influencing individual life expectancy are
also determined.
Owing to its complexity this topic needs to be dealt with in considerably more detail. As referred to
at the beginning of this paper, life expectancies play an important role in old-age pension pro-vision.
This issue will be discussed in Section 8.5.
8.2.1 A comparison of SAVE IV descriptives and official statistics
Asking respondents about their subjective life expectancy puts such people in the unpleasant situation
of having to think about their own mortality. A striking feature of the post-interview comments offered
by respondents is that these questions are felt to be more personal and disquieting than questions about
their wealth and assets. While this is not reflected in people’s willingness to respond - which at over
96% is in fact extremely high - their comments do suggest that this subject needs to be approached
with a degree of caution. For this reason a multi-phase process was used to ascertain to what age
respondents and their partners believe they will live.e. The first question asked was to what age
the respondents believed men and women in the same cohort lived on average154 The next question
was whether the respondents believed they themselves would live longer or shorter than the average
for their cohort, followed by the request to express this difference in years. Respondents were then
presented with four possible explanations for why they thought they would live longer or shorter lives
than the average.155
Individual life expectancy is derived from the average age at death stated by respondents and the
difference in years between this average age and the age to which they expected to live.
154 Cf. Figure 8.1, and Table 8.1 which shows the average anticipated life expectancy of men and women.
155 One option was an open field in which other reasons could be entered.
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The interview procedure was repeated in the same way with the respondent’s partner.
The three steps for assessing subjective life expectancy are summarized in Appendix 8.A.
Figure 8.1 shows the differences in the anticipated average age at death of men and women. Most
of the responses are concentrated around the so-called focal points156 between age 70 and 85; in the
case of women, there is a discernible shift in the age estimates to the right. The modal value is 80 in
both distributions, however. Table 8.1 summarizes the results in descriptive form.












50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100












50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Life expectancy for women
Note: Weighted values.
Source: SAVE TPI 2004
Table 8.1: Average life expectancy by sex
Men Women
Mean value 76.71 80.7
Median 76 80
Standard error 0.25 0.25
Mortality table values 2000/2002 75.38 81.22
Note: Weighted according to age and income.
Source: SAVE TPI 2004.
The mean values for average life expectancy by sex in SAVE are fairly close to the values in the
mortality tables drawn up by the Federal Statistical Office; with a difference of 0.5 years, the life
expectancy of women approximates very closely in both sets of data. The difference in life expectancy
156 Values which represent a multiple of a specific number, such as 10 or 5.
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between men and women is underestimated, however. The difference of 3.99 years is 1.85 years less
than that in the mortality tables. It is striking, however, that the differences in the absolute values
between the individual and mortality table values are as small as they are given that 75.38 or 81.22
years of age are the life expectancy values for people born in the year 2002, while the SAVE survey
asked for the anticipated life expectancy of people of the same age. In combination, Table 8.1 and
Table 8.2 illustrate what households understand by individual life expectancy. The longevity figures
which typically find their way into the media reflect the projected life expectancy of the recently
born, and because these life expectancy values are based on period mortality tables they are entirely
fictitious, with the life expectancy of newborns being thrown into the equation with the same weight
as that of a centenarian.157 Mortality in 100 years is unlikely to be same as it is today.158 At the
same time, lifespan and remaining life expectancy figures which are based on mortality tables suggest
that life expectancy actually increases as people grow older.159 This is due to the interaction of two
opposing effects. On the one hand, the cohort effect - which implies lower life expectancy for older
birth cohorts and thus for people who are already in the older age groups - means that life expectancy
declines in old age. On the other hand, by the age of 50, for example, people have already survived
a number of risks (infant mortality, the risks of various illnesses). People who have already lived
longer than the average expected lifespan, for example, will also have significantly higher overall life
expectancy.
There are therefore two effects which lead to an underestimation of individual life expectancy.
Firstly, life expectancy figures which are based on mortality tables merely describe current population
mortality. Secondly, respondents underestimate the effect of having already survived specific risks
by the time they reach a certain age. Table 8.2, which shows individual life expectancy160 according
to age group, clearly demonstrates how the latter effect is neglected. Younger households anticipate
living to a significantly older age than do older households.
This underestimation of individual life spans can lead to serious errors being made in the financing
of retirement income. In this context, refer to Section 8.5.
Another interesting question is the extent to which the respondents believe that their income po-
sition exercises an influence on their individual life expectancy. Von Gaudecker (2004), for example,
identifies socioeconomic status as the key factor explaining differences in mortality in Baden-Wu¨rttem-
berg, and Reil-Held (2000) uses Socio-Economic Panel data to show how income and life expectancy
are linked. Table 8.3 shows that the differences between four income groups are negligible, however.
In other words, the respondents do not associate an improved income situation with a lower mortality
risk.
157 Life expectancy at birth states the average number of years a specific group (men/women) will live if mortality
rates remained unchanged throughout a newborn’s life. As a result, the construction of this value means that it
en-compasses all age groups.
Cf. CIA factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#2102
158 Refer to Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) who demonstrate a roughly linear increase in average life expectancy of around
0.25 years per year over the last 160 years.
159 Refer to Von Gaudecker (2004) for a discussion of various ratios and concepts for measuring life expectancy.
160 This is average life expectancy ± individual difference.
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Table 8.2: Individual life expectancy (own and that of partner) by sex
Men
<30 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 and older All
Mean value 81.41 77.86 75.18 73.51 78.86 76.8
Median 80 80 75 75 80 78
Standard error 2.551 0.753 0.68 0.627 0.593 0.343
N 9 110 127 112 106 464
Mortality table values 2000/2002a 75.97 76.66 77.33 78.64 83.81 78.37
Women
Mean value 87.74 80.87 80.1 80.13 81.49 80.84
Median 85 80 80 80 81 80
Standard error 2.422 0.619 0.64 0.54 0.547 0.291
N 5 98 112 110 101 426
Mortality table values 2000/2002a 81.69 82.03 82.42 83.22 87.06 87.06
a The mortality table values increase as people grow older because they have already managed to survive to a specific
age. The life expectancy of a centenarian, for example, is not 75.4 (as negative probabilities, like time machines, do
not exist), but 101.96.
Note: Weighted values.
Source: SAVE TPI 2004.
Table 8.3: Individual life expectancy according to income quartiles
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Men
Mean value 76.58 75.72 77.16 77.03
Median 77 75 76 76
Standard error 0.76 0.84 0.87 0.85
Number 102 79 79 81
Women
Mean value 81.8 79.84 80.3 81.82
Median 85 80 80 80
Standard error 0.97 1.71 1.25 0.65
Number 28 23 37 36
Note: Weighted values.
Source: SAVE TPI 2004.
Another interesting question is whether there was a divergence in response behavior between the
years 2001 and 2004. While the question about average general life expectancy was changed (and
respondents were asked for a specific figure rather than age groups), the question about relative
individual life expectancy was identical at the time of both observations. Table 8.3 shows the figures
produced by households or individual respondents in both years only in response to the question
on relative life expectancies for the years 2001 and 2004. There may be two reasons for changes
in the information provided about respondents’ relative life situation. Certain things may well have
actually changed in a respondent’s life which represent new information for the estimation of a person’s
individual life expectancy. On the other hand, responses may simply vary owing to the fact that a
period of three years lies between both interviews. All in all, Table 8.4 shows that the assumptions
regarding relative life expectancy are essentially stable over time. Zaller (1992), for example, examined
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how opinions changed over a period of four months. The responses - selected from a choice of 5
categories (one of which, however, was a ‘don’t know’ category) were identical in 48% of cases (cf. in
this context the diagonals in Table 8.4.)
Table 8.4: Stability of results: Relative life expectancy in 2001 and 2004a
Relative life expectancy 2001
Relative LE 2004a Shorter Exactly as long Longer Total
Shorter 32 31 1 64
55.20% 8.90% 1.40% 13.40%
Exactly as long 25 278 41 344
43.10% 79.70% 58.60% 72.10%
Longer 1 40 28 69
1.70% 11.50% 40.00% 14.50%
Total 58 349 70 477
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
a The precise wording of the question was: “If you think of your own situation and the state of your health, do you think
that, in comparison to the men (if subject male) / women (if subject female) of your age group, you will live shorter,
approximately as long as, or longer than the average?”
Note: Weighted according to age and income.
Source: SAVE TPI 2001 and 2004; panel structure.
The descriptive results and the discussion of the implications of results generated by mortality
tables show that households tend to underestimate their own life expectancy. This is likely to prove a
pleasant surprise in old age for some households - the surprise may however be accompanied in some
cases by a recognition that one’s plans have been too short sighted. Again, cf. Section 8.5 for this
issue.
8.2.2 Regression results
The questions on precise subject life expectancy were asked for the first time in the SAVE survey in
the TPI 2004 subsample. This subsample is about a quarter of the size of the RR 2003 subsample,
although the latter only surveyed general anticipated lifespans in relation to general life expectancy
categories. This subsample can still be used if certain prerequisites are met, however, by imputing
individual life expectancy data. This section therefore presents the regression results from the TPI
2004 subsample; the dependent variable is the subjective life expectancy, explanatory variables are a set
of observable individual and household characteristics. The estimated coefficients of these regression
results are therefore used in the same set of independent variables for subsample RR 2003 in order to
impute individual life expectancies in the latter. Forecasting life expectancy would only be justified
by the high explanatory power of the regression. The following analysis will show whether this can be
reliably assumed.
The multivariate regression analysis broadens the previous bivariate tables to enable the influence
of a number of different factors to be measured at the same time. Our analysis includes potential
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influencing factors such as permanent income161, age, educational and occupational variables, as well as
further explanatory variables such as optimism, health expectations, and current or previous smoking
behavior. The results are detailed in the Appendix, Table 8.22 (for respondents) and Table 8.23 (for
respondents’ partners). Respondent variables were also used for the regression of the life expectancy
of the partner, as the data was given by the respondent on behalf of the partner and the characteristics
of the respondent could consequently influence the data provided for the partner.
The results can be summarized as follows. The age effect is significant in both regressions, with age
difference162 also being significant for the partner regression. Interestingly enough, income and educa-
tion variables are not significant. This contradicts the findings of Von Gaudecker (2004), for example,
according to which the influence of socio-economic status on mortality appeared to be strengthened or
even caused by the level of educational attainment. Women have a considerably longer life expectancy
in both regressions, even more so in the regression for the partner (4.8 vs. 3.4 years). While smokers
are obviously not yet fully aware of the potential curtailing of their lifespan by their habit, the message
seems to have got home to former smokers who anticipate living 1.2 years less than average. Also sig-
nificant in the partner regression are the expectations regarding the development of respondents’ own
and their partners’ health situation. The effect of self-assessed optimism is also significant: the higher
this value is (on a scale from 0 to 10), the higher life expectancy is. Four dummy variables offering
possible explanations of relative life expectancy are also included, each with a high explanatory value
of, on average, plus or minus four years. In summary, the variables very effectively map individual life
expectancy (50% for a small cross-section). Cohort effects of life expectancy are recognized, as shown
in the overall negative significant age effect (with a minimum of 45 years), but not the opposite effect
of risks which have already been survived by people who have reached a ripe old age (cf. Section 8.2.1).
As referred to at the beginning of this section, imputed life expectancy in another subsample or data
record is only legitimate if the regression has sufficient explanatory power. For a small cross-sectional
analysis, the explanatory variable R2 is - at over 50% - very high. As explained before, the basis of
the data used will be broadened to calculate the asset position, pension claims (and gaps in provision)
at retirement age by additionally drawing on the SAVE Random Route Sample 2003 subsample.
8.2.3 Anticipated age of retirement and replacement rates
This section looks at the second variable determining the length of a person’s retirement - the antici-
pated age of retirement. The age of retirement has been a protracted topic of discussion in Germany
over the last twelve months as more and more observers have pointed out that the average age of
retirement is too low. Table 8.5 shows the relevant figures from the Socio-Economic Panel and VDR,
both of which demonstrate an age of retirement of 60 - significantly earlier than the state pension age
161 The construct ‘permanent income’ is intended to eliminate potential transitory fluctuations in gross or net monthly
income and to obtain a better planning variable for households. The method of estimating permanent income is based
on the proposals of King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) and is described in more precise terms for the SAVE data in
Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.
162 This may reflect the hope that an older partner does not die before oneself.
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of 65. The anticipated ages of retirement in SAVE are also shown, these being significantly higher
than the current figures.
Table 8.5: Actual and anticipated age of retirement
SOEP 1999a VDR 2001b SAVEc
TPI 2001d TPI 2004d RR 2003
Men Women Men and women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Mean value 59.7 60.7 60.2 63.1 61.7 64.4 62.9 63.3 63
Median N/A N/A N/A 65 60 65 64 65 65
Std. dev. N/A N/A N/A 3.19 3.01 2.55 3.14 4.09 3.79
Std. error N/A N/A N/A 0.21 0.31 0.18 0.34 0.18 0.14
Number 223 92 203 84 547 702
a Observed values Source: Berkel and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003)
b Observed values. Source: Own calculations / with grateful acknowledgement to Christina Benita Wilke for the data
provided.
c Estimated values
d Panel comparison: Only households / respondents interviewed in both waves
Notes: Weighted values in SAVE ; figures exclude freelance professionals and the self-employed.
The first SAVE survey was carried out before the introduction of the ‘Riester’ pension scheme.
Discussion of the pension system came to the attention of large sections of the population in 2003 in
the wake of the work of the ‘Ru¨rup’ Commission. The quintessence of the discussion is also reflected
in the data: the average age of retirement for men in 2004 is estimated to be 1.5 years later, while the
average expected pension replacement rate fell by 5 percentage points. Table 8.5 shows the expected
age of retirement and replacement rates according to age group. While the age of retirement differed
only insignificantly between the group of under 30-year-olds and the group of 50-59-year-olds in the
year 2001 among re-interviewed male respondents, the difference of 3.6 years in the year 2004 reached
the significant 5% mark. However, the anticipated pension replacement rate for this group, which also
increased, is unrealistic.
Table 8.21 shows the results of the multivariate regression analysis for the age of retirement and
relative pension levels. Education variables are positively significant, which could mean one of two
things. People with higher educational qualifications may really retire later, or they may simply be
more aware of the normal age of retirement of the future. The dummy variables for the Random
Route 2003 subsamples and TPI 2004 are also significant. On average, respondents for this subsample
anticipated retiring between 0.6 and 1.2 years later. Particularly for the TPI 2004 variable, this is
clearly a result specific to this particular year, during which pension reform was a focal point of public
discussion. The significant age effect163 is positive with a maximum of 71 years. This means that
younger households expect to receive relatively lower value pensions than older households - again
probably due to the current pension reform discussion.
163 Age and quadratic age are jointly significant.
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Table 8.6: Anticipated age of retirement and pension replacement age according to age
TPI 2001a TPI 2004a 2003 RR
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Age Ret. age Rateb Ret.a.t Rate Ret.a. Rate Ret.a. Rate Ret.a. Rate Ret.a. Rate
Under 30 63.8 58.2% 63.4 54.0% 66 65.0% 62 63.6 50.9% 63.7 48.0%
30-39 63.7 59.9% 61.2 58.7% 65.2 53.3% 63.2 53.1% 64 57.6% 62.8 52.2%
40-49 62.6 64.9% 61.4 62.3% 64 56.5% 62.8 43.9% 62.9 59.2% 62.8 59.5%
50-59 62.1 63.6% 60.9 57.1% 63.4 64.0% 62.3 53.9% 62.8 62.2% 62.8 61.2%
60 and older 63 67.0% 62.5 59.0% 64 52.6% 63.9 63.8 60.6% 63.2 60.7%
a Panel comparison: Only households / respondents interviewed in both waves
b Pension replacement rate in relation to last income received prior to retirement
Notes: Weighted according to age and income in SAVE ; figures exclude freelance professionals and the self-employed.
8.3 Household assets
This section describes the asset situation of households based on the data provided by both SAVE
subsamples TPI 2004 and Random Route 2003. We begin by presenting the current asset situation
and go on to describe how the asset situation can be calculated at the age of retirement.
8.3.1 Descriptives for SAVE IV and SAVE RR 2003
Table 8.7 shows the value of households’ financial, real estate (owner-occupied and other real estate)
and total assets. While the mean values are very close to each other, the underlying distribution of
assets differs in both subsamples. The median for total assets in TPI 2004, for example, is thirteen
times the value of RR 2003. This is partly to do with the fact that 15% of households in TPI 2004
and 32% of households in RR 2003 have 0 or negative assets. A median of 0, for example, for real
estate means that at least half of all households do not own any residential property at all.
Table 8.7: Financial, real estate, and total assets
Financial assets Real estate assets Total assets
TPI 2004 RR 2003 TPI 2004 RR 2003 TPI 2004 RR 2003
Mean value 23805.1 21062.73 151863.3 130270 166507.2 140014.5
Median 4000 2300 100000 0 119000 9000
Std. error 2791.49 2791.49 8955.31 5930.8 12768.12 14105.88
Number 306 1266 469 1901 234 1109
Note: Weighted values.
Tables 8.7 and Table 8.8 show which asset categories go to make up total assets and demonstrate
that owner-occupied property makes up by far the largest element of people’s assets. This is certainly
noteworthy in the light of people’s asset position upon entering retirement. Residential property is
seldom divisible. In other words, it is not possible to sell off a house or flat bit by bit.164 Nor is
post-retirement communal living or flat-sharing likely to be to everyone’s taste. It is of course possible
164 Excluding the renting out of accessory apartments, for example.
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to sell one’s property and to reshuffle one’s assets by converting real estate into financial wealth.
However, this also entails a substantial increase in the household’s consumption expenditure in the
form of rental payments for alternative rented property. Bearing in mind the value attached to home
ownership in Germany, this latter option obviously cannot be in the interests of owner-occupiers.
Table 8.8: Relative value of assets:a Financial, real estate, and total assets. SAVE TPI 2004
Owner-occupied Other real Business Financial Loans Other
property estate assets assets assets
Absolute values
Mean 60.4% 4.9% 0.2% 33.3% 40.7% 1.3%
Median 79.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Std. error 2.8% 1.0% 0.1% 2.8% 17.8% 17.8%
Number 211 211 211 211 211 211
Conditional values for possession of asset category
Mean 81.7% 35.0% 8.5% 39.1% 99.9% 10.9%
Median 93.5% 30.5% 4.6% 17.6% 20.0% 4.7%
Std. error 1.9% 3.6% 3.1% 3.0% 38.2% 3.8%
Number 150 39 6 187 109 32
a Value of specified assets divided by the value of gross total assets (total assets - loans).
Note: Weighted according to age and income in SAVE
Table 8.9: Relative value of assets:a Financial, real estate, and total assets. SAVE RR 2003
Owner-occupied Other real Business Financial Loans Other
property estate assets assets assets
Absolute values
Mean value 43.2% 3.6% 1.6% 50.1% 38.7% 1.5%
Median 28.6% 0.0% 0.0% 29.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Std. error 1.6% 0.5% 0.3% 1.6% 12.5% 0.3%
Number 787 787 787 787 787 787
Conditional values for possession of asset category
Mean value 83.7% 35.5% 32.4% 56.9% 165.7% 16.8%
Median 91.3% 30.0% 25.7% 77.1% 25.6% 7.5%
Std. error 1.0% 2.6% 4.6% 1.7% 51.4% 2.9%
Number 404 79 40 694 192 73
a Value of specified assets divided by the value of gross total assets (total assets - loans).
Note: Weighted according to age and income in SAVE
8.3.2 Assets on retirement
Assets on retirement will differ from current assets owing to the influence of two factors. On the one
hand, assets will bear interest at a nominal rate i. On the other, account must be taken of general
inflation. The purchasing power of 1 euro will not be the same in ten years’ time as it is today. In
this respect, the required rate of return r equals the difference between the nominal rate of interest i
and the rate of price increase p. We assume that all assets are subject to a constant effective interest
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rate and base our calculations on the required rate of return of 2.8% per annum used by the Ru¨rup
Commission.
The interest period is the difference between the expected age of retirement and the present age
of the head of household. We assume that no asset consumption takes place prior to retirement.
Compound interest effects therefore generate a substantial increase in assets during the period prior
to retirement. At an effective rate of interest of 2.8%, for example, the value of assets doubles over a
period of 25 years.
Current flows of savings in each period up to retirement are added to existing assets as described
in the following. SAVE surveys total household savings for the previous year. These annual savings
are then recalculated and spread evenly across the year as monthly savings figures. We also assume
that these monthly savings remain at a constant level right up to retirement and that they also yield
2.8% p.a. interest.
The entire asset position of the household on entering retirement is therefore determined by the
assets with accrued interest added plus the monthly savings and interest on such savings.
Appendix 8.C summarizes the relevant financial equations.
8.4 Claims on the public retirement insurance system
This section describes households’ claims on pension benefits from the public retirement insurance
system before and after the reform proposals of the Ru¨rup Commission adopted for 2005 and which
involve an incremental reduction, as a response to demographic trends, in relative pension levels.
8.4.1 Calculation method
We calculate claims on the public retirement insurance system on the basis of individual data relative
to the entitlement position of a benchmark pensioner (“Eckrentner”).165
Two values are needed in order to calculate individual entitlements from the public retirement
insurance system: the number of insurance years (calculated on the basis of the anticipated age of
retirement and estimated age at which people’s working lives begin166) and average earned income
over an entire working life.
165 A benchmark pensioner has worked and paid pension contributions for 45 years - precisely in accordance with the
average for all contributors - and has consequently had one earnings point per year credited to his or her pension
account. Average income in 2002 was 28,949, or net monthly average earnings of 1,531.92. 45 earnings points currently
entitle a benchmark pensioner to a gross monthly pension of 1,175.85 euros in the western Germany and 1033.65 in
the new eastern states or, after deducting health and long term care insurance contributions of 89.77, a net monthly
pension of 1,086.08. Refer to the publications of the German Federal Social Insurance Office for Salaried Employees
(BfA).
166 People are assumed to begin their working lives at the following ages: age 16 for those with a lower or intermediate
secondary school leaving certificate, aged 20 for those with the ‘Abitur’ upper secondary school leaving certificate,
and age 25 for those with university or polytechnic degrees. Actual average numbers cannot be easily received, but
looking at the values found, the current job entry age, or the school finishing age, are higher than the values assumed
here. But the German pension system guarantees additional ‘Entgeltpunkte’ for school/university attendance.
If the head of household has been unemployed for a period longer than one month, an additional year of work is
deducted.
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E[REAHH ] = anticipated age of retirement of the household HH
EEAHH = Age at which household begins its working life HH
ØEKHH,POP = Average earned income of household HH or of the population
RAER = Benchmark pensioner’s net pension entitlement (1,062.40 e in 2002)
AF = Adjustment factor used to calculate deductions or additional
credits in the case of earlier or later retirement
We draw on the standard age of retirement of 65, disregarding total and partial disability rules.
The earliest possible age of retirement is currently age 63 and will be reduced by the 1999 Pension
Reform Act in two-monthly steps to the age of 62167 by 2010 to 2011. Monthly deductions/credits
amount to 0.3/0.5% per month or 3.6/6% per year. While there is no statutorily defined upper age
limit for retirement, the actuarially unfair credits do not, however, offer any incentive for people to
postpone their retirement decisions.168
Equation 8.1 describes the deductions or credits received by a household compared with a bench-
mark pensioner depending on relative income, relative number of insurance years and anticipated age
of retirement.
We calculate the pension gap as follows.
Gross pension levels prior to the Riester reform and the introduction of the sustainability factor,
as well as the values after both reforms had taken full effect, were calculated using the MEA-PENSIM
model (for a description of the simulation model, refer to Wilke (2004)). Post-reform pension value
is estimated at 86.6% of the pre-reform gross pension value where the 2004 Pension Reform Act
provisions have taken full effect, which will be the case from the year 2030 onwards. Calculating net
pension levels is somewhat more complicated. The new pension taxation rules make it very difficult
to make any general assumptions in this respect. For the sake of simplicity we therefore assume that
the percentage decrease in gross pension levels is reflected analogously in net pension levels. Based on
these assumptions the reduction factor, RF , will therefore be specified in the following way:
RF = f(cohort, pension entry age, life expectancy) (8.2)
See Table 8.10 for clarifying examples of (8.2).
The gap in provision, DL, is thus calculated as follows:
PGHH = RAHH ·RF = RAHH · (1−RF ) (8.3)
167 Which implies a pension benefit deduction of 10.8%
168 Bo¨rsch-Supan et al . (2004c) calculated the incentive-neutral deductions and credits at around 7% p.a. Refer also to
Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004a) and Bo¨rsch-Supan (2004b) for a definition of incentive-neutral deductions.
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Table 8.10: Pension levels after the year 2003 relative to pension levels before the pension reforms 2001 and
2004
Age
Life expectancy 40 45 50 55 60
70 85.7% 87.7% 89.7% 91.6% 93.2%
75 85.0% 86.9% 88.7% 90.6% 92.4%
80 84.5% 86.3% 87.8% 89.7% 91.5%
85 84.3% 85.7% 87.1% 88.8% 90.6%
Note: Assumed retirement age of 65 years. Early retirement leads to slightly higher values since the relative pension
level declines with time, and with earlier retirement one would get the higher values. Ex.: At retirement with 61 years of
a today 40-year-old with life expectancy of 70 years, shown values would be higher by 0.5%, for a 60-year-old by about
1%. These values are only relative numbers and are contrasted by the pension reduction factor for early retirement.
Source: MEA-PENSIM.
where PGHH indicates the pension gap of household HH due to the pension reforms. (8.3) suggests
that the pension gap is equally great in percentage terms for all households, as was intended by
the Commission on the long-term financial viability of the German social security system (“Ru¨rup
Commission”).
8.4.2 Specification of individual variables
The anticipated age of retirement of a household HH, E[REAHH ], is derived from the SAVE data
record.169 In this context we draw on the earliest possible retirement age under future legislation -
age 62, with a pension deduction of 10.8%.170 As there is no statutorily stipulated upper age limit,
higher figures are not corrected. The deductions and credits referred to in Section 8.4.1 are taken into
account to determine the deduction factor AF .
The age at which people started their working life EEAHH is not surveyed in the SAVE study. We
therefore assume the following three labor market entry ages, in relation to educational attainment:
age 16 for those with a lower or intermediate secondary school leaving certificate, age 20 for those
with the ‘Abitur’ upper secondary school leaving certificate and 25 for those with a university or
polytechnic degree.
The length of a person’s working life, and thus the number of years during which contributions
are paid, the difference between E[REAHH ] and EEAHH , is reduced by one year if the employment
history of the head of household includes a period of unemployment of longer than six months.171
169 “What are your expectations? - At what age do you expect to retire or receive an old-age pension?”
170 In fact, observations for values under 62 are allowed, but the deduction rate remains constant at 10.8%. This allows
for early disability retirement.
171 This ultimately simplifies the actual statutory rules. In fact, unemployed people in receipt of benefits from the labor
office are also covered by the pension insurance scheme. Contributions to the scheme are paid by the labor office.
The relevant contributions for those in receipt of unemployment benefit are levied on the basis of 80% of their last
earned income. The contributions for unemployment assistance claimants are only levied on the basis of the assistance
amount. People drawing old-age pensions or receiving total disability benefits are no longer entitled to benefits from
the labor office, even if their entitlement period has not yet expired. The situation is quite different for those in
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The household’s average earned income, ØEKHH , is determined by estimating the age profile of the
income received according to the estimate of permanent household income. The household’s earned
income on retirement is thus determined and compared with the average value over the working life.
The estimates reveal that earned income is 5% higher than average income at the age of retirement
(cf. Figure 8.2).














Notes: Normalized values: Index is 1 at age 20. The average figure is 12.3% below that at age 65 (normal age of
retirement).
Source: All SAVE data without retired, self-employed freelancers.
The retirement ages elicited in the survey were in some cases considerably lower than the future
earliest state pension age of 62. Deductions are frozen at 10.8% for these cases. If no pension entry
age was given by respondents, an entry age of 61 was assumed.172 Households are typically subject to
larger uncertainties and exogenous fluctuations at the beginning of their working lives than they are
later on.173 All the results in Sections 8.4 and 8.5 therefore relate to households in the age 40 or older
age group and are not yet retired.
8.4.3 Results
The actual meaning of the figures and how they should be interpreted are now briefly discussed before
the results themselves are presented. Projected future pension benefits can basically be regarded as
nominal, real or economic status-preserving euro amounts. These three different presentation options
receipt of partial disability benefits. In this case the labor office continues to pay unemployment benefit in addition
to disability benefits, but only up to the additional earnings limit.
172 If the respondent is already older than 61 and not yet retired: pensions entry age ≡ age + 1
173 Bearing in mind factors such as choice of profession, choice of partner or the decision to start a family or not.
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Notes: Normalized values: Index is 1 at age 20. Wage projections except SAVE refer to results from Fitzenberger et al .
(2001).
differ by the way in which future inflation or, additionally, wage trends are accounted for.174 It is also
possible to present possible (future) pension benefits in relation to (future) income. While this enables
explicit adjustments for inflation to be avoided, the disadvantage is that it is necessary to know what
percentage rates mean, which is unfortunately not necessarily the case for many households.
The status-preserving variables for pension data are consequently values which specify how much
the household would receive if it were to enter retirement today, taking account of all other outstanding
future contributions. This does away with the need for any further mental acrobatics for general or
wage inflation adjustments and the variables can therefore be compared directly with today’s income.
8.5 Private pension provision: how the pension gap can be closed
This section compares the post-retirement income sourced from annuitized assets (cf. Section 8.3)
with claims on the public retirement insurance system, and considers in particular whether private
asset positions can compensate for the pension gap which arises as a consequence from the pension
reforms 2001 and 2004.
174 Cf. Bo¨rsch-Supan et al . (2004b), who discuss the presentation options in considerable detail and emphasize the
importance of how each of them are used. The way these are presented can have a huge influence on the way a
person’s individual pension future is perceived as is the case, for example, with pension notifications sent by the BfA.
The latter present a picture of future nominal pension entitlements and include a statement that no adjustments have
been made for inflation. The values as stated are therefore higher than many people expect, which can in turn result
in misguided economic behavior.
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Table 8.11: Pension levels prior to and after the impact of the 2004 pension reform
Values before Riester reform after Ru¨rup Pension gap
relative to relative to
pension level pred.last net inc. pension level pred.last net inc. in today’s Euros
Meant 1393.9 58.6% 1247.6 52.2% 156
Median 1352.8 57.7% 1211.5 51.1% 144.4
Std. Error 17.1 0.3% 15.2 0.3% 2.5
Obs. 897 897 875 875 875
Note: Weighted values.
Source: SAVE RR 2003 and TPI 2004. Self-employed and freelancers excluded.
Section 8.5.1 calculates a household’s hypothetical annuities175 based on assets saved prior to
entering retirement. The focus of the analysis lies in using financial wealth and savings, since housing
wealth, which typically represents the largest portfolio share, cannot be liquidated in a comparable
way to financial assets. Additionally, selling a house is associated with a status change from renter
to tenant which in turn would necessitate rent payments. Cf. Chapter 7.3.3 for a discussion, where
also an alternative procedure is mentioned: reverse annuity mortgages. These payments also depend
on the age of the household (minimum age: typically 62 years), the value of the home, and interest
rates. They become more and more popular in the U.S., even for richer households, but play a very
minor role in Germany.
Section 8.4.3 argues that status-preserving variables offer an appropriate means of presenting future
income and assets positions. Similarly we make adjustments to the development of assets in order to
ensure that personal assets are not overestimated in comparison with pension developments. Future
assets are therefore adjusted for wage growth g by dividing them by (1 + g)retirement ageHH or using
the approximative required rate of return cr = r − g.
Section 8.5.2 compares private savings accumulated by the age of retirement with the pension gap
and examines to what extent households are in a position to close this gap. The starting point in the
analysis is the subjective life expectancy. But since it can be presumed that households systematically
underestimate their life expectancy, results from alternative values are also shown, including the official
life tables.
After the sensitivity analysis for life expectancy values, Section 8.5.3 shows the results from Section
8.5.2 in dependence of the parameters r, the real interest rate, and g, the real wage growth rate.
Section 8.5.4 shows the ability to fill the pension gap in dependence of three household character-
istics: age, income, and schooling.
175 The term annuity as used here refers to individual life expectancy and is not based on the life expectancy calculated
by insurance companies using individualized mortality tables. In this respect the term differs from its usual actuarial
definition in that there is no longevity risk if the household reaches precisely its anticipated life expectancy
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8.5.1 Monthly life annuities from provisions for old age and personal assets
In addition to pension benefits provided by the public retirement insurance system, all house-holds
could hypothetically receive annuities from their saved personal assets. In this case we make the
following assumptions. The household does not include any inheritances in its financial planning;
these only arise if members of the household die earlier than expected and therefore do not consume
their entire savings. The relevant points in time for calculating annuities are the anticipated date of
retirement (in order to project savings and assets based on the effective rate of interest r = 2.8% p.a.)
and life expectancy (the point in time up until which annuity payments will be made). The payout
period is thus the difference between these two points in time.
In SAVE, Gross financial wealth176 is constructed by eight different wealth categories. For consis-
tency reasons, only full information observations are used. This means that for a household indicating
the ownership of a wealth category but refuses the answer for the corresponding wealth value for
any of these categories, financial cannot be constructed. This procedure entails a large data loss.
To mitigate this data loss, financial wealth is imputed in the following way. In a semi-logarithmic
specification, relative financial wealth (financial wealth / net income) was regressed on a polynomial
on net income and age; sociodemographics; and dummy variables indicating the ownership for any of
the six177 wealth categories. Solving the predicted values for financial wealth (exponent of ln(financial
wealth/ net income) times net income) raises the number of observations by 50%. The relevant sample
was the later used (age 40 to 65, no retired HH, no self-employed and freelancers). The regression
results are shown in Table 8.24. Imputed values are only used for households for which computing
wealth was not possible. Households indicating no possession for every financial wealth group have a
total financial wealth, accordingly.
Table 8.12: Monthly life annuities from predicted savings, future financial and housing wealth, based on
subjective life expectancy
Savings Financial wealtha Housing wealth Conditional housing wealth
Mean 348.0 e 299.6 e 1,548.7 e 2,960.4 e
Median 108.4 e 99.6 e 384.9 e 1,834.5 e
Std. error 26.7 e 39.8 e 176.6 e 316.0 e
Obs. 662 673 768 417
a Net financial wealth (total financial wealth reduced by consumption, family and other short-run credits)
Note: Weighted values.
Source: SAVE RR 2003 and TPI 2004. Only households with head being between 40-65. Self-employed and freelancers
excluded.
The means of monthly life annuities are relatively high. The future values of today’s financial net
wealth reaches a monthly life annuity of 300 e. Assuming that today’s savings will be continued in
the future and annuitized at the pension entry age, an additional second monthly life annuity of 348
176 financial wealth without credits
177 The three forms of private old-age provisions of any form were aggregated.
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e will be received. Finally, if it would be liquidated, housing wealth would provide a third annuity of
1548 e.
Means of wealth values are misleading, since the wealth distributions typically are skewed to the
right. This can be read by the median values which are significantly lower than the means; the median
values are about 1/3 for savings and financial wealth. Additionally, some households do not hold
financial assets or do not even save, which leads to an annuity of 0. E.g., the conditional178 annuity
for housing wealth provides an annuity of 2960 e which is about twice as high as the unconditional
value.
Additionally, the annuities presented in Table 8.12 are calculated using subjective life expectancies.
These are, as shown in Section 8.2, significantly lower projections from current life tables. Table 8.13
shows the same values as in Table 8.12, but assumes a more realistic life expectancy. Hence, monthly
private pensions from accrued savings, financial and housing wealth drop by about 20%.
Table 8.13: Monthly life annuities from predicted savings, future financial and housing wealth, based on
subjective life expectancy plus 3 years
Savings Financial wealtha Housing wealth Conditional housing wealth
Mean 311.0 e 248.8 e 1,222.6 e 2,324.2 e
Median 94.8 e 84.6 e 378.8 e 1,580.4 e
Std. error 31.3 e 33.6 e 85.4 e 139.1 e
Obs. 672 683 781 427
a Net financial wealth (total financial wealth reduced by consumption, family and other short-run credits)
Note: Weighted values.
Source: SAVE RR 2003 and TPI 2004. Only households with head being between 40-65. Self-employed and freelancers
excluded.
8.5.2 Values from monthly private pensions in relation to the pension gap
As the next step, it will be shown how the private pension wealth from Tables 8.12 and 8.13 compare
to the pension gap shown in Table 8.11.
Table 8.14 summarizes the results as percentaged filling of the pension gap. It also compares three
different measures of financial wealth plus savings.
The first one is net financial wealth (computed as the sum of eight different financial wealth cat-
egories minus short-run consumption, family and other credits) and net savings (computed as gross
savings179 plus credit repayments plus contributions to life insurances), ‘Riester’ plans and occupa-
tional pension plans, assuming that households do not think of these categories when trying to recall
total last year’s savings. Evidence for this hypothesis is provided in Chapter 7. The second one is
gross financial wealth (all financial wealth categories ignoring short-run credits) and net savings. The
third is net financial wealth and gross savings (without credit repayments and imputed contributions).
The numbers are quite similar and do not change the qualitative statements. This becomes clear when
178 Conditional on home ownership
179 as the values given to the one-shot savings question
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looking at the short-run credit volume which is rather low with a mean of 1850e and a median of 0
(weighted values). The difference between the gross and net medians of monthly savings measure is
about 15 e. In the following, the first set will be used for the rest of the analysis (net savings, net
financial wealth).
Numbers higher than 100% means that the private pensions which a household can retrieve from
private wealth, suffice to fill the pension gap, numbers below 100% indicate that the pension gap
cannot be covered. It shall be emphasized again at this point that the current savings behavior is
projected, and therefore it is not accounted for possible behavioral changes possibly induced by the
pension reforms 2001 and 2004. The research interest is: do household save enough today to fill the
future gap?
Table 8.14: Households’ ability to fill the pension gap in dependence of the life expectancy
own LE own LE + 3 own LE + 5 own LE + 10 LE from life tables
Net financial wealth including consumption credits and accrued savings, including
contributions to Riester plans, life insurances and credit repayments
Mean 362.3% 290.1% 262.0% 216.9% 305.0%
Median 198.8% 157.2% 141.6% 117.6% 161.0%
Std. error 25.6% 19.5% 17.4% 14.1% 19.1%
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599
Gap in provision 32.4% 35.8% 37.3% 43.7% 35.1%
Gross financial wealth without credits and accrued savings, including
contributions to Riester plans, life insurances and credit repayments
Mean 379.1% 303.4% 273.6% 226.1% 316.8%
Median 204.2% 168.9% 147.0% 121.0% 168.3%
Std. error 25.6% 19.5% 17.3% 14.0% 18.9%
Obs. 593 597 597 597 619
Gap in provision 30.5% 34.0% 35.9% 42.0% 33.4%
Net financial wealth including consumption credits and accrued gross savings
Mean 328.2% 262.0% 237.1% 196.7% 275.7%
Median 174.5% 146.4% 131.9% 107.5% 144.1%
Std. error 23.3% 17.8% 15.9% 12.9% 17.0%
Obs. 609 614 614 614 638
Gap in provision 35.5% 38.8% 40.6% 45.6% 37.8%
Note: Weighted values. Share of households with zero or negative savings and financial wealth: 16%.
The same arguments pointed out for Tables 8.12 and 8.13 also apply for Table 8.14: mean values
are quite high and definitely high enough to fill the gap. Median values, in contrast, come close to
one when assuming a 10 year longer life expectancy, and about one third of the households in the
sample will not be able to fill the gap. This percentage grows to 44% assuming a 10 year higher life
expectancy. The values’ dependence on life expectancy is has a simple reason. Individual longevity
risk is not covered by personal assets where this risk is not borne by other insured persons as is the
case, for example, in the public retirement insurance system. The last column of the table shows the
filling of the gap assuming values of current life tables; results compare about to underestimating the
subjective life expectancy by three years. But the current life tables ignore all medical progress in
196 8 Savings and the pension gap
the future and of the past180. The Ru¨rup- commission, for example, anticipates an increase in life
expectancy of 2.5 years over the next 30 years. This forecast is about 2/3 lower than the estimates
of Oeppen and Vaupel (2002). If the more optimistic of these scenarios - a long-term increase in life
expectancy of 0.25 years per year - proves to be correct, the public pension insurance system will be
confronted by further financing problems which will articulate themselves once again in the form of
rising contribution rates and lower pension benefits. The non-coverage of the gap thus affects about
36 to 40% of all households, while the median value is able to fill the gap by more than 100%.



























































































The skewness of the distribution of savings and wealth is thus also reflected in Figure 8.4 which
shows the distribution of the ratios of monthly life annuities to the pension gap. The distribution also
shows that obviously, there are two major groups of households: the ones not being able at all to fill
the gap at 0% and below, and the other ones who can easily absorb the financial task with 200-1000%
of the gap.
8.5.3 Robustness of the results
This section checks the effects of different interest and growth rate scenarios on the results found so
far. The shown numbers base on a scenario with real interest rate of 2.8% p.a., which corresponds to a
nominal interest rate of 4.3% p.a. assuming an inflation rate of 1.5% which is aspired by the European
Central Bank. The current interest rate is below the assumed real interest rate, but the average rate
since the 1970s is higher than this value. The same is true for the current growth rate; its average
value since the 1970s is also higher than the assumed wage growth rate of 1.5%. Current reforms
180 affecting the survivors of each cohort in the life tables
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aim to strengthen productivity and regain higher growth rates; on the other hand, the demographic
change might weaken economic growth and reduce the probability to reach a long-run growth rate of
1.5% or more.
The procedure here is thus as follows. First, the growth rate is assumed being constant, while the
interest rate will be varied (r = 2,0% / 2,8% / 3,5%, cf. Table 8.15), while in the second comparison,
interest rates will be held constant and growth rates are varied (g = 1,0% / 1,5% / 2,0%, cf. Table
8.16). In a third step, a pessimistic scenario is contrasted by an optimistic one (r=2,0% and g=1,0%
versus r=3,5% and g=2,0%, cf. Table 8.17).
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Table 8.15: Filling the pension gap in dependence of the capital market return
Low interest rate r = 2.0%
Net financial wealth and accrued savings
own LE own LE + 3 own LE + 5 own LE + 10 LE from life tables
Mean 323.6% 256.1% 229.7% 186.9% 270.0%
Median 174.1% 142.1% 126.5% 100.4% 139.2%
Std. error 23.4% 17.5% 15.4% 12.2% 16.8%
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599
Gap in provision 35.1% 38.7% 41.6% 47.5% 38.7%
Medium interest rate r = 2.8%
Net financial wealth and accrued savings
own LE own LE + 3 own LE + 5 own LE + 10 LE from life tables
Mean 362.3% 290.1% 262.0% 216.9% 305.0%
Median 198.8% 157.2% 141.6% 117.6% 161.0%
Std. error 25.6% 19.5% 17.4% 14.1% 19.1%
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599
Gap in provision 32.4% 35.8% 37.3% 43.7% 35.1%
High interest rate r = 3.5%
Net financial wealth and accrued savings
own LE own LE + 3 own LE + 5 own LE + 10 LE from life tables
Mean 400.2% 323.5% 294.0% 246.9% 339.4%
Median 216.8% 175.6% 158.1% 132.4% 179.4%
Std. error 28.0% 21.7% 19.4% 16.0% 21.4%
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599
Gap in provision 31.1% 32.8% 34.2% 39.2% 33.2%
Note: Weighted values. Wage growth rate g = 1.5%.
A higher interest rate clearly rises the level of coverage of the pension gap, while lower interest
rates makes this task more difficult. The effects are also not strong enough to change the number of
households not being able to fill the gap in a large scope; the ratio remains by about 1/3.
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Table 8.16: Filling the pension gap in dependence of the wage growth rate
Weak wage growth rate g = 1.0%
Net financial wealth and accrued savings
own LE own LE + 3 own LE + 5 own LE + 10 LE from life tables
Mean 379.8% 303.8% 274.4% 227.2% 319.9%
Median 207.0% 165.3% 147.9% 122.2% 169.0%
Std. error 26.8% 20.5% 18.2% 14.8% 20.2%
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599
Gap in provision 31.3% 34.0% 36.4% 42.1% 33.7%
Medium wage growth rate g = 1.5%
Net financial wealth and accrued savings
own LE own LE + 3 own LE + 5 own LE + 10 LE from life tables
Mean 362.3% 290.1% 262.0% 216.9% 305.0%
Median 198.8% 157.2% 141.6% 117.6% 161.0%
Std. error 25.6% 19.5% 17.4% 14.1% 19.1%
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599
Gap in provision 32.4% 35.8% 37.3% 43.7% 35.1%
Strong wage growth rate g = 2.0%
Net financial wealth and accrued savings
own LE own LE + 3 own LE + 5 own LE + 10 LE from life tables
Mean 345.8% 277.1% 250.4% 207.3% 291.0%
Median 186.2% 152.1% 137.8% 111.4% 150.1%
Std. error 24.6% 18.7% 16.6% 13.4% 18.1%
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599
Gap in provision 33.7% 36.8% 39.6% 45.1% 36.4%
Note: Weighted values. Interest rate r = 2.8%.
A stronger wage growth rate affects the relative position of retirees. Since economic status-
preserving values are compared here, the relative value of savings is negatively affected by a higher
wage growth rate. This is why a higher growth rate would lower the share of coverage of the pension
gap.
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Table 8.17: Filling the pension gap: two different scenarios
Optimistic scenario (g = 2.0%, r = 3.5%)
Net financial wealth and accrued savings
own LE own LE + 3 own LE + 5 own LE + 10 LE from life tables
Mean 381.6% 308.8% 280.7% 235.7% 323.4%
Median 210.7% 166.8% 151.4% 126.4% 169.5%
Std. error 26.7% 20.7% 18.5% 15.2% 20.3%
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599
Gap in provision 31.5% 33.7% 35.6% 41.6% 34.1%
Pessimistic scenario (g = 1.0%, r = 2.0%)
Net financial wealth and accrued savings
own LE own LE + 3 own LE + 5 own LE + 10 LE from life tables
Mean 338.8% 267.9% 240.2% 195.5% 282.9%
Median 184.7% 146.0% 130.4% 106.4% 148.0%
Std. error 24.3% 18.2% 16.1% 12.7% 17.7%
Obs. 575 579 579 579 599
Gap in provision 34.1% 37.8% 40.8% 45.9% 37.7%
Note: Weighted values.
The difference between the optimistic and the pessimistic scenario are, given the results from Tables
8.15 and 8.16, relatively small. Scenarios for interest and wage growth rate thus do not change the
results qualitatively.
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8.5.4 Household types and the ability to fill the pension gap
This part examines household types by three characteristics, schooling, age and income, and checks
whether differences in any of these three variables influences the household’s ability to fill the pension
gap. The procedure is to divide households for each of these three variables into three groups. For
age and income, terciles are built to uniformly distribute households.
Table 8.18: Filling the pension gap in dependence of age
Age
40 to 45 46 to 52 53 bis 65
Mean 349.65% 360.63% 375.25%
Median 197.86% 220.68% 181.54%
Std. error 37.83% 37.93% 54.58%
Obs. 192 192 191
Gap in provision 32.29% 31.77% 32.98%
Relation of monthly pensions 86.51% 89.12% 91.50%
Pension values before ‘Riester’ (Median) 1,480.47 e 1,342.89 e 1,191.72 e
Pension gap (Median) 196.19 e 145.91 e 102.32 e
Monthly life annuities (Median) 376.79 e 335.71 e 168.13 e
Note: Weighted values.
The share of households being able to fill the gap is rather constant over age classes. On a first
glance, this is surprising since older households are not as hard affected by the pension reform as
younger households (cf. Table 8.10). But younger households have a larger amount of financial wealth
which will accrue to the pension entry age from which they will receive higher monthly life annuities.
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Table 8.19: Filling the pension gap in dependence of income
Income
up to 1800e 1800 up to 2750 e more than 2750 e
Mean 193.08% 356.07% 621.43%
Median 71.65% 233.66% 395.34%
Std. error 22.92% 38.85% 64.51%
Obs. 217 163 194
Gap in provision 53.00% 28.83% 12.37%
Relation of monthly pensions 90.06% 88.53% 88.55%
Pension values before ‘Riester’ (Median) 977.56 e 1,479.84 e 1,859.53 e
Pension gap (Median) 94.32 e 169.36 e 201.65 e
Monthly life annuities (Median) 71.37 e 358.85 e 806.33 e
Note: Weighted values.
When looking at pension gaps and income classes, one can find that the calculated pension reduction
factors181 are distributed relatively evenly over income classes. This is due to the age distribution which
is relatively even between income classes. Differences arise concerning the ability to fill the pension
gap since households in the upper third of the income distribution are better prepared due to a larger
financial provision relative to their income. This is important to mention since, of course, the pension
gap of these households is also higher, according to their income and their pension entitlements.
181 which take account of the affect of the pension reforms
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Table 8.20: Filling the pension gap in dependence of schooling levels
Schooling
Hauptschule/ Abitur/Fach-. FH/Studium-
Mittlere Reife hochschulabschl. abschluss
Mean 297.84% 361.30% 624.98%
Median 151.87% 220.68% 375.91%
Std. error 22.87% 57.97% 97.20%
Obs. 413 50 112
Gap in provision 38.74% 30.00% 9.82%
Relation of monthly pensions 89.12% 87.72% 88.59%
Pension val. before ‘Riester’ (Median) 1,280.10 e 1,600.82 e 1,632.66 e
Pension gap (Median) 134.10 e 189.17 e 179.41 e
Monthly life annuities (Median) 187.13 e 411.19 e 630.78 e
Note: Weighted values.
Similar to income classes, the separation for schooling classes reveals an even distribution for the
pension reduction factor, as age is evenly distributed between the schooling classes. But concerning
the ability to fill the pension gap, Table 8.20 shows large differences. The share of households not
being able to fill the gap is much smaller for the group with a college degree. One might presume
that this is due to a higher associated income, but that is not the case as can be at the pension
entitlements. They are much the same for the second and the third group, but their financial wealth
and savings is not. The share of households with zero savings is much smaller in the group with the
highest schooling. This can have two explanations. The first one is that households with a college
degree are more disciplined and self-controlled concerning their financial planning and foresight. The
other one is that that their response behavior might differ from households with a lower schooling,
which might more likely to tend to escape the effort to answer to ‘annoying’ questions for savings and
wealth.
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8.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes how many households are already prepared to fill the upcoming pension gap,
assuming no changes of of financial behavior. Considering accrued182 financial wealth and monthly
savings as the basis for calculating monthly life annuities, it can be shown that about 1/3 of all
households in the sample will not be able to fill the pension gap they will have to face, even if they
use all their financial wealth and savings. Even the median household would nearly loose all degree
of freedoms for other financial allocation choices. If a household is forced to consume all the financial
wealth to reach to the pension level known today, it practically eliminates the possibilities reaching a
higher pension level which is closer to the income flows before retirement.
The values of subjective life expectancy, which is a crucial variable in this analysis, are shown to
be assumed independent of age which is counterfactual. Therefore, the subjective life expectancy is
compared to the influence of more realistic values. This affects additional 3 to 10% of the households
in the sample which, assuming the realistic values, will not be able to fill the pension gap.
The lessons to be learned are that the long-term savings rate will need to increase if we are to
master the challenges posed by the demographic trends which, in the final analysis, are the reason for
the introduction of the sustainability factor. Policymakers would be well advised to draw attention to
these developments.
Despite low uptake and acceptance, the introduction of the Riester pension has at the very least
increased peoples’ awareness of the problems the future holds. Households now reflect considerably
more on the provision they are making for their old age than was the case prior to the reform. The
task must be to reinforce this trend.
182 at the time of the households’ pension entry age
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8.A Design of the subjective life expectancy questions
Subjective life expectancy is asked in a three step question to keep the level of concern about this
subject as low as possible.
The wording of the questions was:
1. What do you belief: up to what age will men and women of your age live?
2. When thinking about your living and health situation. What do you belief: compared
to persons of your gender and age, will you live shorter, about as long, longer?
followed by the question for the number of how many years longer or shorter that
might be.
3. If answer to last question was ‘shorter’ or ‘longer’: Why do you belief to live shorter
/ longer than the average?
followed by a list with four possible reasons respondents might think of and one open
field.
The interview procedure was repeated in the same way with the respondent’s partner.
When calculating subjective life expectancies, one has to be aware of the gender of the person to
which the calculation applies (respondent/partner) since the first question asks not for the average of
persons of the same gender but for both, men and women.
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8.B Tables
Table 8.21: Regression results: Age of retirement and replacement rate
Age of retirement Replacement rate
Coeff. P > t Coeff. P > t
Permanent net income / 10,000 -3.09 0.352 0 0.121
(Perm. income/10,000) squared 2.87 0.508 -0.343 0.156
Age / 10 -0.638 0.218 0.056 0.047
(Age / 10) squared 0.051 0.383 -0.004 0.219
Intermediate secondary school leaving certificate (D) 0.646 0.003 -0.017 0.162
Upper secondary school leaving certificate (D) 0.538 0.057 -0.027 0.106
University/polytechnic degree (D) 1.261 0.000 -0.031 0.052
Children (D) 0.698 0.032 0.005 0.781
Children living in same household (D) -0.243 0.347 0.003 0.814
Job: Employee (D) -0.002 0.993 0.002 0.890
Job: Civil servant (D) -1.888 0.000 0.076 0.000
In part-time employment (D) 0.064 0.842 -0.025 0.175
In marginal part-time employment (D) 0.747 0.035 -0.066 0.003
Not gainfully employed (D) 0.244 0.422 -0.078 0.000
Unemployed (D) -0.31 0.378 0.041 0.065
Unemployed for more than one month -0.031 0.895 0.004 0.732
Unemployed for more than six months 0.02 0.943 -0.011 0.479
Partner (D) -0.2 0.556 -0.021 0.289
Separated or divorced (D) -0.106 0.767 -0.021 0.332
Widowed (D) 0.332 0.350 0.012 0.563
Gender: female (D) -0.972 0.000 0.002 0.881
Eastern Germany (D) 0.64 0.014 -0.027 0.054
Subsample: RR 2003 1.269 0.000 -0.051 0.002
Subsample: TPI 2004 -0.306 0.200 -0.011 0.415
Constant 64.582 0.000 0.429 0.000
Number of observations 1856 941
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661) 4.87 6.63
Prob > F 0 0
R sq. 0.06 0.148
Adj. R sq. 0.048 0.126
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Table 8.22: Regression results: Respondents’ life expectancy
Coeff. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 9.056 0.53
(Permanent income / 10,000) squared -5.14 0.813
Age / 10 -0.714 0.004
(Age / 10) squared 0.008 0.002
Intermediate secondary school leaving certificate (D) -0.426 0.555
Upper secondary school leaving certificate (D) 0.068 0.942
University/polytechnic degree (D) -1.092 0.259
Children (D) 0.572 0.603
Children living in same household (D) -1.873 0.015
Job: Employee (D) -0.576 0.542
Job: Civil servant (D) 1.537 0.238
Job: Freelancer (D) 3.368 0.240
Job: Self-employed (D) -0.667 0.589
Pensioner (D) -4.222 0.007
In part-time employment (D) -0.004 0.997
In marginal part-time employment (D) 4.488 0.001
Not gainfully employed (D) 2.511 0.067
Unemployed (D) -2.926 0.073
Unemployed for more than one month 1.14 0.126
Unemployed for more than six months -2.346 0.014
Partner (D) -2.157 0.128
Separated or divorced (D) -0.077 0.953
Widowed (D) 1.728 0.568
Gender: female (D) 3.399 0.000
Eastern Germany (D) -0.835 0.335
Smoker (D) -0.842 0.243
Former smoker (D) -1.212 0.075
Expectations regarding health status 0.229 0.121
Self appraisal: optimist 0.217 0.077
Live less long owing to: Illness (D) -5.088 0.000
Live less long owing to: Life circumstances (D) -1.133 0.426
Live less long owing to: Early death of family member (D) -5.811 0.001
Live less long owing to: Other reasons (D) -3.884 0.097
Live longer owing to: Health status (D) 3.583 0.010
Live longer owing to: Life circumstances (D) 3.842 0.001
Live longer owing to: Longevity of family members (D) 3.341 0.011
Live longer owing to: Other reasons (D) 4.884 0.009
Self assessment of risk: Health 0.002 0.982
Constant 89.902 0.000
Number of observations 430
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661) 10.6
Prob > F 0
R sq. 0.5074
Adj. R sq. 0.46
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Table 8.23: Regression results: Respondents’ life expectancy
Respondent Partner
Coeff. P > t Coeff. P > t
Permanent income / 10,000 -14.04 0.454
(Permanent income / 10,000) squared 25.554 0.344
Age / 10 -0.905 0.003
(Age / 10) squared 0.01 0.002
Age diff. to partner (AgeP −AgeBP ) 0.208 0.022
Secondary school (D) -0.104 0.902 -0.406 0.616
Graduation diploma (D) -0.106 0.926 -0.186 0.873
University degree (D) -1.455 0.216 3.315 0.004
Kids (D) -0.571 0.682
Kids living in same house (D) -1.081 0.265
Job: blue collar (D) -2.162 0.051 -0.859 0.563
Job: civil servant (D) -0.516 0.750 -1.549 0.366
Job: freelancer (D) 2.978 0.388 -3.426 0.286
Job: self-employed (D) -1.35 0.332 0.05 0.986
Retired(D) -2.721 0.120 -0.356 0.798
Work parttime (D) 1.565 0.292 1.06 0.341
Work little (D) 2.91 0.066 -1.614 0.209
Work not (D) -0.685 0.662 0.035 0.977
Unemployed (D) -2.9 0.124 -1.465 0.378
Work parttime (D) 0.744 0.388 0.4 0.645
Work little (D) -0.96 0.392 0.489 0.627
Work not (D) 2.285 0.234
Widowed (D) 2.121 0.722
Female (D) -4.887 0.000
Eastern Germany (D) 0.113 0.914
Expectations regarding health status -0.373 0.099 0.904 0.000
Self appraisal: optimist 0.473 0.001
Live shorter: Illness (D) -1.227 0.435
Live shorter: Life circumstances(D) 2.953 0.068
Live shorter: Early death of family members (D) -3.433 0.115
Live shorter: Other reasons (D) -3.416 0.227
Live longer: Health status (D) 2.196 0.152
Live longer: Life circumstances(D) 2.298 0.080
Live longer: Longevity of family members (D) -1.43 0.328
Live longer: Other reasons (D) 4.48 0.081
Constant 96.64 0
Number of observations 365
F(33, 1100) / F( 20, 661) 3.9
Prob >F 0
R sq. 0.3831
Adj. R sq. 0.2849
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Table 8.24: Regression results: logarithm of relative financial wealth
Coef. P>t
Net income / 10,000 -0.287 0.876
(Net income/10,000) squared 0.710 0.735
Age 0.059 0.002
Age squared 0.000 0.135
Household size -0.059 0.599
Children (D) -0.095 0.689
Children living in same household (D) -0.087 0.721
Eastern Germany (D) -0.489 0.009
Village (D) 0.159 0.622
Secondary school (D) 0.162 0.330
Graduation dipl. (D) -0.227 0.380
University (D) 0.328 0.118
Job: Employee (D) -0.062 0.711
Job: Civil servant (D) -0.203 0.331
Work parttime (D) 0.055 0.924
Work little (D) -0.955 0.122
Work not (D) -0.361 0.461
Unemployed (D) 0.273 0.581
Female (D) -0.210 0.112
Widowed (D) 0.240 0.596
Separated or divorced (D) -0.360 0.225
Partner (D) -0.454 0.138
FW: Saving accounts (D) 0.604 0.000
FW: Build. soc. contr. (D) 0.331 0.014
FW: Whole life ins. (D) 1.063 0.000
FW: Priv. old-age prov. (D) 0.274 0.073
FW: Bonds (D) 0.821 0.000
FW: Stocks (D) 0.679 0.000
Home owner (D) 0.240 0.103
Constant -1.137 0.131
Number of observations 354
Prob > F 0
F(33, 1100 / F( 20, 661) 7.92
R squared 0.4149
Adj. R squared 0.3625
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8.C Calculation formulas
A number of methods used in financial mathematics to present future value and annuities were applied
in Sections 8.3 and 8.4. The equations used to calculate individual values are presented in brief here.
The future value of a current asset is determined by
FV (Wretirement ageHH ) = (1 + gr)
retirement ageHH (8.4)
where
FV (Wretirement ageHH ) = the future value of an asset W at the
age of retirement of the household HH
gr = the effective growth rate ≈ r − g
We assume that savings remain constant at today’s levels every year until retirement. The future
value of savings at the age of retirement is therefore:
FV (Sretirement ageHH ) = S
t
HH ·




Sretirement ageHH , S
t
HH represents the household’s HH savings in year t or on retirement
The fraction in (8.5) forms the inverse of the annuity equation as, in this case, constant contributions
are invested over a specific period of time.
Assuming that contributions are not paid in annually but on a monthly basis, the following modi-
fication must be made to (8.5):








(1 + gr)(retirement ageHH−ageHH) − 1
gr
(8.6)
The annuity arising from all the savings accumulated up to the age of retirement, including the
accrued assets and accrued interest, is calculated as follows:
MLAmHH = FV TA ·
r








MLAmHH = the annuity of a household in month m following retirement
FV TA = the future value of the entire assets
retirement years = # of years during which person continues to live after retirement
= subjective life expectancy - pension entry age
r = the real interest rate
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